

DISSENT

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The Shame of U. S. Liberalism **IRVING HOWE**

Socialism vs. the Welfare State **G. D. H. COLE**

An Interview **IGNAZIO SILONE**

David Riesman's America **NORMAN MAILER**

Latin America: Tragedy & Prospect **VICTOR ALBA**

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Indo-China: End of an Epoch **JACK RADER**

The American Student: a Profile **GEORGE RAWICK**

AUTUMN 1954

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THE JOURNAL OF DISSENT

The purpose of this magazine is suggested by its name: to dissent from the bleak atmosphere of conformism that pervades the political and intellectual life of the United States; to dissent from the support of the "status quo," now so noticeable on the part of many former radicals and socialists; to dissent from the terrible assumption that a new war is necessary or inevitable.

The accent of DISSENT will be radical. Its tradition will be the tradition of democratic socialism. We shall try to reassert the libertarian values of the socialist ideal, and at the same time, to discuss freely and honestly what in the socialist tradition remains alive and what needs to be discarded or modified. We are, it goes without saying, unalterably opposed to all forms of totalitarianism, both of the Fascist and the Stalinist varieties.

DISSENT is not and does not propose to become a political party or group. On the contrary, its existence is based on an awareness that in America today there is no significant socialist movement and that, in all likelihood, no such movement will appear in the immediate future.

DISSENT will not have any editorial position or statements. Each writer will speak for himself. Our magazine will be open to a wide range of opinion, though naturally our editorial emphasis will be such as to favor those contributions which help reestablish socialist thought and values. At the same time we shall welcome any expression of competent thought or scholarly contributions touching upon our area of interest, even if these dissent from DISSENT.

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DISSENT

A QUARTERLY OF
SOCIALIST OPINION

VOLUME I
NUMBER 4

Autumn 1954

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AN INTERVIEW WITH IGNAZIO SILONE

Why do you write?

To communicate.

And when you write, are you consciously partial to certain classes of readers?

To the discontented ones, to men and women who are reflective.

What have your books to offer such people?

A bit of company.

And how about the mere casual readers?

A fly around the ears.

What is your opinion of critics?

The world has a place for everyone.

What influence has criticism had on the direction of your work?

None whatsoever.

Your favorite authors?

Cervantes, Tolstoy, and Verga.

And your favorite contemporary painter?

Rouault.

What would you consider the second best occupation?

A miller.

And the best?

To talk; to read.

Are you planning to return some day to active political life?

If all liberty was in danger.

What is Nature's greatest gift?

Good health.

Which relationships have been the most crucial in your life?

Those with persons of integrity; and among the well-known, Don Orione, Gramsci, Trotsky and Ragaz.

Who at the moment are the most stimulating figures for you in Italian history?

Joachim of Flora, Francis of Assisi, and Thomas Campanella.

And in our time?

Simone Weil.

continued on page 416

A Letter--To You

With this issue DISSENT closes its first year.

How well we have succeeded in fulfilling the aims announced in our first issue, is not for us to say. We do know that we have been tremendously encouraged by the many letters received from friends and readers. We have been gratified that our circulation, while still small, is twice as large as the goal we set ourselves a year ago. And we are pleased that new, skilled contributors are being attracted to the pages of the magazine.

This is not to say that we feel any sense of complacency. Those of us who have worked to put out DISSENT know its deficiencies only too well. We know that improvement is possible and necessary in many respects, from the contents to the proofreading, from the division of editorial labor to the finances. But we feel that, particularly at this time, the existence and modest flourishing of DISSENT is a triumph for the preservation of democratic socialist values in America.

We have survived by means of the most rigid economies. No contributors receive payment. None of the administrative work is paid for; the printer is.

The moment has now come when you, readers and friends of DISSENT, will decide its future. We are working very hard to continue beyond the first year. Yet in the nature of things a magazine like DISSENT cannot be self-supporting. We have therefore decided on several steps:

1) A small price rise. Beginning with this issue, individual copies will sell for 75 cents. Yearly subscription will cost \$2.50 (for students, \$2.00)—but those who subscribe or resubscribe by December 31, 1954 will be able to do so at the old rate of \$2.00 (for students, \$1.50). This small increase will help us somewhat, and will surely impose no strain on our readers; it is necessary, among other reasons, because we have printed far more pages than we planned when setting the original price.

2) A fund drive to insure publication for the next three years. We have begun by soliciting ourselves and our friends. Our situation, frankly, is this: We have received enough financial pledges so that—if we can raise an additional sum of between \$5,000 and \$6,000—the life of DISSENT will be assured.

We hope you will respond, immediately, generously. DISSENT was started with contributions from readers; it must be continued that way. Immediate cash payments are most welcome, but since we hope you will want to contribute, proportionately, more than a year ago, we will be glad to receive pledges for payments made through regular installments.

On the success of this appeal, depends the future of the magazine. Send check or money order to DISSENT, 509 5th Ave., New York 17, N. Y.

3) We are calling the Second Annual Conference of DISSENT supporters. It will be held at Adelphi Hall, 74 5th Avenue, near 13th Street, on Saturday, November 6, at noon sharp. All friends, readers, subscribers are invited. At this conference, the first year's work, future plans, editorial and technical problems will be discussed. Please come.

THE EDITORS.

THE SHAME OF U. S. LIBERALISM

. . . Never before had the fact of being an American brought one so close to humiliation. The sight of Washington in August was enough to make one cringe, so enormous was the upsurge of elemental stupidity and reasonless passion; the spectacle of Congress venting an impotent legislative fury upon the Enemy seemed a nightmare, an insanity of force. Never before had he felt that the remaining decencies and verities, which had trickled down from an almost legendary American past, seemed so perilously close to extinction.

He had seldom been an admirer of the American political species. He had seldom felt anything but a slight shudder, trained into invisibility, before the average Congressman—and, as he sometimes asked himself with a wry impatience, what other kind of Congressman was there? But the behavior of the Senate during those last lunatic weeks of August, when all petty factions melted into one insensate mass of fear and ignorance, struck him as beyond belief. Even he, who had resigned himself to being an observer, which meant a little to the stance of being a skeptic, found himself rubbing his eyes at this Congressional stampede to prove that each party was as ready as the other to trample the concept of liberty in the name of destroying its Enemy.

As he circled through the streets of Washington during the hot summer days, his mind haunted by voices—for him they were ancestral voices—that had once rung with the hope of a greater freedom and a finer polity, Adams sensed that at least he had lived long enough to witness the end of an epoch. He knew that to “outlaw” the American arm of the Enemy, in itself so withered and wretched, signified nothing but a hidden conviction among the men in power that the Enemy was beyond their reach and perhaps beyond anyone’s. Unable to mobilize itself against the true danger, which was abroad, the government in all its branches had turned with a reckless ferocity to the shadow of that danger, which was at home. And from long bitter experience Adams knew how pleased a Congressman felt at uniting his baser political passions with the certain prospect of self-advancement. None would have to fear that a vote which tore so deep a rift

into the fabric of traditional American liberties would bring him into disfavor at home.

To declare a political party "outlaw"—Adams, ransacking his small store of history, could recall no precedent in Congress—was clearly a danger. Yet American democracy might survive the blow. In one of those surges of unreasonable hope from which his training in stoicism had not quite freed him, Adams felt that, finally, it would survive. Liberalism, however, would not; at least not the liberalism of the moment. For while democracy had suffered a blow, liberalism had struck it. As the creed to which so many of his friends had turned in their gradual loss of belief, liberalism could at least claim negative virtues: there was so much it had not done. And in an age during which most of what had been done was unmitigated horror, this was no small claim. But now, in a political gesture so coarse and transparent that it could not even deceive the mass of electorate it was designed to deceive, liberalism had resigned its moral claim. It had committed moral suicide. Adams knew that this was a troubling age, when certainties were shed with an almost ritual eagerness, and he sympathized with the impulse if not with the manner; but of one thing he was now certain: that after August 1954 American liberalism could never again speak, except with the most vulgar of hypocrisies, in the name of either liberty or liberalism.

Adams felt no surprise when the herd of village lawyers and political mastodons voted for the proposal which the clever Senator Humphrey had sprung at the penultimate moment. He expected nothing else. Nor was he surprised when the ranting demagogue from the Middle West who had kept the country in a constant state of paralyzed hysteria voted for the proposal which the clever Senator Humphrey meant as the great stroke of strategy, if not vindication. He was not even surprised at Humphrey himself, who from the very beginning he had felt—it was a dubious consolation to remember—to be a demagogue too, though a demagogue who had strayed to the side of liberalism. But even Adams, inured as he was to the ways of the world and the ways of Congress, felt himself a little dismayed, a trifle shocked that not one of the liberals in the Senate—neither Douglas, who was reputed to be a scholar, nor Lehman, whom he had taken to be a man of integrity, nor Morse, who had preened himself on being a man of courage—dared, or desired, to mention the simple fact that the law their clever colleague had initiated was not merely absurd but monstrous. It seemed an appropriate, if sour, irony that only through the influence of the President, in whom the distrust of mind seemed almost genetic, was the work of the Senate liberals and intellectuals somewhat modified. And then when Adams read that the association of intellectual liberals declared through its spokesman, a distinguished professor of his-

tory at Harvard, that "it took no position" on the idea of "outlaw," he felt a sickening at heart. Of such stuff were American heroes made in the middle of the twentieth century!

In stray moments, when he suffered the delusion that what the Congress had done might be examined with the methods of reason, Adams tried to analyze the claims of those who defended the new law. It was a hopeless task. The term "conspiracy" had become the cant of the moment, a broad stifling canvas beneath which irrationality spread and repressive impulses flourished. That there was a danger from the Enemy, he was the first to acknowledge. That there was already sufficient, and more than sufficient, legislation with which to intercept or punish any *acts* of espionage or sabotage, no one troubled to deny. What purpose then could the new law have but to repress opinion, to hinder the free expression of views so detested that nothing could be a more decisive bar to their success than their free expression? And in this regard Adams had to admit a certain irritation at the arguments of those few who cautioned against the new law. From the greatest newspaper in the country to most of the voices of "independent opinion," the claim was that the law was inexpedient, that it hindered the all-absorbing struggle against the Enemy, that it duplicated already existing laws of repression. Hardly a voice said clearly and simply: it is a deprivation of liberty.

As he turned wearily to his apartment late in an airless night, when the noises of the city had fallen to a hush and the illusion of peace lay upon the comforting darkness, Adams felt a great wave of nausea suffuse his body. He fought to maintain his philosophical detachment, he told himself that at his age the measure of human folly and deceit need no longer be taken, he reflected upon the assuaging and amending potentialities of time; but to no avail. One word kept coursing through his mind and rubbing against his nerves, bringing fever to his very finger-tips. The word was, *shame!*

The above fragment was discovered in the course of other, quite unrelated research. It was written, apparently, shortly after the recent passage of the bill to "outlaw" the American Communist Party.

IRVING HOWE

Indo-China: End of an Epoch

The Geneva agreement which brought the fighting in Indo-China to an end wrote *finis* to the French Empire in Asia. France is the last of the European powers to have been driven out of Asia, and with its defeat a whole epoch of Asian history—the struggle for national independence—seems to be coming to an ambiguous close. The implications of this are enormous, but here it may be possible merely to sketch a few suggestive and rather speculative notes.

Except for Malaya, where nationalism is not yet a full-fledged political force, and a few minor enclaves which exist mainly as outposts for European flags but do not decisively influence Asiatic politics, the European powers are through. It is customary to wonder how this will affect the future of Asia, but it is at least as interesting to wonder how it will affect the future of Europe. What kind of economy can West Europe work out without the buttress of colonies? Can the economic well-being of England and France, which rested at least in part on their extensive imperial holdings, now be recaptured once they have been rendered poorer by Asia?

Conversely, what kind of society can the former colonies develop in a world that is increasingly lop-sided and uneven in its distribution of economic power and resources, that is riven by an irreconcilable conflict between two social systems, that cares least of all to help the nations of Asia industrialize, vitalize their agricultures and human resources and thereby step onto the modern stage as truly independent forces? By and large, the present economies of the Asian countries have been fashioned during the last three centuries to the needs of their European rulers; now that the Europeans have been driven out, or have beat a retreat, what can fill the socio-economic vacuum? Regardless of who takes over Indo-China—and at the moment the odds are it will be the Communists—this will be a key problem in attempting to reestablish any sort of political and economic order.

It also points to a special problem in the case of Indo-China, which did not exist in China. If the Communists capture all of Indo-China, would it not be to the interests of China to keep its southern neighbor in approximately the same kind of subordinate status—at least economically—in which France kept it, i.e., as a source for coal, tin and rice?

The people of Asia have paid a heavy price for freedom from foreign rule but they succeed to their own national states in a world in which sovereignty is devalued, nationhood brings few automatic advantages, and the

extent of control that new states are able to exercise even on development within their domestic domains depends on vast uncontrollable world forces. If these are some of the elements in the price that must be paid by India, Burma, etc., for emerging now as nations, how can we measure the cost in Indo-China where the commitments to the Communist power bloc are made in advance by Ho Chi Minh?

If the Geneva conference marked the end of 300 years of European expansionism into Asia, it also marked something far less desirable and indeed ominous—the first successful colonial war waged under the leadership of the Communists, the first time a war for the “national liberation” of a colony from its mother country has triumphed under the auspices of a Communist movement. All other nationalist movements in Asia during the 20th century have been under either bourgeois or intellectual leadership. We are now in a position to evaluate the results.

THE INDO-CHINESE COMMUNISTS WON THE WAR, but it is at least possible that they feel they were deprived of the full fruits of their victory. During the last two years, it is true, the Chinese and Russians helped with arms and diplomacy, but the fighting in Indo-China had been going on for some eight years during which Ho Chi Minh built up an independent power. The French could neither defeat nor restrain his armies. Now at the very moment before victory, the Russians and Chinese—Ho's Big Brothers—have stepped in to make a deal. A deal prompted largely by fear of U. S. intervention, it is true, but exactly what Ho and his supporters think of this, no one knows. There are some indications, particularly from the behavior of his emissaries at Geneva, that they are not wildly enthusiastic about the arrangement; that they feel sold out because power and territory which they thought they could take and hold were given away by their friends. There is good ground for believing that Ho felt capable of taking not only the Delta and Hanoi, but likewise the rest of Annam and Cochin-China to the south.

In every Asian Communist party there are presently two inclinations, if not two wings, with one looking toward Moscow for guidance and the other toward Peiping. Ho, an extremely astute political leader, is aware that in his organization too there are such divergent tendencies. Not tomorrow, or the next year, perhaps, but in time these divergent tendencies may come forth in Ho's party and with Ho's tacit approval. Aware that with his victory the Russians and Chinese now have something to fight over, he is certain to make the most of his bargaining possibilities.

Meanwhile, from a larger point of view, the settlement in Indo-China proves again how ambiguous and false are the claims of the Asian Communists to speak in the name of Asian national interests. For clearly

both Molotov and Chou En-Lai, whatever their differences, set the interests of the Communist world bloc far above the interests of the colonial people. They operated at Geneva, not like intermediaries or advisors, but like men with complete authority to barter; they acted as if they had the power to give away what they pleased in Indo-China.

France is finished in Indo-China, and the only possibility for a revival of Western power there is blunt intervention by the United States. With two years presumably ahead of them before the decisive election to settle the country's fate, certain elements around Bao Dai would still like to see a U. S. supersession of France, even if this required making the country a military base and transforming the struggle into an international one. Such a prospect is not immediate, but no one can say that it will not happen within the next two years, given the frustration of U. S. policy in that area. Such a military adventure would be a disaster for all parties with a real danger of ultimate catastrophe.

Is there any chance that Indo-China might yet save itself from Communism? To be honest, very little. Years of rapacity, exploitation and stupidity cannot be undone by some brilliant political stroke at the 12th hour. The Indo-Chinese, like the rest of mankind, are paying for the sins of capitalism, for the failure of socialism, for the whole social decay of the modern world which has made the rise of Communism possible. And they are paying for the incredibly blind and venal French policy during the past few years which did everything in its power to make certain that nationalist sentiments were channelled into the hands of the Communists and that no other nationalist movement be allowed to survive. Nor is this political hyperbole; it is literal fact.

Is there still a chance for salvaging the South of Indo-China? If the French pull out immediately and unconditionally and if they allow full political liberty and the beginnings of genuine political life to develop as they withdraw, then perhaps there might develop some sort of genuine nationalist or nationalist-liberal movement in the South which under the compulsions of crisis could find its own course. Could such a movement challenge Ho? At best, this would not be easy. He is immensely popular; his army has been tried and steeled in battle; his organization is compact. But one thing is sure: that if the French remain in their ineffectual way, if they hang on with Bao Dai or some equivalent, then there will not even be a political struggle worthy of the name. And the likelihood appears to be that France will not quickly or gracefully exit.

There is talk of U. S. economic aid to Southern Indo-China. Such a course, we are convinced, would in itself mean very little, other than providing immediate relief. It would not meet the issues at stake there in any way. The day when such palliatives had meaning has long since gone.

What of the possibility of a serious struggle by the genuine nationalists in consort, perhaps, with other Asian nationalists, liberals and socialists? So far as one can presently tell, the new Vietnamese Premier is a sincere and devoted nationalist and he has paid for his belief with years of exile. His handicaps are enormous. He is a Catholic in a Buddhist country. In the North the Catholics were strong, but this helps him very little in the South. He is new to the country, looked upon with suspicion by the old Viet Nam politicians. He inherits disaffection, disintegration, defeatism. In many parts of the South there is no effective government whatsoever since the French never permitted an Indo-Chinese government apparatus to develop. He holds office under the sign of Bao Dai and France, which renders him suspect before most of the people. He has no party or movement, nor is there such an embracing, coherent force in French-held areas. Whether he can create something overnight is extremely doubtful.

As for the non-Communist Asian powers, they are insecure, wary, frightened in foreign affairs. The socialist government of Burma is beset by hazards of its own; the Indian regime of Nehru can hardly be counted upon for any decisive action and none in Asia against the Stalinists; the Indonesian regime subsists on the verge of chaos. The socialists of Asia could serve, perhaps, as an auxiliary force in an all-Asian effort to win the political struggle within Indo-China during the next two years. But the Asian socialists, either weak or beleaguered at home or lacking a clear sense of the Communist danger, could not be expected to carry the brunt of any effort to defeat the Communists in Indo-China. That must come from within, where it does not exist.

The likelihood is therefore that the Communists, after their military victory, will gain a political victory if and when an election is held in Indo-China; certainly they would win overwhelmingly today, so far as one can determine. The catastrophe is complete with all the inevitability of high tragedy. An assessment of the forces at work on the scene leaves little doubt as to the outcome. There is always a chance—in this case a paper thin one. If it were to appear it would have to arise from subterranean sources of popular strength that are now for Ho; and therefore challenge him at the root of his power. No one has yet given the Indo-Chinese masses a good reason to do this. The real question, unfortunately, is not Indo-China any longer, but whether the Indo-Chinese tragedy is only the curtain raiser on an ominous age that is opening for all South Asia which would lock that area, so recently emancipated, in the vise of conflict between the two world powers.

JACK RADER

SOCIALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE

The following article is a condensed version of a pamphlet entitled *Is This Socialism?* recently published in England and written by G. D. H. Cole. Though clearly intended as part of the discussion preceding the Labor Party conference this fall, the pamphlet raises many questions of larger scope and interest, including a number that have been discussed in previous issues of DISSENT. Since Mr. Cole focuses exclusively on domestic policy, some sections of the pamphlet involve problems local to English politics; but most of those which are of general interest appear below. We are grateful to Mr. Cole and his publisher, *The New Statesman and Nation*, for permission to reprint.

G. D. H. Cole

A socialist, we used to be told, is "one who has yearnings for the equal division of unequal earnings." This description neatly slurred over the fact that the inequalities the socialists were most intent on getting rid of did not arise out of earnings at all, but out of the possession of claims to income based on ownership and, above all, on inherited wealth. Socialists saw the gross inequalities of income as proceeding much more from the "rights of property" than from differential rewards in return for unequal services. Most of them did, no doubt, hold that the large disparities of *earned* incomes were due to a considerable extent to the existence of large *unearned* incomes, and that, if the latter were eliminated, it would become much easier to narrow differences in earned incomes. They denied the contention of many orthodox economists that differences in earned incomes corresponded to real differences in the value of services rendered, and were dictated by inexorable economic laws. They held, as against this view, that the high salaries and fees paid to professional and managerial workers were in part a reflection of the social inequality inherent in a social system which accepted unearned incomes based on property as legitimate and as carrying high prestige, and were in part due to the near-monopoly of higher education by the children of the well-to-do. They wished to diminish the inequalities of earned as well as of unearned income; but their main attack was concentrated on the inequality due to ownership. On that ground, in

the main, they demanded the socialization of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the elimination of the toll levied by individuals on the social product on the score of ownership.

In practice, however, Socialists—as exemplified by the Labor Government of 1945—have attacked inequalities of *income* much more than inequalities of *property*, and earned incomes almost, though not quite, as much as unearned. True, they have nationalized a number of industries and services; but they have compensated the owners, if not with generosity, at any rate so as to leave them with their claims to income broadly intact. As against this, they have taken over a structure of taxes on incomes erected to meet the emergency of war and have used it to help finance an expansion of social services in time of peace with very little discrimination between incomes derived from property and incomes received as a return for personal services. Admittedly, it is often difficult, or even impossible, to draw a clear line between earned and unearned incomes where a person gives his services to a business in which his property, or some of it, is also invested; for such cases there is no valid way of deciding how much of his “profit” comes from his invested capital and how much from his work. But, in practice, lines are drawn, however arbitrarily, for tax purposes; and it would have been possible to discriminate further against unearned incomes if the Labor Government had really wished to do so. It did not, because it did not really want to: in the main, it concerned itself rather with finding the money to pay for the social services and for other public outgoings in the easiest way, rather than with attacking unearned incomes as such.

Why was this? And why was it that the Labor Government made no attempt, or almost none, to attack inequalities of ownership, and contented itself with lopping off by taxation a large fraction of the really big incomes, while leaving the property that gave rise to most of them practically intact? . . .

Is the answer that the Labor Government of 1945 had no mandate to introduce a socialist system, but only to carry through certain social reforms representing an advance towards the Welfare State, and to nationalize certain industries and services only on condition of *not* socializing the property rights of their previous owners? This is part of the answer; and it is reasonable to plead that the Labor Government could not have gone beyond what it did without seeking a fresh mandate. That, however, only involves re-casting the question. Why, we are impelled to ask, did the Labor Party, when it put forward a program for further advances, beyond what it had received a mandate to do in 1945, produce in succession three further programs in which there was still virtually no attempt to attack inequality at its roots or to advance beyond mere piecemeal nationaliza-

tions to the socialization without which it was clearly impossible to set about the establishment of a classless society?

It did not, because it did not want to—at any rate for the time being. Why then, did it not want to do what its professed socialist faith surely required of it? Largely, no doubt, because it did not believe that a majority of the electors would be prepared to give it a mandate to do anything of the kind. The electors who returned the Labor Government of 1945 voted, for the most part, not for socialism but for a change—and not too great a change. As far as they envisaged anything clearly, they thought of the change they wanted mainly in terms of better social services, including more equal educational opportunities, and of “full employment” as against a return to the depressed conditions of the 1930s. They did not for the most part think of it at all largely in terms of nationalization of industries—much less of socialization of property—though they were quite prepared to see some industries that had got into a mess taken into public ownership. . . .

Most people are neither socialists nor anti-socialists in the sense of having a thought-out view of the social and economic system they want. They have certain wants, for particular things, and certain broad preferences for one sort of society over another. But for most of them the particular wants are much more clearly present, and much more of a driving force, than the vaguer ideals they entertain; and, in a society such as ours, with its long traditions of gradual adaptation as against revolution, most voters vote on the assumption that the Government they vote for will do less than it says it intends to do, even if its declared intentions are not very extensive. Under conditions of universal suffrage, electorates do not vote for revolutions—unless the revolutions have already happened. If, in 1950 or in 1954, the Labor Party had put forward a really challenging election program, involving a large advance in the direction of socialism, one thing certain would have been, and would be, the loss of the ensuing General Election by the defection of the “marginal” voters.

In part, then, the absence of a more socialist program is to be attributed to the Labor Party’s wish to get back to power—or at least to office. This is a very natural desire, not only because politicians naturally prefer winning to losing, but also because they honestly believe that they have a better case than their opponents. This latter belief is shared by their active supporters, and makes them also eager to win. Accordingly, if a moderate program offers the best prospect of electoral victory, the odds are very heavily in favor of the party, as well as the politicians, preferring it to anything more drastic. . . .

BUT IS THIS THE WHOLE EXPLANATION? I feel sure that it is not. I feel sure that many politicians who are professed socialists, and not a few

of their active supporters, have lost the simple faith in socialism with which most of them began—and which, up to a point, they still hold to with part of their minds—and have come to entertain doubts whether the attempt to establish socialism does not involve too great risks for the game to be worth the candle. Quite serious and even cogent reasons can be advanced in support of this doubt. They are very often not openly admitted, but haunt the backs of people's minds and are half-repressed. Let us try to drag some of them into daylight.

First—to take one which lies quite near the surface—nationalization, in the form of public management of industries and services, does not look quite so enticing as it did now that we have had some of it and can see how it works out in our society as it is. It is not so easy as it was to contemplate with ecstasy, or even with equanimity, the prospect of all or most of the means of production, etc., being nationalized, if that is to mean their administration by a series of Public Boards on the model of the Coal Board, the Transport Commission, and the B.E.A. We may, or may not, approve of these bodies; whether or no, it is not very easy to look forward to their extension to cover most branches of production, nor is it easy to see what alternative socialists have to offer. So we fall to disputing about how much of industry we still need to nationalize after all, in order to infuse *enough* socialism—if it is socialism—into the economic system; and, in doing that, we soon find ourselves a long way off the old formula of socialization—or even nationalization—of “the means of production, distribution and exchange.”

Secondly—to go a good deal deeper—equality, or even near-equality, does not look quite so simply desirable an objective as it used to do. The Labor Government thought it saw good reasons for paying the administrators and managers it needed for the nationalized enterprises as good salaries as they would have got under private ownership, or as those holding analogous positions in capitalist industry were continuing to get. It also thought there were good reasons for not paying those of its own supporters whom it appointed to such positions less than it paid to persons taken over from capitalist industry. It therefore, on what appeared to be valid grounds, created a new labor aristocracy of officials in the public service, and in doing so had at any rate some influence in causing such bodies as trade unions to increase the salaries of officials who were *not* so transferred. In effect, it sanctioned degrees of inequality of earned incomes which would have horrified the socialist pioneers. It did this the more easily and with fewer doubts because there was proceeding at the same time so considerable an uplifting of standards at the bottom of the social scale and because so many workers in positions of superior vantage had actually become able to earn good middle-class incomes that it seemed natural for those who were

higher in the scale of incomes earned by honest work to move up too. So, no doubt, it was; but that cannot alter the fact that the consequence was to undermine the old belief in a much nearer approach to economic equality, and to make it very much more difficult to launch any attack on middle-class, or even upper middle-class, incomes in general.

Thirdly—and here we come nearest of all to the bone—the experience of one kind of totalitarian rule under Hitler and of another kind of totalitarianism under Stalin unavoidably put into the minds of reasonable persons a fear of placing too much power into the State's hands, even if the State professed to be socialist. The workings of universal suffrage under totalitarian conditions did not encourage the continuance of the faith that, where the "people" had the right to vote—all nominally on equal terms and with the secrecy of the ballot guaranteed—democratic government would necessarily follow as a result. Democracy came to be thought of less exclusively in terms of electoral rights and more in terms of personal freedom—of speech and writing and association—and with this went a greater preparedness to take account of the claims of minorities and of groups within the larger society. This reacted on, and interacted with, the new look of nationalized enterprise. It began to be seen that the government of an industry by a National Board could not be simply identified with its government by "the people," and that there was a real problem of finding out how to control the controllers.

In Great Britain, this fear of putting too much power into the State's hands has hardly come, as yet, to be more than an uneasiness. We are in no present danger of losing our rights of free speech or association, or of passing under the control of a "one-party" State machine. But we cannot quite avoid asking ourselves whether our present immunity in this respect may not have something to do with the fact that what we have been engaged in setting up has been, not socialism, but only a partial embodiment, within our limited opportunities, of the Welfare State.

Of course socialism involves the Welfare State: that is implied in the old slogan "From each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs." It has always been one of the essential socialist objectives to put an end to poverty and to ensure that in the distribution of incomes the children, the aged and the incapacitated are not pushed aside by the predatory or the strong. To the extent of our success in advancing towards this we have been doing what every socialist must wish to do. But the Welfare State is, all the same, not socialism: in the form in which we have been attempting to move towards it in recent years it is at most only socialistic—if even that. For what we have been doing is not to put people on an equal footing, but only to lessen the extremes of inequality by redistributing grossly unequal incomes through taxation; and even this redistribution has

quite largely taken the form of making the poor pay for one another's basic needs. . . .

THE GAINS ACHIEVED THROUGH FULL EMPLOYMENT and the Welfare State are beyond doubt considerable in terms of the reduction in the amount of sheer suffering and enfeeblement of human quality by privation. So far, they are a great good. They depend, however, at least as much on full employment as on the expansion of the social services, and are precarious to the extent to which there is a danger of severe unemployment coming back. Moreover, these gains have been secured at the expense of a narrowing of the differentials awarded for most, though not for all, kinds of superior manual skill, and *may* be reacting on the future supply of skilled workers by making it less worth while to learn a skilled trade. The supply of new recruits for the non-manual occupations which have declined in relative earning capacity is for the most part less likely to be affected because our educational system has a strong bias in favor of such occupations and because some of them are more attractive in themselves, and may still carry higher prestige than better-paid manual jobs.

What does all this indicate in respect of the class-structure of the society towards which we have been moving? Certainly not that we are advancing towards a "classless society." Except at the very bottom of the scale—the numbers in which have been reduced—there has been a diminution of economic and social inequality between skilled and less skilled manual workers, and between manual and white-collar workers. But there is also a tendency for a new grade, or even class, of highly paid super-skilled manual workers to develop and to increase its distance from the main body. These are not Stakhanovites; for many of them are time-workers or setters-up rather than operators of machines, and even where they are piece-workers their exploits are not announced in the newspapers or rewarded with public decorations. But they constitute a new and growing labor aristocracy, with "money to burn" because they are only now adjusting their living standards to their increased earnings. They are still, however, in this country only a small group, not at all comparable with the much bigger labor aristocracy that has grown up in the United States. Nor is there at present any sign of a wish on their part to dissociate themselves as a group from the groups lower down in the economic hierarchy.

More widespread for the present is the economic assimilation between the large body of fairly-skilled, but not super-skilled, manual workers and the main body of white-collar workers: so that these too are being merged economically and to a considerable extent socially as well into a single stratum. A step above them socially, and sometimes but not always economically, the lesser professional groups and the general run of technicians

constitute, together with the middling tradesmen, an intermediate stratum—a *petite bourgeoisie* which, far from dying out, is more than holding its own in relative numbers. With it go a large part of the farmers and many small employers, such as garage keepers, jobbing builders, radio dealers and electrical contractors: so that this stratum includes groups of widely divergent fortunes and interests. It is linked on the one hand to the major professions and on the other to the group of middling profit-makers and industrial executives. A part of it has been losing, and a part gaining ground: it has no common social outlook or political allegiance, though the greater proportion tends to be politically Conservative, with some tendency to swing over when things go badly wrong.

Above all these strata the rich remain. But they have considerably changed their composition. Riches and aristocracy still go together in the case of a limited group of old families which have large holdings of urban or industrial land or have used the accumulations of the past from land to become great investors in business. To these must be added the aristocracy of banking and commerce which has bought or married its way into the "upper classes" in the traditional sense of the term. But side by side with these, and as rich or richer, are those who have made great fortunes in business too recently to be counted among the "idle rich"; and this group of new wealth, including now many high-level business administrators who draw large salaries and have risen by personal exertion from the middle or lower grades, forms a larger proportion than ever before of those who can afford to live at a luxury level and to hobnob, without much feeling of inferiority, with their American opposite numbers.

Such a society as this is definitely not socialist; and I cannot feel that it is even on the way to becoming socialist. It is, of course, much less aristocratic than the society it is displacing: in terms of social origins the top classes of today are a very mixed lot. Oxford and Cambridge are no longer gentlemen's preserves to anything like the same extent as they used to be; a much lower proportion of top Civil Servants and of the successful members of the higher professions come from a small group of gentlemen's schools; and on the boards of directors of the great business concerns there are to be found a large number of "self-made" men who have risen, if not from the ranks, at all events from quite low beginnings. Our society has become a good deal more "open" than it used to be, in the sense that the old distinction between "gentlemen" and "not-gentlemen" has largely broken down. A "player" can not only captain England, or his country, at cricket: he can also captain the Nuffield Organization of Unilever—or, of course, the B.E.A. But on the whole the new recruits to both grammar schools and universities tend to come much more from the poorer section of the middle classes than from the families of manual workers—and to

come hardly at all from the less skilled sections of the manual working class. No doubt, some children of manual workers get their higher education rather through technical schools and colleges than through grammar schools and universities; and account has to be taken of this in estimating the effects of educational development on the class structure. But in this case too the children of the unskilled workers are largely left out.

What we are getting in practice appears to be a society in which the field of recruitment for the superior positions is being considerably widened, so as to give those who can get as far as the higher ranges of grammar or technical education an improved chance of rising further even if their parents cannot afford to help them. But at the same time we are putting an increasingly difficult barrier between those who do get so far and those who do not; and this is still in the main a class barrier, though it has been moved further down the social scale . . .

If this is a correct picture, the question that arises is whether a society of this sort is on the road to socialism. The question is whether it does not, as a hard matter of fact, offer the prospect of even greater resistance to socialism than the society it has displaced. In other words, is the Welfare State, in the form in which it has been developed so far, a step on the road to socialism, or a step in quite different direction—that is, a step, not towards a classless society, but rather towards a new stratification that is likely to persist and to become more marked?

The situation outlined in the preceding paragraph is of course only a new version of a very old dilemma. In France the peasants, when they had got the land and destroyed the old feudal privileges, turned promptly into a conservative class and became a bulwark against socialism. They might easily have done the same in Russia had not the Bolsheviks first stamped hard on the kulaks and then collectivized the villages. In our society, the opening of higher education to wider class groups (but by no means to all, regardless of class), combined with full employment and greater social security, may well be creating barriers in the way of socialism rather than helping its advance, especially if a child's whole chance of rising to the higher social and economic levels is to depend on the results of a single test, applied at an age when the nature of the home environment is bound to be of great influence in determining these results. This kind of test looks like leading to a new class structure which will on the one hand cut the working class in two—those with a chance of rising further and those without—and will on the other animate the upper of these two segments with a desire to protect itself against the lower, and also permeate it with a belief in the virtue of personal advancement and in the values of an acquisitive society. In short, is it towards socialism we are tending, or towards an Anglicized version of the American conception of democracy? Is our goal

the classless society, or only the so-called "open" society which is in fact still closed to a majority of the people? . . .

THE FIRST QUESTION THAT ARISES HERE is that of the extent to which Socialism is to be regarded as compatible with economic inequality in its various forms. I think it is clearly incompatible with any social system that allows great fortunes, or even moderate fortunes *that have been inherited once*, to be transmitted at death. I see no reason why it should be regarded as inadmissible for a person to pass on to his wife or children, or perhaps to other near relatives, moderate sums which he has accumulated by saving in his own lifetime, or of course to transmit in moderation personal possessions which are not of a capital kind; and I see every reason why it should remain possible for security of tenure, subject to good use and payment of rent, to be granted to the families of farmers or householders from one generation to the next. But beyond these reasonable limits I think socialists are bound to stand for doing away with inheritance, because *they cannot recognize any able-bodied person's right to live in idleness on the labor of others or to claim on account of inherited wealth a much bigger income than he can earn by his own exertions*. Accordingly I believe that not merely higher death duties but positive abolition of the right of inheritance beyond fairly modest limits should take a high place among Labor's next steps toward its declared socialist objective. The transition could, if it were thought fit, be eased by allowing limited additional annuities to be paid for a single further life; but beyond the permitted sums generally applicable, the capital should pass to the public, subject to such transitional charges as might be allowed. . . .

Such taxation of inheritance would, of course, mean that the State would have to be prepared to take over the actual property of those dying with considerable fortunes and not money payments supposed to represent their value. For it would create a situation in which there would be far too few buyers for the estates passing at death to be sold to new private owners. It would therefore mean that the Government would be continually acquiring ownership both of shares and bonds of all sorts and of other forms of property, such as houses, landed estates, and private businesses. Nationalization, or rather socialization, would thus advance by a new route, even if no further industries were taken over by the methods hitherto adopted. The State would become, to an ever-increasing extent, part proprietor of a host of productive businesses, and the holder of mortgage charges on many estates and non-company businesses remaining in private hands. It could use the powers it would thus acquire to appoint its own directors to joint stock enterprises and to foreclose on concerns which failed to meet their obligations. For a time, it would find itself the partner

of profit-making business men, and engaging in profit-making enterprises. But I can see no valid objection to this, if it is merely a stage in the process of acquiring total, or majority, ownership of the businesses in question; and I can see the positive advantage that it would not involve the creation of more top-heavy centralized administrations of the type of the Coal Board and the Transport Commission. Of course it would be necessary for the directors whom the Government would appoint to such businesses, not only to play an active part in their operation in the public interest, but also to work together, through some sort of collective body including all the state directors within an industry, and to follow a collective policy laid down by the Government's planning agencies. It would be necessary to train men specially for these tasks, in order to ensure well-informed intervention in the affairs of the businesses concerned; and *the long-run effect would be to establish socialized production over a wide field without setting up giant organizations in forms of enterprise better suited to relatively small-scale, and within limits competitive, operation.*

The restriction of inheritance would of itself do nothing to lessen inequalities of earned income, though it would do a good deal towards leveling those who receive large incomes partly from work as managers or members of the higher professions and partly from ownership of property. In the main, excessive disparities of earned incomes would have to be tackled by other methods. *As the Government now meets a large part of the cost of higher education and professional training, it is no longer reasonable for the incomes of those who have received this help to be calculated at rates meant to pay back the expenses of their professional preparation.* Nor should there be any need in business occupations to pay the very large salaries which are based largely on a comparison with what is received by capitalist employers in the form of profit. . . .

As for the middle incomes, no special action seems to be called for, except a steady policy of reducing trading margins so as to squeeze out the inefficient as fast as they can be replaced by more efficient producing or trading firms—which should become fully practicable if the level of new investment is made high enough to keep pace with technical progress . . .

Wage-incomes and the lower ranges of salary-incomes raise more complex problems. It is fully consistent with Socialist principles to allow whatever differentials turn out to be needed to procure adequate recruitment for the more skilled kinds of work, and also to offer whatever piecework or similar incentives turn out to be necessary in order to secure high output. Nobody, however, can believe that the existing wage-structure complies with these requirements, or is anything other than a confusion due partly to the varying fortunes of the tug-of-war between employers and trade unions and partly to sheer accident or tradition. In a socialist society, it

will clearly not be possible to continue to allow wage-rates to be settled by a large number of uncoordinated bargains, influenced largely by the degree of shelter or exposure of particular industries to outside competition, or to the expansion or contraction in the demand for their products. There will have to be both some general way of determining how large an aggregate of wage-payments the economy is able to afford, and, broadly, how what is deemed to be available shall be divided among the various claimants. It would be premature today, while non-wage incomes remain uncontrolled and while the greater part of industry is still under capitalist operation for profit, to introduce any "national wages policy" under which a body of highly placed officials would have the right to fix wages as they might think fit. But, as we advance further towards a socialist society, the planning of wages will become indispensable, if only because wages and prices are inevitably linked together and it will be as a rule a matter of choosing between higher wages and higher prices, with the balance of advantage shifting in favor of lower prices as the toll levied by unproductive consumers is reduced by the erosion of incomes derived from ownership.

Class-structure is a matter, not only of incomes, but also of culture and of social prestige. I regard it as a great calamity that Labor Governments have allowed themselves to fall into the evil habit of conferring titles both on persons who are barely distinguishable from those ennobled by their political opponents and—worse still—on persons who are supposed to share with them in the socialist faith. In the case of peerages, this practice is defended on the ground that, as long as the House of Lords exists as a legislative chamber, Labor has to be represented in it; but no such excuse can be put forward for the growing practice of authorizing trade union and cooperative leaders to stick "Sir" in front of their names. As for peerages, surely the correct course is to abolish the House of Lords at the earliest possible moment, and in the meantime to make do with those who have been ennobled already to assist in winding up its affairs. I cannot help saying that it fills me with sheer disgust to see Labor leaders accepting titles for no conceivable purpose except that of denying their alleged faith in social equality—I mean those who become "Sirs," or join the peerage without being specially needed to represent the Government in the Upper Chamber. *I cannot conceive how any socialist can defend this kind of social snobbery, which does immense harm to the socialist cause by compromising the Labor Party with the unclean thing and spreading cynicism about the sincerity and disinterestedness of those who lead it. . . .*

Some people say that a more equal society is impossible, or will lead to disaster, because there are too few able persons to run it. They argue, for example, that the increased numbers in higher education have already involved a fall in average quality. I believe this to be nonsense: I do not

profess to know whether the supply of real first-raters can be greatly increased by improving our educational system; but I feel no doubt that the supply of good second-raters can be, and that more good second-raters are what we chiefly need to do the jobs which the advance towards a fair deal for everybody will require us to fill. No doubt, it would be nice to double our supply of first-raters; but a limited number can go a long way if they have good seconds-in-command at call. . .

I COME NOW TO THE MAJOR PROBLEM of industrial democracy. Given full employment, trade unions are in a powerful bargaining position, because employers cannot afford to lose the services of even moderately efficient workers. *Full employment has been chiefly responsible for the great changes that have come about in factory relations and in industrial discipline as a whole.* The foreman can no longer play the tyrant as easily as he could in the past; and the higher management has to mind its P's and Q's when trade union susceptibilities are in question. In some industries, including those which have been nationalized, there have been considerable developments of joint consultation in the workplaces as well as at higher levels; and trade-union bargaining has spread to many trades in which it was previously almost nonexistent. So far, so good; but *neither trade union bargaining nor joint consultation makes the worker a responsible partner in industry*, or necessarily gives the individual a sense that it is up to him to render of his best and to think of himself as a member of a team cooperating in the performance of an essentially social task. He cannot, indeed, be expected to have this sense of responsibility where businesses are still being carried on for the profit of absentee shareholders, or where the management still behaves as a caste of superiors issuing orders to inferiors to whom it recognizes no democratic responsibility. Exceptionally, a few managers or employers do contrive, by virtue of sheer personality, to establish really friendly and cooperative relationships; but most managements are incapable of achieving this and will continue to be so as long as they represent a business structure in the control of which the workers have no share. This applies even to the nationalized industries, in which the controlling boards are far too remote from the actual workers to give them any sense of participation—and would remain so even if the trade unions were allowed to appoint members to sit on them in a formally representative capacity.

In the past, in a society explicitly based on inequality, it was for the workers to obey orders and for the representatives of their "masters" to give them. Obedience was enforced partly by custom, partly by inducements such as higher earnings for greater efforts, and partly—and to no small extent—by fear of the sack or of being "laid off" for offending the

authorities, or in extreme cases of being blacklisted as well as fired. Nowadays, these fears have become much less potent, though they still exist. Piecework incentives and other monetary inducements still retain their power, but have been to some extent weakened by the introduction of guaranteed minimum wages and by the diminished danger of getting fired for not producing enough. The greatest change of all, however, has been in the lessened prestige of those who give the orders and the sense of increased power to question them among those to whom they are given. The consequence is a relaxation of discipline which is bound, for the time being, to react adversely on output. This is partly to the good, where it prevents slave-driving or feverish self-driving under the influence of fear; but it is also to the bad, where it conduces to irresponsibility or to a refusal to cooperate in team work. I am not suggesting that, in most industries, average output has fallen; on the contrary, it has been going up despite a small reduction in average hours of work. But the increases have been due mainly, if not entirely, to greater mechanization and improved working arrangements rather than to higher effort or better cooperation.

If we mean to constitute a really democratic society, permeated by the spirit of social equality, we shall have to find ways of replacing the old incentives of fear and habit with new inducements more consistent with the recognition of equal human rights. In large enterprises I do not think this can be done as long as they continue to be conducted for private profit: in small ones it *sometimes* can, where the human relations are good. Social ownership will not of itself put matters right, as the experience both of the nationalized industries and of cooperative employment abundantly shows. *Social ownership is only half the battle: the other half is real participation by the workers in control—not only at the top, but at every level from the work-group upwards.* By participation I do not mean merely consultation: I mean *real control*. This is necessary, not only for the sake of its effects in making the workers more conscious of their responsibility for high productivity, on which the standard of living must depend, but also because it is impossible to have a really democratic society if most of the members have to spend most of their lives at work under essentially undemocratic conditions. What a man is at his work he will tend to be also in his pleasure and in his activities as a citizen. Industrial democracy is therefore an indispensable part of social democracy—that is, of socialism. . . .

This brings us back to the question how far it is psychologically possible or socially desirable for the workers and their organizations to accept any sort of responsibility for the efficiency of profit-making industry. Psychologically, any such notion encounters very strong resistance, both rational and irrational. "Why should I work harder, or produce more,"

says the socialist workman, "in order to swell my capitalist employers' profits?" That is the rational objection; and with it, over a much wider field, goes the non-rational resistance to a change of traditional attitudes which rest on the long experience of exploitation to which the workers as a class have been subjected. Socially, too, there are powerful arguments against collaboration, because it is liable not only to destroy the fighting spirit of the trade unions but also to break up class-solidarity and put in its place a loyalty to the particular firm which unscrupulous employers can use as a means of undermining trade-union influence.

These arguments are so strong as to be conclusive against collaboration, save under certain indispensable conditions. The workers as a class cannot properly be invited to collaborate on any terms which envisage an indefinite continuance of the toll levied on their labor by profit-making employers or shareholders, or the continued private appropriation of that part of their product which is needed to finance new investment. They need to be assured that the toll levied on labor by the claims of ownership will be brought to an end as speedily as possible and that immediately a beginning will be made with the transfer of profits needed for investment to public ownership.

We have seen already how, by means of the abolition of large inheritances, the ownership of existing capital assets could be transferred to the public by stages not too prolonged. Side by side with this gradual transfer, the State could begin at once to assume public ownership of that part of profits—or of a part of the part—that is needed for new investment. This could be done by (a) *statutory limitation of dividends*—that is, of the part of profits that can be paid out to shareholders as incomes; (b) *statutory allocation of a share in profits to a capital fund which would become at once public property* and, if invested in the business, would carry shareholding rights to be exercised by public nominees. The public would thus acquire holdings of capital in what are now private enterprises by a double process—through the lapsing of shares to it at the owners' deaths and through the new shares to be created out of profits placed in reserve. By rapid stages private ownership of joint stock enterprises would be extinguished: they would become public property, and the State would be free to make what arrangements it might think best for their future conduct. It could, for example, sell or lease some of them to the Consumers Cooperative Movement, convert others into Producers Cooperative societies, and arrange for others to continue as publicly owned joint-stock companies. It could amalgamate businesses into larger concerns where this seemed likely to increase efficiency; but it would be under no necessity to set up huge organizations except where the technical conditions required them. *The outcome would be a highly varied and flexible system of*

socialized ownership and control, which would not preclude leaving as many small enterprises as might be considered desirable to continue under private ownership and control, subject to due provisions to insure good working conditions and compliance with planning requirements.

Given a clearly defined socialist program of this sort, I do not see why the workers should not be prepared to collaborate with the dying capitalist under the control of a Socialist Government pledged to carry it through to the end. There remains, however, the obvious difficulty that under our political system no Government can be sure of remaining in office for more than five years, and that accordingly the carrying-out of the program might be broken off short by the return of the Conservatives to power after an election victory. To be sure, this difficulty applies to every attempt to advance towards socialism by non-revolutionary means: *it is part of the price we pay for preferring parliamentary government to dictatorship under a one-party system.* There is no doubt that most people in Great Britain do prefer parliamentary government, and the socialist who wishes to see his ideas carried out has to proceed on that assumption. This, I agree, makes it much more difficult than it would be if continued office could be assured to persuade the workers to modify their traditional attitudes: indeed, they cannot fairly be asked to modify them in any way that would reduce their ability to resume their fighting posture in face of any attempt by a Conservative Government to undo the achievements of its predecessor. This means that any collaboration that can be advocated under present conditions must be carefully safeguarded so as to preserve, and where possible to increase, trade union power.

This I believe to be entirely practicable, provided that the policy receives the full backing of a sympathetic Labor Government—but not otherwise. What it involves is, first, that the trade unions shall set out deliberately to *extend the area of collective bargaining* to include much that employers still regard as belonging to the sphere of “managerial functions” and therefore outside trade union competence, and secondly that they shall use this extension to *transfer to the workers, under trade union supervision, certain of the functions of workshop discipline and organization* that are at present in the hands of foremen and supervisors appointed by the employers to order the workers about. Under this second head I have in mind the replacement of foremen by elected supervisors chosen by the workers themselves from among properly qualified candidates and the substitution, in suitable cases, of collective contracts under which groups of workers will undertake to carry through a particular job, or series of jobs, at a collective price, making their own arrangements for the organization of the work and sharing the proceeds in accordance with rules drawn up by the trade unions to which they belong.

The effect of these changes would be to throw upon the workers responsibilities which they would exercise, not jointly with nominees of their employers, but by themselves, under arrangements negotiated by their trade unions with the employers and their associations. The transfer of functions to the workers, far from undermining their collective power, would add to it, and would provide the foundation for extending their authority into further fields. Such arrangements could, and should, operate both in nationalized industries and in those remaining in private ownership or in transition from private to public ownership. *They would constitute the reality of "workers' control" where the putting of a few trade union nominees on National Boards would give only the appearance of it.* Indeed, I feel sure that trade union representation on National Boards can be desirable only after a measure of real "workers' control" has been established in this more real form—if even then.

I have written this pamphlet in the belief that since 1950 Labor's official leadership has shown clear signs of not knowing how to make a further advance towards socialism and perhaps even of not much wanting to. Certainly some Labor Party leaders, notably Herbert Morrison, have made no bones about saying that what is needed now is a pause for consolidating what has been set on foot rather than a venture into new projects. I do not agree with this view, partly because I do not believe there is any satisfactory halting place between a mainly capitalist and a mainly socialist economy, but also because I am afraid that *the effect of what has been done, if we halt at the point we have reached, will be to establish a new class-system rather than to clear the road for a further advance towards a classless society.* We are in danger of coming to regard large salaries, titles for trade union and cooperative leaders, and the control of industry and the workers by highly paid administrators imposed from above, not as necessary evils of transition, but as right and proper elements in the new society we are attempting to create. We are in danger of accepting "reasonable" profits and the maintenance of capitalist operation as legitimate for the major part of industry, provided only that the Government holds certain very broad powers of planning and control—powers which, under such a system, it is very difficult to use effectively in any matter upon which the capitalists are not prepared to "play ball." We are in danger of failing to carry through the major reorganization and large investment program which many of our industries need because capitalist insistence on profit-taking, which provokes workers' insistence on higher wages, does not leave enough resources for capital development or make it possible to guide investment into the right channels. . . .

THERE WILL, I AM SURE, BE MANY OBJECTORS to the new pro-

gram outlined here. Some who regard themselves as socialists will object to it on the ground that it is bad electioneering. To them I answer that I do not care if it is—for the time being. I am a socialist and a believer that socialism means, above all else, a classless society. I am not in the least interested in helping the Labor Party to win a majority in Parliament unless it means to use its majority for advancing as fast as is practicable towards such a society. I do not expect a majority of the electorate to agree at present with what I have said, for the simple reason that it differs from what they have been used to hearing. For the same reason I do not expect a majority even of the active leaders of the Labor Party to agree; for it is not what they have become used to saying. For a long time now, many of them have given up talking socialism and have been talking instead about nationalization and the Welfare State. They have now, thanks to the enterprise of the Labor Government between 1945 and 1950, got nearly as far as they can go along these lines, until they set about doing two other things as well—smashing the class-system by a direct attack on property rights, and putting real responsibility into the hands of ordinary people.

It took a considerable time and a great deal of apparently fruitless effort to get the working-class movement solidly behind the program which the Labor Government carried through between 1945 and 1950. It will take a great deal of effort to get similar support for a new program that will carry us on towards socialism. Therefore, the sooner we begin on this essential task of education and propaganda, the less long shall we have to wait for its results.

The alternative is to rest content with what has been achieved, and to give up trying to establish a socialist society. That, I fear, is what many who continue to call themselves socialists are really minded to do, sheltering their apostasy behind the assertion that the majority of the electors would not be induced to vote for it. But what is the use of winning an election, except as a means to an end? To win an election without a policy is the surest way of losing the next, and of spreading dismay and disillusionment among one's supporters. If the end is no longer socialism, but something else—what else? If it is still socialism, let us tell the electors frankly how we propose to advance towards it.

GUATEMALA AND AMERICAN POLITICS

It is possible that by the time this issue of **DISSENT** appears, the problem of Guatemala will have been forgotten, pushed aside by some new catastrophe. But forgotten, we are convinced, only for the moment. What happened there is so critical and symptomatic that it will have to be returned to again and again.

In the two articles that follow, Victor Alba presents a brief report on the Castillo Armas "revolution" and a speculative discussion of the Latin American problem in general. He writes from the perspective of a socialist living in Latin America; here we need only add a few words from the perspective of a socialist in the United States. . . .

What was most astonishing was not so much the openness of U. S. intervention as the frank, cheerful desire of Washington that this openness be universally noted. Despairing, apparently, of diplomacy, politics and economic aid, the State Department now wished to *proclaim* its reliance on military force. John Peurifoy, the U. S. Ambassador to Guatemala, boasted that he had sponsored an armed revolt against a government which, it might be recalled, had been legally elected. In the *New York Times* for July 18, 1954, he was quoted as saying that "people are complaining that I was forty-five minutes off schedule" in overthrowing the Arbenz government—the sort of joke that would have delighted Teddy Roosevelt.

Equally astonishing is the fact that the State Department either has not cared or has not been able to prevent Castillo Armas from immediately fulfilling the worst expectations. That the new regime should be so *openly* reactionary—how can this be explained except as a sign of a wilful hardening of political intelligence among those who set U. S. foreign policy?

Directly upon taking power (taking it, that is, from Mr. Peurifoy), Castillo Armas disenfranchised 72 per cent of the population on the ground of illiteracy. American commentators have discussed this action in a way that can lead a sane man to insanity. Because of the peasant's illiteracy, we are told, they were particularly susceptible to the Stalinists.* Hence, to destroy this influence, the peasants had to be deprived of their vote—a

* A theory which should make the Parisian intellectuals entirely immune. . . .

clear way, no doubt, of persuading them that the Stalinists were wrong.

The new government has also "suspended temporarily" the agrarian reform law. Reports the *New York Times* of July 27, 1954:

Early last year, the Arbenz government expropriated more than 200,000 acres of the company's holdings. . . . The company refused to accept as compensation 600,000 quetzales in twenty-five-year agrarian bonds. Its \$15,000,000 claim is still pending. While the new law seems certain to create unrest among peasants possessing land under the old reform, observers are optimistic that there will be no violence. . . .

In Latin America—no violence!

A WORD NEEDS TO BE SAID about the response of the American liberals. Worst of all, predictably, was *The New Leader*. Writing in that journal Mr. Daniel James declared that "Castillo Armas and his army have fought the good fight—ours as well as theirs"—and we should not begrudge them our praise. Let us pass by the fact that Castillo Armas fought no fight whatever but was shoehorned into power by Peurifoy. We would be curious to know, however, whether "the good fight" includes, in Mr. James' estimate, Castillo Armas' political behavior after taking power. Or does that fall into the department of "regrettable excesses?"

Not all American liberals were as crude as *The New Leader*, a journal that has developed chauvinism into a fine art. Most of them, caught in a conflict between their moral impulses and their belated discovery of *realpolitik*, decided that the U. S. hadn't been sufficiently subtle but that the coup had, alas, been necessary. They then went on to urge the U. S. to extend economic aid to Guatemala, neglecting what should have been immediately obvious: that economic aid can count politically and socially, from any desirable point of view, only if extended to a government with some faint interest in using it in behalf of the population.

Only *The Reporter* troubled to note that the Guatemalan incident "presented the Soviet government with the best possible precedent for Communism to use in future aggressions. . . ." Very true; though still an objection on the tactical level only. Far more important is the complex of political and moral problems raised by the Guatemalan incident.

Life With the New Leader Dept.

" . . . a struggle for H-Bomb supremacy could have excellent results, since this weapon is exceedingly expensive and the U. S. can afford far more expenditure than the Soviet Union. Limitations of armaments need not always be a factor working for peace."

Salvador de Madariaga, *The New Leader*, August 9, 1954

For some years now writers like Sidney Hook have been saying that a fundamental ground for objection to Communists and fascists is that they do not stick by "the democratic ground rules," but believe in the use of armed coups by minorities. Let us accept this view as a working premise. If we do, it becomes extremely difficult to understand or justify the support, bemused or stricken, most American liberals gave to U. S. foreign policy *vis-a-vis* Castillo Armas. Here was a revolt, clearly without popular backing, led by an army colonel of something less than spectacular liberalism; a revolt which overthrew a legally elected government. If the use of arms by a minority against a legally elected government constitutes a violation of "the democratic ground rules," what possible alternative is there to condemning both the Castillo Armas rebellion and those who sponsored it?

Two possible objections may be anticipated. First, that in this case the Arbenz government, as it placed increasing restrictions on civil liberties, was verging on terror, and hence it became justified and necessary to support an armed coup. Very well; but in that case is it not curious that the United States shows no alarm whatever over the regimes in numerous Latin American countries which are already absolute dictatorships. (Nicaragua, Paraguay, etc.) and not merely on the verge of becoming such. For it should be remembered that while the Arbenz regime was, apparently, beginning to practise terror, it had not yet hardened into a dictatorship; the majority of the Guatemalan newspapers still printed anti-Arbenz material.

The second possible objection comes closer to the realities. The Arbenz government, we are told, was receptive to Communist infiltration, hence it had to be removed. Very well; but in that case the ground of argument shifts very sharply from political morality to the most crass expedience. The "democratic ground rules" are put aside—as they so often are in times of stress—and the liberals who resort to the argument of "Communist infiltration" have no credible way of distinguishing themselves from, say, a Pentagon general. As to the *value* of this argument (for arguments presented in the name of expediency do not always prove expedient), we refer the reader to the opening sentence of Mr. Alba's first article.

That the Communist Party of Guatemala was growing alarmingly, that it was seeping into governmental and institutional life, seems certain. That this, consequently, was a danger to the people of that country, and of other Latin American countries, clearly follows. But that the course taken by the State Department was a classical example of how *not* to fight Stalinism—indeed, an example of how to insure the ultimate victory of Stalinism while corrupting whatever remains in this world of democratic principles—is proven by everything that has happened since the Castillo Armas coup, and not least of all by the outraged reactions in every free Latin American country.

Said Molotov to Malenkov: "You know, we don't really have to *do* anything, we only have to wait." Nor do I claim that one can imagine Molotov saying this. I claim that this is what he said.

I. H.

LOST ILLUSIONS IN GUATEMALA

Victor Alba

MEXICO CITY

Since the end of the second World War Communism has achieved no victory in Latin America as effective as its defeat in Guatemala.

The optimistic declarations of diplomats could not help. Nor did legal action undertaken by the Attorney General of the United States against the United Fruit Company as a monopolistic enterprise succeed in diminishing the importance of the Communist success.

United Fruit, the most reactionary element in Guatemala, and, perhaps, the politics of the State Department, have triumphed, for the moment. It is a pyrrhic victory. For what is defeated is not Communism, but the people of Guatemala and left, non-Communist opinion in Latin America.

We are all familiar with the events: in May, the State Department announces that arms from behind the iron curtain have arrived in Guatemala, where the Communists have infiltrated the administration, the unions and even the parties of the left. United Fruit maintains tenacious resistance against the strikers and continues to oppose the expropriation of a section of its fallow land. In June, an "army of liberation" (some 300 men, 5 planes, and an efficient propaganda apparatus) is formed in Honduras. A group of the Guatemalan military—young, formed by the revolution of 1944, that is, by the left—demands that President Jacobo Arbenz remove the Communists from the positions they hold. Arbenz must give his reply 72 hours later. A man of feeble but obstinate character, who passes through successive periods of euphoria and depression, Arbenz is on the verge of acceding to the demands of the military. The first consequence, therefore, of the alliance of leftist parties with the Communists is, in the world conjuncture, to give the military a political role contrary to the very principles of the revolution which, in 1944, had put an end to the armed dictatorship of Ubico.

It seems logical to suppose that an intelligent policy would be to let events ripen and permit the military and possibly the leftist parties of Guatemala to free themselves from Communist confines. Thus the Communist danger (not imminent, but purely political and non-military) would

disappear without risk to social legislation, agrarian reform and the essentials of the democratic regime which has been in existence barely ten years.

But this suits neither the army of "liberation" nor those who finance it. On the eve of the day fixed for Arbenz's reply, the invasion of Guatemala begins. For twelve days, it continues without struggle, without victims but not without terror on both sides. All the parties of Guatemala—made up of youngsters, raised under the dictatorship of Ubico, who had come into political life in the era of the alliance between Moscow and Washington—are thus put into the same bag as the Communist Party. Colonel Castillo Armas and his ministers (all known reactionaries, some of them, at one time, great landowners and collaborators of dictator Ubico) do not announce that they will respect the social legislation and agrarian reforms. Hence they do not find awaiting them the popular revolts against Arbenz that they had anticipated.

Arbenz, on his side, finds no sincere popular support. Distrusting the army, allying himself more directly with the Communists, he begins to organize workers' brigades. But the army—this is Latin America, whose long military tradition must not be overlooked—sees in Arbenz's dilemma an opportunity for avenging ancient feuds. In 1948 the most popular revolutionary military leader, Colonel Arana, was assassinated. A conviction exists that Arbenz was one of the instigators of this crime and the one who profited directly from it. In Latin America such questions often take the upper hand over politics and ideologies. Diaz, a prominent Major, gives Arbenz an ultimatum: resign, or see the army unite with the rebels. In one of his periods of depression, Arbenz resigns. Diaz wants to arrive at an agreement with Castillo, in order to save the essentials of the revolution. Castillo refuses. Diaz then passes the power to Monzon, a colonel, once minister of Arevalo, well-known anti-Communist, although left of center. Monzon and Castillo negotiate at San Salvador, under the aegis of Colonel Oscar Osorio, President of San Salvador. A "Junta" is formed, presided over by Monzon. But at the end of one week, a coup d'état by Castillo gives him the presidency and eliminates from the "Junta" the military revolutionaries.

Thus Guatemala has, in two months, passed from a regime of social reform, strongly infiltrated by the Communists, to a regime of reaction, which suspends the agrarian reforms and has for its "slogan" the phrase "God, Country, Liberty." Two thousand persons are in prison—there were not that many militant Communists in the country—hundreds have found refuge in the embassies, which they cannot leave, because Castillo refuses them safe-conduct. An era of vengeance, counter-reform and overweening power for the "liberating" army begins in Guatemala, this country which hardly ten years ago began its apprenticeship of democracy and

which had let itself (or rather, its leaders) be dazzled by the opportunist intransigence of the Communists.

How could the Communists exert such an important influence in Guatemala? For this influence is undeniable, and, of late, it takes on the already classic character of police terror. To speak here of secret agents or the danger to the Panama Canal would be grotesque; in case of war Communist influence in Guatemala could be liquidated even more rapidly than it was by Castillo Armas. The danger was essentially political. In 1944 there were no Communists in Guatemala. The young officers and students who made the revolution were vaguely socialistic, frankly democratic and liberal. The regime of President Arevalo, a pedagogue, was not Communist. But under Arbenz, the Communists expanded rapidly; they established their party, under the name of the Party of Work-dominated the labor unions, the peasant unions (though to a lesser extent) and even the police. How was this possible?

Imagine a regime of youngsters (the average age of deputies was 35), without ideological cohesion, without political experience, imbued with strong feelings and the consciousness that they were in the process of making history. Imagine that each time these young politicians took a step—social legislation, for example—they encountered the opposition of the United Fruit Company. (U. S. Ambassador Patterson said to Arevalo: "I will do my utmost to see that you do not get a single pair of boots, a single cent from my government, unless you stop persecuting American companies." *The New York Times*, June 30, 1950). Nationalist sentiment becomes more violent. Arevalo tries to divert it by renewing the traditional demands of Guatemala upon British Honduras. But Arbenz is carried away by the current. The Communists, following the tactic of Mao, put aside all social programs and lead a fierce nationalistic campaign.

At the same time, Nicaragua—where the dictator Samoza holds sway—throws accusations of Communism against Costa Rica, whose president, Jose Figueres, is a Christian Democrat and anti-Communist. Once again, the strikers against United Fruit in Honduras are accused of Communism, although in July they agreed to negotiate under the mediation of ORIT (the regular trade union). Under these conditions who, in Latin America, without objective information, but with the memory, for example, of accusations of Communism against Calles, Sandino, Cardenas (at the time of the oil expropriation in Mexico), who could believe accusations of Communism directed at Guatemala—even if this time they had some foundation? United Fruit had cried wolf too often and when the State Department really saw the wolf, no one listened to its cries.

The Communists had set a snare for the State Department, and for

Guatemala. It mattered little to them that agrarian reform and social legislation would be sacrificed, or that their militants would be persecuted.

Whatever it might be the upshot of the situation would serve Moscow: if Arbenz triumphed, Communism showed itself to the masses of Latin America as the strongest supporter of social reforms, democracy and the struggle against imperialism. Arbenz defeated, the Communists had no difficulty in representing Castillo Armas as an imperialist agent.

For an American it is difficult to understand that a citizen of Guatemala or Costa Rica would be revolted by the fact that while paying the highest salaries in the country, United Fruit owns the railways, dominates the fruit market, intervenes in the export of coffee, controls maritime transport and meddles in the politics of the country, at the same time refusing to obey the regularly promulgated social laws. But it would not be impossible to understand that, even with "high" salaries, all this makes for an atmosphere ripe for nationalist and patriotic propaganda which has been—and is—utilized by the Communists.

It will take years to erase the effect of events in Guatemala. A complete change of Latin American politics on the part of the State Department would be necessary: aid to democratic governments, support for social and agrarian reforms, no arms for dictators, and above all (since it is a fact that Washington is a determining factor), preventing reaction from becoming the mistress of Guatemala. Then Latin Americans might not have the impression—today general—that anti-Communism is the mask used by the reactionary elements of each country and by the imperialist enterprises for returning to a state of things which the Latin American believed dead since Roosevelt.

The problem is not whether Washington could achieve such a policy, but whether Washington would be capable of understanding that it is the only policy possible. Otherwise, there is only the prospect of an interminable succession of Castillo Armas. . . .

Translated by RIMA DRELL

LATIN AMERICA: TRAGEDY AND PROSPECT

Victor Alba

Before 1930 a passable history of Latin America might have been written without any reference to its labor movement. Today this would be impossible. Peronist demagogic and its equivalents throughout the continent have inadvertently succeeded in drawing the working

class into political life, where it now begins to constitute an influential, if not determining, force. Having acquired a taste under the Peronist demagogues for being taken into some account, the workers would resist the relinquishment of what only yesterday had seemed a rare and barely attainable privilege.

For this very reason, by virtue of the curiously mixed development of Latin America, the labor movement now faces new possibilities and responsibilities. Foremost of all, it must determine whether its mission in society is inclusive or fractional, the lifting of Latin America out of its primitive poverty or the protection and aggrandizement of a small "aristocracy" of labor. Until very recently the Latin American labor movement had been chained by the prevalence of misery to the immediate task and the immediate moment; in matters of broader scope, in defense of interests only indirectly related to the pressure of daily needs, it had seldom been more than an echo of the middle class.

But the future will require a choice: either a continuation of the present role, nestling uneasily behind the swords of the dictators, or an effort to become a decisive factor in the evolution of Latin America. And if it chooses the latter, the Latin American labor movement must confront those essential problems which the middle class has not been able to solve, the *caudillos* have not known how to solve, and neither the old landed oligarchy nor the new industrial powers even acknowledge to be problems.

Until recently Latin America has consisted of states; only during the last few years have nations come into existence. The democratic regimes, where they exist, have managed during the past decade to give their peoples some sense of nationality. Independence, aborted in its economic phase by imperialism, is slowly becoming a political reality. What anti-imperialism could not achieve, revolutionary nationalism has.

But nationalism has great dangers. Like Peronism, a caricature of revolutionary nationalism, it may place a false emphasis on the noun and obliterate the adjective. Demagogery renders nationalism sterile, preventing the solution of such basic problems as absentee landlordism and the ownership of national resources. In Argentina the workers have fallen into this trap. But in other countries the demagogues have either been less skillful or less daring, and for the time being the workers have been saved from purely nationalist contagion.

In the notes that follow I want to outline the trying problems that face the Latin America labor movement, and to suggest—particularly through emphasis on its relation to the middle class and to revolutionary nationalism—a possible course for it. This course, which would involve an effort to build up a socially "controlled capitalism," is by no means without dangers; but I think it is, at present, the most significant possibility.

Industrialization and the Working Class

In Latin America there are only the land and the mines to nationalize. The first demands basic agrarian reform, the second a mature labor movement capable of directing the mining industry. But the realization of these aims, involving as it must the creation of both a sense of community and a group of independent technicians to staff the nationalized mines, necessitates the prior existence of a powerful bourgeoisie. One need not speak of the impossible here, a "good" bourgeoisie; it would be enough to have a class that lacked some of the traditional vices of Western capitalism. In Latin America today a situation exists where, depending on the capacities of the labor movement, the character of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie can to some extent be controlled. It can be influenced or pressured to accept working class leadership in industrial life. The trade union struggle can be made to base itself on the principle that the land must be divided among those who work it and that subsoil rights must become national property. Not being tied to the feudal oligarchy, this bourgeoisie can "determine itself," by means of appropriate legislation, adequate education and a program of industrialization.

Large-scale industrialization, financed by North American capital, was introduced in Latin America only with the Second World War. It is continuing with capital from the World and Export-Import banks, as well as from private sources. This industrialization seems economically well-oriented. Heavy industry is being expanded wherever possible, while at the same time light industry is being developed in order to improve the immediate living standards of the masses. From the capitalist point of view, its success is apparent in the fact that for the first time in history local capital is flowing into industry instead of being invested in land or exported.

More opposition to this industrialization, started with capital from the only country in the world which has it in surplus, would lead to political suicide. Only those whose actions are geared to world diplomacy rather than the interests of the Continent, can afford to take such a position. On the other hand, to allow this industrialization to develop blindly is to surrender in advance to a bourgeoisie inclined to copy all the worst aspects of its North American counterpart.

It is the task of the labor movement to canalize this industrialization. Capitalism will not do it except under pressure from the middle and working class. Ample proof of this is to be found in the Mexican situation. In 1950, the groups comprising the 42 most powerful enterprises in Mexico had a combined capital of 717,600,000,000 pesos and their profits for the year were 109,800,000,000 pesos, or 15.3 per cent. In 1951, this capital

increased to 752,800,000,000 pesos and the profits to 169,400,000,000 pesos, or 22.5 per cent. It is not uncommon in Mexico for new industries to amortize their initial capital in two or three years. In general, only 28 per cent of profits is used to increase available capital or develop industry. There are enterprises such as the Ford Motor Company of Mexico which with a capital of 12 millions can report a profit of 9 millions in a single year (1950), or concerns such as H. Steele (office supplies) which with a capital of two millions made three millions in one year. Profits from North American investments in all Latin America for 1950 totalled 682 million dollars or slightly over half of U. S. profits from all foreign investments. It is self-evident that this industrialization is not as healthy from the social as it is from the economic point of view. Nor can it be until labor takes measures to control it.

In general these measures should tend to:

- (1) maintain a proper balance between consumer goods and production goods industry;
- (2) require that a high percentage of profits be re-invested in the extension of the same or other industries, and limit the amount that can be withdrawn from the country;
- (3) insure that a sufficient portion of investment capital go into agriculture and allied industries, and that a proper balance be maintained between urban and rural consumption, as also between domestic consumption as a whole and export;
- (4) encourage small local industry in order to raise living standards in remote areas where transportation is inadequate;
- (5) increase the social responsibility of employers toward their employees;
- (6) favor the organization of farm workers and guarantee them the same benefits enjoyed by workers in industry;
- (7) require that national capital be in the majority in each industry;
- (8) establish laws against monopoly in order to protect the national industries against international cartels and consortiums;
- (9) secure, at all levels in this program, the participation of not only the working class but also the middle class and farmers. (This does not mean that the working-class parties must necessarily collaborate in the government. Sometimes such collaboration may be advisable and at other times not.)

It may be held that all these measures will serve further to develop capitalism. This is true. It may be argued that this is not the task of the proletariat. This also may be true: certainly it is a debatable subject in developed capitalist countries. But in Latin America, where stagnation in a primitive semi-feudal economy has become intolerable and there are neither the resources nor the possibility for an independent development toward socialism, what alternative can there be to the policy of having

the working and middle classes exert a severe discipline over the rising bourgeoisie?

Can the trade unions face up to this responsibility? In seeking an answer it is necessary to bear in mind that Latin-American industrialization, as presently developing, is tending to separate industrial workers from the rest of the population and transform what is yet scarcely a developed class into a privileged caste. As miserable as the lot of these workers may be, they are still privileged in comparison to farmers, artisans and part of the middle class—greatly so in relation to unskilled workers and farm labor. Given this situation plus the high prices resulting from an antiquated tax system and the absence of limitations on profits, it is easy to see why the industrial workers, who, unlike the impoverished masses, are in a position to buy back at least some small part of what they produce, appear as parasites on the backs of the consumers. And since the Latin American trade unions help to perpetuate this state of affairs, it devolves upon the political organizations of the working and middle classes to change it.

Trade Union Bureaucracy

A Mexican trade unionist writes:

Lacking any educational program to foster future leadership, trade-union directives are passed around only among a small clique. The trade union becomes a blessing or an evil, depending on the impression it makes on its members in relation merely to their personal aims. . . . Ignorance and obliviousness of the origins and principles of our movement are the rule. Come May First or the renewal of collective bargaining, and the old flag is dusted off and the old repertory of words such as "solidarity," "class struggle," and "proletariat" re-iterated. After due commemoration and the necessary demagogic, we then fall back into the old life. And what is this life but that of a selfish bourgeoisie? . . . Powerful trade unions, such as the railway workers, oil workers and electricians, form a privileged sector, the interests of which are practically identical with those of the bourgeoisie. The differences which arise periodically between these powerful unions and the bourgeoisie are not fundamental class differences but mere differences of bargaining such as arise between various sections of the bourgeoisie in the course of their business.

In underscoring the isolation of the trade unions, this unionist continues:

What do the big trade unions do to improve the miserable conditions of the Indians, child labor, the child beggars, the many who work in small workshops? Have there been any strikes or demonstrations demanding that the State take effective measures in their behalf? On the contrary, we erect a wall against the weak by the bosses. This is why the people, the raw conglomerate mass, remains deaf to our appeals. If this trend continues, there will eventually be a complete merging of interest between the powerful unions and the most wealthy sector of the bourgeoisie to the detriment of the majority of the people who will then be exploited by both.

Many forms of this trade-union parasitism exist. For example, the Mexican oil workers allow their industry—one which is nationalized, let it be noted—to employ temporary workers who receive no protection and draw notably lower salaries. Among the printers many hold one and a half jobs, "jobbing" out the extra half at a profit so as to become direct exploiters. In wage demands, one never hears of a union asking for a raise inversely proportionate to salaries received, which would help those in the lowest wage ranks; rather we hear of demands for a flat percentage increase redounding to the benefit of the highest wage earners.

In certain areas the trade-union leaders are so well entrenched and the rank and file so apathetic, that the former may exploit their station with little fear of reprisal. Strikes are sold; the power to call or forestall strikes is used to extort private bribes from employers; union leaders amass private fortunes; the apathy of the masses is so great, their disillusion so profound, that union functionaries dare to arrive at meetings in their Cadillacs without fear of being hissed.

The situation is, of course, not identical throughout the Continent and one may find many trade union leaders of personal integrity. But even these individuals, together with their less honest colleagues, may all be characterized as submissive to the state. The trade unions are simply no longer independent. It is through the state rather than their own militancy that they attempt to gain their ends. They do little or nothing to educate their members politically; they fail to intervene in important national problems or even to protest against injustice unless they are directly concerned. In fact, the only trade unions which seem at all interested in these matters are those led by the Communists, whose tactic it is to generate fanaticism and utilize the unions for their propaganda. On the whole, however, the Latin American trade union movement is monopolized by a parasitic caste whose interests demand the transformation of the unions themselves into parasites, first on the state, then on society in general.

This situation may very well be inevitable, considering the peculiar evolution of the Latin American labor movement, its hesitant beginnings, lack of ideological development and inner contradictions. For the bureaucratization of the trade union movement, which sometimes reaches the proportions of gangsterism, is both cause and effect of a more general situation that is equally reflected in labor politics.

Political Concubinage

It is understandable that when some military clique undertakes a coup d'etat, the trade union bosses, clutching their privileges, stand idly by. Exception may be claimed for Venezuela and Peru where the trade union leaders come from the Democratic Action and APRA movements.

But even in these countries there were no strikes at the beginning. The fight against the colonels began only later, not as a united action in order to restore democracy, but rather as a defense of the trade union leaders against the military who wanted to replace them with Communist leaders.

Here we come to another aspect of the Latin-American labor movement which will throw light on its ineffectiveness. It is politically weak. The socialist parties have no rank, not even a third one. Outside of Argentina, Chile and Ecuador, they are only small nuclei with narrow doctrinal views and no fighting spirit.

The spirit and enthusiasm which animated the early working class parties have been lost. These parties were ineffective because they were composed almost exclusively of European immigrants without native roots, but at least they gave some meaning to the life of their members. Today not even this is true. The political labor movement has been permeated by the leadership cult which dominates the trade unions as well as the political state, and mediocre leaders have replaced programs. Not a single theoretician of any stature is to be found. In de-Europeanizing themselves, the radical parties have acquired all the vices of political oligarchy without gaining integral stature.

The only organizations on the political field, with the exception of the Socialist Party of Argentina, which defend the working class and strive to reconcile its interests with those of Latin-American society are the revolutionary nationalist parties of the middle class. It is among their leaders that we find outstanding theoreticians and leaders, men such as Haya de la Torre, Figueres, and Betancourt.

The general decadence is also reflected in the Communist parties. The Communist parties, whose composition is middle-class students, intellectuals, union functionaries, are mere agencies of agitation and technical corps at the service of the military. "Political concubinage" is the appropriate label for their type of activity in relation to Peron, Vargas, Ibanez, to the military juntas in Venezuela and Peru, to Molas in Paraguay, General Hendriquez in Mexico and Batista in Cuba. Nor is this a matter of the old Marxist quarrel over support or non-support of bourgeois governments; it is an impudent, immoral collaboration with the most reactionary forces against the interests of the country and the workers, all in behalf of Soviet diplomacy.

The trade unions are left, therefore, without any real working-class political orientation, and the industrial workers are left dependent upon the parties of the middle class as the only political force capable of representing them effectively. Because of this dependence they are affected by the defeats always threatening these precarious parties. But the worst aspect of labor's political impotence is that the peasantry, that miserable

"conglomerate mass" most in need of leadership and whose participation is essential in order to solve any of the continent's basic problems, finds itself pitifully abandoned.

The Abandonment of the Peasants

Latin America is primarily a peasant continent. Peasants form the majority of the population and depend for their welfare upon the most calloused and incompetent minority: the big landowners. Except in Mexico and Argentina, these landowners continue to govern, directly or through the politicians and the military. They oppose the mechanization of agriculture, and therefore also the appearance of an agricultural bourgeoisie. Many live in Europe or the United States. Their sons speak a different language from that of the men who toil for them. The results of this system of land ownership and its consequent monoculture are: under-production, famine, a political tendency toward military dictatorship and dependence upon foreign industry.

Two solutions have been advanced for the land problem, one by the Argentine Socialists and the other by the Mexican Zapatists. Through mechanization, they both sought to transform the peasant into a small proprietor and create an agricultural middle class. The Argentine Socialists were never in a position to test their theories and in Mexico the program of the Zapatists was distorted in imitation of the Soviet example. Creation of *ejidos* (collective farms) in Mexico avoided the rise of an agricultural middle class but paved the way for an agricultural (factory-in-the-field) capitalism. This development has created two antagonistic blocs: the *ejidatarios* who are always poor and an upper bourgeoisie of the land which differs from the old land-oligarchy only in that it lacks the aristocratic mentality and employs modern instead of feudal methods of production.

The labor movement has not concerned itself with the peasantry, not even in Mexico. Here again, though without success, it is the middle class alone which has made efforts to liberate the peasant from his bondage, and here again the labor movement finds itself isolated from the people. If its position in regard to the peasants is to improve in the future, the labor movement must recognize two things: a socialized agricultural economy is not possible in states where the dominant class is a nascent industrial bourgeoisie; huge foreign agricultural holdings must be absorbed by each country, limiting their power while conserving their economic potential. The peasant masses cannot extricate themselves from their poverty and ignorance, from their almost pre-Columbian methods of cultivation, unless they become direct owners of the land they till and unless they imitate, if but on a small scale, the technical example of the foreign trusts. Such a

program implies fundamental revision of traditional labor oratory on the agrarian question. For those attached to principles imported from Europe and especially from the Soviet Union, all of this will appear reactionary and "in the service of imperialism." But the Latin American labor movement must place the sincere examination of national needs above the fear of worn phrases.

Today the United Fruit Company owns four million acres in Central America and the Grace Company has about 200 million dollars worth of land, ships, mines, etc., on the Pacific Coast. In Cuba six and one-half million acres belong to North American companies, and the American Sugar Company with 300,000 acres controls 62 per cent of the Cuban sugar industry. It is inconceivable that these estates, thoroughly mechanized and managed by the most modern methods, be distributed or converted into primitive agrarian communities. As in Mexico, a powerful parasitic agricultural caste of *ingenios* would arise to exploit the poor *ejidatarios* under their control. However, with the exception of Uruguay and Argentina, the agrarian question is closely related to the Indian question and the two condition one another.

The Indian Question

A good half of Latin-American peasants are Indians or *metis* who share the native life. Coca, marihuana, and alcohol play havoc among these people who have neither ambition nor perspective and who live in a condition of servitude.

In the region of Ayacucho, where in 1824 a decisive battle was fought for American independence, the Indians now sing:

*I was conceived on a stormy night
The rain and the wind were my cradle
No one feels sorry for me in my misery
Cursed be my birth!
Cursed be my conception!
Cursed be the world!
Cursed be all things!
Curses on myself!*

This song may suggest the difficulties to be met in organizing the Indians, whose very misery could easily place them in the service of reaction and who thus constitute a potential threat to organized labor as long as they remain outside its ranks. Yet the labor movement has not turned towards the Indians, whereas the middle-class parties—APRA, Democratic Action, the Mexican Party of the Revolution, the non-Communist revolutionary groups of Guatemala—have shown genuine concern for them.

Must one defer the solution of the Indian problem until after the working class has achieved power, or instigate reforms here and now to

ameliorate the lot of the Indians? If it is to be the latter, what must be the basic direction of these reforms? Should the native patterns of culture be preserved, thus isolating the Indians from modern civilization, or should the Indians be integrated into the national life at the expense of their indigenous culture?

The Communists have exploited the Indian problem for agitational purposes, systematically eulogizing the ancient pre-Columbian civilizations and demanding the proclamation of the States of Aymara, Maya and others—an advocacy of Indian separatism which approaches racism. The intellectuals free of Communist influence defend integrating the Indians into modern life while respecting their individual character. However, this cannot be achieved in a society transitional between feudalism and industrial capitalism which tends to proletarianize the Indian.

There are three currents in Latin American "nativist" thought, each of them paternalistic and limiting: the "racists" for whom everything "Indian" is perfect; the "erudite" fascinated by the picturesque; the "culturalists" who hope to integrate the Indians into an industrial civilization through cultural means. The labor movement, too, though more realistically, should strive for integration, a process which must be as painless as possible. It should conserve and encourage native craftsmanship, oppose all forms of Indian servitude, and demand equal rights for Indians in all respects. At present they are not even accorded equal status in the unions.

Without emancipation of the Indians, there can be no emancipation of the workers. Nor should labor's aim be the transformation of the Indians into industrial workers, but rather the co-existence of native ways of life—improved through culture, hygiene, modern communications, etc.—with an industrialized society. Land must be given to the Indians, of course; but they must also be free to organize their own life, even if this means a degree of anarchism. If the Latin American labor movement will make itself the champion of Indian freedom, it will gain an indispensable ally.

The Latin-American labor movement needs other allies if it is to accomplish the huge task confronting it. Permanent victory over the foreign enterprises cannot be achieved unless these enterprises are subject to check by unions in their own country. Moreover, effective agrarian reform is impossible unless U. S. public opinion is kept informed and the reformers are not falsely labeled as Communists. And finally, the Latin-American people cannot win decisively over dictatorship and demagogic unless liberal and working-class opinion in the United States forces the State Department to set some minimum requirements as the price of governmental recognition. It might at least demand what it condemns the Communist regimes for lacking: democratic elections, respect for fundamental liberties and abolition of servitude.

No one talks revolution in Latin America today, not even the Communists who until 1935 were the only ones demanding power for a practically non-existent proletariat. But also no one talks of victory of the labor movement, for the very simple reason that no one is able to say what would constitute victory. The Mexican experience has shown that agriculture cannot be socialized in a rising capitalist society. The anti-imperialist fight has proved that the working class is not yet the determining force in Latin-American life. But at the same time, the experience in Venezuela and Peru demonstrates that when the middle class takes power and starts fundamental reform, it is unable to sustain itself. And finally the Peronist experience makes it clear that demagogic cannot improve the living standards of the masses, and that such a movement dwindles down to a small clique.

Yet on every hand there is evidence that unprecedented possibilities exist in Latin America today for the rise of a modern planned capitalism free from the worst vices that developed under *laissez faire*. To succeed, such planning must be truly on a large scale. The objective from the liberal and labor point of view should not be to make the new capitalists into "angels," but to prevent them from acting against the common interest.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is the labor movement itself which should take the initiative in the planning and controlling of Latin-American capitalism. None of its objectives can be reached in a basically feudal society out of which a foul capitalism is rising. Today facts prove, if theory is insufficient, that one cannot pass directly from feudalism to socialism. It is logical therefore for the Latin-American labor movement to set the stage upon which it can become effective.

Here and now, insofar as these countries are concerned, revolution can only be realized through reform. The labor movement cannot accomplish this task alone. It needs the active alliance of the middle class. It needs the alliance of the peasants, who, transformed into small proprietors, will provide a base for this middle class. It needs the alliance of the Indians in order to neutralize their reactionary tendencies and make them a stabilizing element in the over-all picture. It needs the alliance of the workers and liberals in the United States in order to set limits to the ambition and greed of North American capitalism. It needs the help of the European working class in order to profit from its experience, its accumulated knowledge, its techniques. But finally, and this above all, the Latin-American labor movement needs to regain some of its original purity, some of the enthusiasm of its early fighting period, some measure of that passionate and fervent political spirit which moved the exiles of the Commune to establish, in the Buenos Aires of the gauchos, the first socialist groups.

Translated by TRAVERS CLEMENT and LEONARD PRAGER

DAVID RIESMAN RECONSIDERED

Norman Mailer

The only review of *Individualism Reconsidered* by David Riesman (The Free Press, 1954) which I have seen up to this writing is a dithyrambic piece of Granville Hicks' in *The New Leader* of July 19, 1954. He concludes his appreciation by saying, "What I am sure of, however, is that this culture of ours, even if it should vanish from the earth, would survive in men's minds as an example of what the human race can accomplish. Among the forces which have forged that conviction must be included the writings of David Riesman."

As I say, this is the only review I have read, but I can imagine the others, and it takes no talent for prophecy to assume that Hicks' review is typical. For there is no mistaking that Riesman is the professional liberal's liberal, and while I happen to have met no particular person who has been influenced by him, I have seen his name in many references, blurbs, and occasional columns, all exceptionally laudatory, by such intellectual deacons of the liberal body as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Max Lerner.

I

After such a preface, it is little embarrassing to say that I found *Individualism Reconsidered* more boring than impressive. A book of five hundred odd pages, it is a collection of thirty essays which were published in various magazines in the last seven years with the emphasis on those articles written from 1950 to the present; there has been a certain movement, and, from my point of view, regression in Riesman's thought since the Forties; as he says himself, ". . . my later writings are less acrid and satiric; there is a somewhat more sanguine attitude toward American Culture."

The essays vary in quality and in subject matter; Riesman embarks upon such separate topics as the character of law review students, the political implications of Freud's thought, and a socio-historic survey of the growth of football. His variety is to be praised if his treatment can not be, yet despite the gamut of the articles, and ignoring his ideas for the moment, what is distressing in *Individualism Reconsidered* is his style, overburdened with modern sociological jargon (individuate, marginality, personality ideals, and pluralistic), and what compounds the boredom is that Riesman says so little in so many words and like so many sociologists gives little feel or sense of life itself. With the exception of his article on the legal profession

which contains fascinating observations about the social character of lawyers, the life and élan of law review students, etc., I believe I can say with no conscious smugness that I learned almost nothing else in these five hundred pages. There are essays on popular culture, on individualism and its values, on minority problems, on totalitarianism, on the problems of method of the social sciences; the text of a long speech on the relationships between technical progress and social progress is reprinted; there is a condescending evaluation of Veblen with a psychoanalytical interpretation of his character added to prove why in Riesman's opinion Veblen has now become a "poor, if often amusing and provocative guide to America."

Only the essays on Freud are impressive, and this not so much for what is said (the critique will not be new to anyone familiar with Horney or Fromm), as for the considerable work which was done and the honesty of the attempt; and I should say that one can admire Riesman's honesty and his capacity for work, the number of his projects, the range of his interests. Add to his credit some remarks on what he calls "The Nerve of Failure" written in 1947, ". . . the courage to accept the possibility of defeat, of failure, without being morally crushed," and, "What kind of authority has laid down the rule that it is wrong to be critical or negative if one cannot also be constructive?"; add to that early essay his sympathetic review of *Communitas* by Percival and Paul Goodman which he titles "Some Observations on Community Plans and Utopia," also written in 1947, and one has gleaned almost all of Riesman's now defunct radical temper and almost all that is interesting.

I do not think I speak only from my prejudices, although in justice I must admit that I approached Riesman's work with animus. Still, even a sympathetic reader could hardly be unaware that his writings wander, his emphases shift, his articles are headed by important titles and introduce important subjects only to dissipate them, until time and again the essay comes to a close after pages of decelerated discussion, almost as if he were a verbose and needy lecturer who has lost his point, glances at his watch, discovers he is half an hour over and will be charged for continuing to use the hall and so comes to an abrupt end by reciting the final dramatic sentences he had memorized before he began. If Riesman were not considered so seriously, I doubt whether *Individualism Reconsidered* could have found an eager publisher, let alone sympathetic reviewers, let alone even the desire in himself to collect his essays and present them in a book. In his latest writings one senses, perhaps incorrectly, a certain complacency, as if Riesman has begun to regard himself as a public figure.

II

But, after all, it is not *Individualism Reconsidered* which the reviewers are writing about. In essence they are re-reviewing *The Lonely Crowd*, which is a better book and a more important one. Indeed, since the greater part of the essays in *Individualism Reconsidered* are merely

points of departure or extensions of discussion from the thesis of *The Lonely Crowd*, it is natural to relate the themes in *Individualism Reconsidered* to the structure of his thought in *The Lonely Crowd*.

Apart from his proudly eclectic approach to experience, ". . . the pluralism which is one of the glories of liberalism," which I intend to discuss later, Riesman's ideas in *The Lonely Crowd* revolve around the terminology he coined of the "tradition-directed," "the inner-directed," and "the other-directed." Briefly, and avoiding the demographic characteristics to which he connects these categories, it can be said that Riesman considers the tradition-directed person (very roughly, the peasant) to be comparatively unimportant in the study of modern American life, and *The Lonely Crowd* is an attempt to explore the dynamics of American social movement in terms of the growing tendency of the American character to change from inner-directed to other-directed. The latter categories are explained at length. The inner-directed man—the nineteenth century business man would be a prototype—is essentially self-directed, "gyroscopic," production-minded, set for life from early childhood in pursuit of certain built-in goals, and therefore rigid, strong, compulsive, capable of sustaining loneliness, opposition, and strife, yet moved in his circuits by guilt. By contrast, the other-directed man is flexible, anxiety-ridden, oriented not toward such goals as success or moral probity or serious work, but toward the approval of whichever group or groups he finds congenial. His movement is "radar-controlled," his happiness acceptance, his social outlook one of consumption rather than production, his "taste" rather than his work the primary concern. He obeys "*the process of paying close attention to the signals from others . . .*" and he behaves by ". . . an exceptional sensitivity to the actions and wishes of others."

In the first uncritical acceptance of these categories, intellectual excitement is generated and one has the feeling that much is about to open, much sociology, much about life. But the book is reminiscent of a performance which is begun on a high note of excitement where the actor

Dept. of Gradual Clarification

"In the arts of consumption as well as in the arts of production, Americans have moved so fast that, in architecture and design, in moving pictures and in poetry and criticism, we are living in what I believe to be one of the great cultures of history. It is not fashionable to say this. Yet, we may ask as Crane Brinton does in 'Ideas and Men': 'What is there in Pericles' famous praise of Athens that does not apply to us, in some or even in extended measure?'"—David Riesman, "Individualism Reconsidered."

"My very presence here may be taken as an indication that the tycoon of culture, the professor of social science or humanities, is beginning to rank with the tycoons of metallurgy or finance."—David Riesman, Address to Conference on Social and Technical Progress, MIT, August 28, 1953. Quoted in "Explorations in Entrepreneurial History," Vol. 3.

has not sufficient reserves to sustain the role. So there are lags, disappointments, rather astounding conclusions which seem constructed out of nowhere, unbelievable naivetes, repetitions of the early excitement, and finally on an exhortative note, for Riesman is nothing if not hortatory, the curtain is lowered and one waits for the flag in the background. By the time *Individualism Reconsidered* appears, the expectation is justified: ". . . our creativity, stimulated by such conferences as this, is one element. The M.I.T. students who brought us together dreamed up the whole idea, then found the means to implement it. They exemplify the new generation of American entrepreneurs who engage in team-work, are not profit-minded, and seek outlets in the world beyond our borders."

Riesman does not always sound like a *Life* editorial; but I think there is nothing in that quotation which he would not defend as it stands, and the direction of *The Lonely Crowd* was toward such remarks. For Riesman predicated the development of the other-directed personality as a response to something unique in history—an economy of abundance. Other-directed man as a social type emerges in his consumer orientation, and capitalism enters the process of becoming something other than capitalism. Competitive strife begins to disappear and is replaced by the cooperative jockeying for position of the other-directed types who are essentially more anxious to meet approval than to succeed at any cost. The edges of conflict become rounded. The productive speed-up tends to be replaced by "mood" engineering and "feather-bedding;" management concedes more to labor than is asked, labor in turn does not demand all that it could; conspicuous spending within production (committee management, incentive systems, etc.) replaces conspicuous consumption, and in short, "In this modern atmosphere of sharing, of geniality, of muted competition and unmuted conspicuous production, who would be the Scrooge who would hoard trade secrets or hoard capital . . . or hoard time (very few top businessmen are actually as inaccessible as their secretaries like to pretend)." One feels tempted to ask Henry Luce for an appointment.

Riesman carries his conclusions to the point of declaring that there is no longer a ruling group or ruling class in America, but that power is distributed among a variety of veto groups: the Church, Jewish organizations, Protestant organizations, lobbies, consumer groups, between management and labor, between the "warring congeries of cattlemen, corn-men, dairy men, cotton men," black-belt whites, ethnic groups, "the editorializers and storytellers who help socialize the young," "the military men who control defense and in part, foreign policy," and "in the hands of the small business and professional men who control Congress, such as realtors, lawyers, car salesmen, undertakers and so on." Power in terms of control does not exist; it is "situational and mercurial." "Even those intellectuals, for instance who feel themselves very much out of power, and are frightened of those who they think have the power, prefer to be scared by the power structures they conjure up than to face the possibility that the power structure they believe exists has largely evaporated."

There are many elements I have omitted, and Riesman, despite his infatuation with the economy of abundance, is not entirely uncritical of American life. His main objections concern the anxious joylessness of the other-directed, and in a liberal parallel to the radical dream in the Thirties of a renovated super-proletariat, Riesman looks for a development of what he calls the autonomous individual, a concept very close to the analyst's norm of a "genital" member of the middle class. How the middle class legions are to move from other-direction to autonomy is left in abeyance, although Riesman finds hope in the mass-communication media. "Surely the great mass-media artists, including the directors, writers, and others behind the scenes who create and promote the artists, make an important contribution to autonomy. The entertainers . . . exert a constant pressure on the accepted peer-groups and suggest new modes of escape from them. The sharpest critics of American movies are likely to forget this too easily."

III

What is to be said of all this? In the style of socialist polemic one could declare Riesman's structure to be sheared at a stroke because the economy of abundance is artificial, grown from a war economy, and subject either to crisis in the event of no war, or subject to war itself for continuing health. I believe that generally this is true, but since Riesman would probably argue that it is the economy of abundance which is the prime fact, and the war economy is superficial and capable of being replaced by American improvisation and the acceptance of new challenge and so forth, I would prefer to bypass these arguments which like most economic colloquies between liberals and socialists resolve themselves inevitably into a Keynes-Marx imbroglio, and try to go at the matter in another way.

There is an essay in *Individualism Reconsidered* called "Some Observations on Social Science Research" where Riesman states quite nicely that the present dichotomy in sociology between the data-collectors and the theorists is very great. The techniques and the resources of sociology permit factual research on very limited topics, and the theorists who wish to construct more elaborate syntheses of society must do so mainly on the basis of their intuitions and perceptions. In that sense, I think it can be said that any ambitious sociological work is created artistically and presents a *Weltanschauung* which is more comparable to the kind of world a novelist makes than the structures of a scientist. Naturally, I would be the last to say that the world a novelist creates is without value in helping us to understand reality (or indeed whether there is Reality) but I do want to insist on the difference. No one dreams of considering a novel, at least a good novel, as a document; we understand tacitly that its view of the world is a compound of the novelist's prejudices, instincts, and sensitivity, and we learn from the novel in degree as our own prejudices and intuitions are exercised, confirmed or confuted by the art-work.

This, then, seems to me the best way to approach *The Lonely Crowd*—as a fictional conception rather than a sociological analysis; and again I am not trying to say it has no value because its “reality” is “fictional.” True, much of its material has been gathered by interviews, and other forms of sociological apparatus are used to bolster it now and again, but no one can seriously pretend (except perhaps a Ph. D. in Sociology) that the one-hour interview or the twelve-hour interview, or even a thousand interviews, are “scientific.” Riesman himself would not make such claims. They are analogous to the very partial and limited encounters with “experience” which some novelists employ in finding material,—and who can claim that the good sociologist with his technical jargon is *ipso facto* a better observer than the good novelist? Far more important than the data are the attitudes and pre-conceptions with which the artist or *equally* the sociologist begins his work. Not to mention the energy and ambition.

Viewed as a “novelist” or better as an “artist,” Riesman lacks real stature in my opinion. The style of his insights is reminiscent of any number of novelists who tend to place too much emphasis upon too little, until whole systems of good and evil are elaborated out of the nuances of the drawing room. (Given sufficient genius this can of course be done, but it is obviously very difficult.) Riesman’s concept of the other-directed which is recognizable in one’s friends or in oneself, suffers nonetheless from our suspicion that he is extrapolating upon the vast American canvas a view of life which too closely corresponds to the generally tender and anxious world of the middle-class intellectual in or out of academic life. Moreover, one wonders how new a phenomenon is other-direction—merely think of the gallery of female characters in the Victorian novel. And in the business world where Riesman places so much emphasis on the emergence of other-directed cooperation instead of inner-directed competition, one can say that it would be surprising indeed if human relations at work were as ugly, as brutal, and as competitive now as they were let us say in the Thirties. It is just as likely that Riesman has been prone to magnify the traces of other-direction which are to be found in government officials and management executives.

One may suggest similar criticisms with regard to his idea that there is no ruling group in America. Again and again there is a truly ingenuous quality to Riesman’s statements. When he comes to discuss the power for influence of the advertising media, he says in effect that he, personally, has never been influenced by advertising, but merely annoyed and disgusted by it. He adds that everyone he has talked to declares the same thing, but that they make the mistake of believing that while they are not influenced by advertising, other people must be. Why assume this, asks Riesman? Why not agree that everyone is indifferent to the power of advertising and that it is all a huge hoax, perpetuated only because it is an institution?

Nowhere in his work does Riesman seem to have the faintest idea that there is an unconscious direction to society as well as to the individual,

and that, just as many phenomena proceed in society at two levels, so a particular man or as easily all Americans can believe consciously that they are superior to advertising while in fact they suffer an unconscious slavery which influences them considerably. One feels almost embarrassed to remind Riesman of something so basic as this.

Riesman approaches the problem of power in America in almost the same way. One cannot keep from comparing his remarks to the apologia of the fellow-traveller who dependably will say that in the Soviet Union there is no dictatorship, but rather that the power of government is distributed among the working class, the farmers, the intelligentsia, the Communist Party, the sober industrious management executives, the esteemed public artists, etc. etc. The forms of power are taken for the content, and there is no attempt to distinguish between those who lead and those who are led.

While the problem of who has the power in America is undoubtedly more difficult to answer than it is in the Soviet Union (although certainly not astronomically so), there is no reason to assume that there is no power, or put somewhat differently, no resultant of power from its vectors. It may be true, and I would guess it is true, that no group in America nor any individuals believe consciously that they wield really important power; but it is one thing to think one has no power and another for it to be so. A neurotic general overcome with work may believe he has the power to effect nothing; a drunken private on a whore-house tear may have the illusion that all liberty is his possession and all omnipotence, but one would have to be violently antipathetic to the idea of society itself to argue that there were not social and power relations between the general and the private independent of their will or their personal conception of their state. Obviously, I do not wish to say that "Wall Street" or "General Motors" controls America or that mass-communication media determine absolutely the content of people's minds. But it is far more ridiculous to assume that "power" is distributed equitably between General Motors as an entity, and a given number of small town lawyers who go to Congress. Riesman does not really seem to have ever considered seriously whether it is *any* small town lawyer who can go to Congress. Again, concerning the mass communications media, one does not need to argue that men's minds are absolutely controlled, but rather that a man's mind, and just a small part of his mind, is affected in a small way—no more is necessary for him to conform socially to the main historical trends; put another way it is men's actions which make history and not their sentiments, but the actions of a man, particularly his social and historic actions are comparatively minute in relation to the whole man. Nonetheless it is that fraction which can be and is affected by the media, and it is that fraction which unfortunately makes history.

When one reviews the history of the last ten years and takes into account the complete about-face of American public policy toward the Soviet Union in the matter of a year or two (it will be remembered that the

USSR changed neither its colors nor its stripes during all of this) I think it is a matter of small importance whether or not there is a ruling class which pulls the strings. Most responsible socialists would discard this notion for its vulgarity, its Stalinoid connotations, and its complete failure to fit more complex facts. But it is quite another thing to relinquish one's view of America as a social organism with a capitalist economy whose problems are deep and probably insoluble, and whose response to any historical situation must be a function of its need to survive as that need is reflected, warped, aided and impeded by countless smaller social organisms, traditions, and finally individuals who cancel one another out or double their force (so far as *actions* are concerned) until the result of these numerous vectors represents a statement of where the power in America rests and where the necessity. That the "power" in any important sense does not belong to nine-tenths of the "people" but rather is embedded in such massive and complementary constellations as management and labor executives, the military and the government hierarchy, the Church and mass-communication media, is more or less self-evident to radicals who would I believe agree that it is not the differences of interest in the groups I have named which are noteworthy (has there ever been a society including the Soviet Union in which there were not deep clashes of interest among the ruling elite?) but rather it is the objectives wanted in common by these powerful groups which can provide the best explanation of the virtually complete conformity in America during the Second World War and in the eight years which have followed. What characterizes all pre-socialist history and may (let us hope not) characterize a socialist history if there be one, is that the mass of men must satisfy the needs of the social organism in which they live far more than the social organism must satisfy them.

Now, I am aware that the argument I have presented is as completely a "fiction" as the world of David Riesman. There is finally no way one can try to apprehend complex reality without a "fiction." But one may choose the particular "fiction" which most satisfies the sum of one's knowledge, experience, biases, needs, desires, values, and eventually one's moral necessities. And one may even attempt to re-shape reality in some small way with the "fiction" as a guide. What one can always do is to compare the "fictions" and try to see where they may lead.

IV

In *Individualism Reconsidered* another tendency becomes apparent in Riesman's ideas. He has become concerned with what he calls "reversals of emphasis," and I believe they can best be illustrated by a number of quotations:

... these men act in obedience to their self-image as proper businessmen, no matter how strenuously they insist (as, depending on mood, most Americans will insist) that they act only out of self-interest.

Wealthy students often act as if ashamed of their wealth. I have sometimes been tempted to point out that the rich are a minority and have rights, too.

The students would be much better off if they could take a stand against taking a stand.

. . . airless conformism under the banner of non-conformity.

. . . 'the tyranny of the powerless' over their group—the tyranny of beleaguered teachers, liberals, Negroes, women, Jews, intellectuals, and so on, over each other.

The current attempt to unify the country against municipal patronage and bossism seems to me dangerous, because by enforcing an ideological unity on politics we threaten with extinction a few men, soaked in gravy we can well spare, who protect our ideological pluralism.

For instance, girl students at some of our liberal universities need occasionally to be told that they are not utterly damned if they discover within themselves anti-Negro or anti-Semitic reactions—*else they may expiate their guilt by trying to solve the race question in marriage!* But even that judgment has to be made in terms of the wider social context—in this case, a judgment that the lot of Negroes, let alone Jews, in America is not always so utterly desperate as to call for the ruthless sacrifice of protective prejudices. (Italics added.)

In some colleges, professors who testify before the Velde or Jenner committees with dignity and restraint (often *educating* committee members in the process . . .) are slandered as appeasers. (Italics added.)

I recall in this connection a conversation with the energetic editor of a liberal periodical who had suggested in one of his articles that there was something to be said for the investigating committees: they were not all vicious, and after all Communist conspiracies had existed. As a result, he was bombarded by letters charging that now he, too, was betraying the cause, was giving in to hysteria, was leaving his loyal readers in the lurch. He *did* give in to hysteria—to his reader's—and decided to publish no more such articles.

I wonder if these "reversals of emphasis" are not essentially intellectual tricks in which a liberal platitude is converted to its opposite, and an illusion of insight is thereby gained. Riesman furnishes us the altruistic businessman, the persecuted rich, "the tyranny of the powerless," the benefits of corruption, of prejudice, and the hysteria of the liberal, not to mention numerous others. There is truth of course in many of these insights, but to what degree and of what kind? Life itself viewed statically, seen as something "which-is" rather than as something "which-should-be," is always so various in its aspects that there are a host of frozen truths. Every man and every institution sees itself through its own eyes, and there are probably few situations on earth whose moral judgments cannot be reversed to provide the illusion of equal truth. Intellectual penetration of this sort can never fail, but on the other hand it can never succeed for it is merely a flipping of switches, a change of polarities, and the platitude turned on its head is still a platitude.

Let me quote from "Winesburg, Ohio," where Sherwood Anderson says it as well as anyone could:

The old man listed hundreds of the truths in his book. I will not try to tell you all of them. There was the truth of virginity and the truth of passion, the truth of wealth and of poverty, of thrift and of profligacy, of carelessness and abandon. Hundreds and hundreds were the truths and they were all beautiful.

V

In the enormous reversal of emphasis which characterizes Riesman's work—the absence of ruling classes, the replacement of competition by cooperation, the change in American character from the stereotype of the brash aggressive man to the other-directed man, one may well wonder whether Riesman, despite his sincere intentions to invigorate thought and to make people "see" reality, is not really encouraging thought in circles, passive thought, but thought which gives the illusion of making strides, emitting energy, and approaching discovery. Is this not his basic appeal to the liberal who wants precisely to have thought which elicits an aura of excitement but does not force him to relinquish to his ideas any important part of his ambitions or his comforts? One feels Riesman's desire to find something justifiable, something *functional*, in all aspects of society. Ultimately, his credo seems to be that what-is must necessarily contain something good, and so an intellectual process which begins by stimulating the mind ends in eclectic monotony. At last all things are equal, are justifiable—one is drawn to quietism and acceptance. To the left liberal—for want of a better classification—who like everyone else has become progressively more exhausted by the neurotic intellectual demands of the Cold War, there is peace and an attractiveness in the endlessly varied world of what-is where finally everything can be seen inside-out or right-side-back—again if so the need arises.

One cannot emphasize enough how neurotic is the political climate of our time, and for the liberal who wishes to be active, the situation is not easy. For I would say that we live in a climate so reactionary that the normal guides to understanding contemporary American politics are reversed like the controls of a plane which bursts through the sound barrier; and to the liberal's dismay and confusion it is the Republicans who can make peace in Korea, who are obliged to fight with McCarthy no matter how reluctantly, who can accept an armistice in Indochina, who may even come to recognize Communist China with the possibility that presents of splitting China from Russia—who can in sum effect the policies which normally belong to the Democratic Party, even as it will be the Democratic Party, I would venture, which will carry out the complete reaction if and when it comes. For example, if Stevenson had been elected, could one imagine him making peace in Korea against the happy anguish and hypocritical storms of the Republicans that American lives had been lost in vain?

To the confusion of such relations in politics is added the fact that

radical political life in America has become difficult, and to hold the position of a libertarian socialist is equivalent to accepting almost total intellectual alienation from America, as well as a series of pains and personal contradictions in one's work. It is difficult for us to approach the liberal, to attempt to convince him, when we can offer no place to go, no country, no cause, no movement, no thing, and are ourselves exposed to all the temptations of circular thought, of reversals of emphasis, until far from obtaining the satisfaction of thinking ourselves martyrs, we are more likely to torture ourselves with such questions as our own neurotic relation to life. Riesman speaks glibly of the airless conformity of the non-conformist, but what he ignores is that the radical temper is often turned most radically upon oneself, and he is far from the first to ask whether one is a socialist because of the easy pride non-conformity may offer. In that way, Riesman's appeal is almost as strong—if unconsciously not stronger—to radicals than to liberals, and there are probably few socialists who have not felt the temptation to substitute what-is for the more elusive what-should-be.

VI

Yet, after everything else, there remains the basic core of socialism so deep in Western culture, the idea, the moral passion, that it is truly intolerable and more than a little fantastic that men should not live in economic equality and in liberty. As serious artistic expression is the answer to the meaning of life for a few, so the passion for socialism is the only meaning I can conceive in the lives of those who are not artists; if one cannot create "works" one may dream at least of an era when humans create humans, and the satisfaction of the radical can come from the thought that he tries to keep this idea alive.

If one is to take the trend of other-direction seriously, it makes equal sense to argue that the increasing anxiety of American life comes from the covert guilt that abundance and equality remain utterly separated, and we have reached the point where socialism is not only morally demanding but unconsciously obvious—obvious enough to flood with anxiety the psyches of those millions who know and yet do nothing.

For so long as we can choose our myths, I prefer this to Riesman's essential if unstated fiction which finally revolves around the old saw that the rich are miserable and the poor lead simple happy lives. Perhaps, if one could make such statistical counts, it would be true or half-true. But, after all, the question of happiness is related not to politics, nor to action, nor to morality. As socialists we want a socialist world not because we have the conceit that men would thereby be more happy—those claims are best left to dictators—but because we feel the moral imperative in life itself to raise the human condition even if this should ultimately mean no more than that man's suffering has been lifted to a higher level, and human history has only progressed from melodrama, farce, and monstrosity, to tragedy itself.

SECTS AND SECTARIANS

Lewis Coser

I. The Sociology of the Sect

A sect, as the Latin etymology suggests, consists of men who have cut themselves off from the main body of society. They have formed a restricted and closed group which rejects the norms of the inclusive society and proclaims its adherence to a special set of rules of conduct.

The religious sect, as distinct from the Church which contains within its fold both saints and sinners, consists of the visible community of pure saints; the political sect, as distinct from the political party which aims at encompassing a high proportion of the mass of electors, consists of specifically qualified members, "professional revolutionaries," certified Marxists or Alte Kaempfer. The party is inclusive, the sect is exclusive. The Church and the party aim at attracting all men of good will, the sect aims at recruiting an elite of religiously or politically qualified "performers."

The very structure of the sect, quite apart from its ideology, is likely to lead to a number of characteristic patterns of behavior, and it is these I propose to discuss.*

I am quite aware that there are fundamental differences between, say, a fundamentalist sect and the political sects of the modern socialist movement, but I shall try to show that the structure of sects as such breeds certain common patterns. Lenin's organizational principles cannot be fully understood unless seen in the historical context of the struggle against the police regime of Czarism; yet his insistence on "restricting the membership of this organization to persons who are engaged in revolution as a profes-

* The following discussion is deeply indebted to the sociological writings of Georg Simmel, Max Weber and Roger Caillois, though no special reference to their work will be made in the body of the article. The interested reader is referred to *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, Kurt H. Wolff, ed. The Free Press 1950; *From Max Weber*, Gerth and Mills, ed. Oxford University Press 1947, and Roger Caillois' article "L'esprit des sectes" in *Renaissance* (New York), vol. II-III, pp. 30-44. . . . To avoid possible misunderstandings, let me stress that the concept of sect is used here in the sense that sociologists generally do. I am aware that socialists have often used it differently, and that with them it has come to have a derogatory connotation. But in its sociological usage no value judgments are intended or involved. Furthermore, it should be clear that I am employing a typological procedure—no actual sects will ever in all aspects embody all the features of the typological model.

sion" and on maintaining that "the thing we need is a militant organization of agents" (*What Is To Be Done*), has consequences for that organization, which, even if only partially anticipated, determine to a large extent its further development and the conduct of its members.

The sect, by its exclusive structure, creates a morality opposed to that of the rest of society. Since it regards the outsider as not participating in grace, as not belonging to the select, as not yet having the fortitude or capacity to adhere to revolutionary principles, it sees him as an exponent of a lower morality. Hence what is forbidden to the outsider may be perfectly legitimate for the insider since he speaks in the name of a higher morality. The sectarian is genuinely surprised—no element of cant is involved here—if the outsider measures his conduct by ordinary yardsticks. There can be no common measure, he feels, between "their morals and ours," since they represent the past and we the future, they are the children of darkness and we the children of light. "When the history of this epoch is written," says James P. Cannon, "they'll discover that the only really moral people were the Trotskyists." (*Fourth International*, Feb. 1944).

Small, exclusive, centripetally organized groups need to preempt the total personality of their members if they are to withstand actual or potential attack from the outside. The very structure of the sect forces the members to take decisive stands in matters both public and private. The sect requires the unreserved devotion of the individual to the rationale of the group. The exclusive group, being unable to avail itself of the advantage of large numbers, must attempt to offset it by the intensive exploitation of the loyalty of its members. Where the larger group can afford to leave its members leeway in opinions, attitudes and conduct, the sect must ever strive completely to subjugate the individual. "We must train people," writes Lenin, "who shall devote to the party not only their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives."

The morality of the sect is a morality of extremes, it cannot tolerate reservations. Allegiance is expected to be total and hence hesitation, an act of deliberation and reflection, is suspect. Bossuet, with profound insight, defined a heretic as "a man who has personal ideas." From the point of view of the sectarian, a man who reflects for himself is indeed a dangerous man since he asserts a right to personal examination of conduct in an organization which is based on a rejection of the right to establish personal standards.

The large group may be lenient, the sect must adhere to the axiom that "who is not for me is against me." This helps explain the famous dis-

pute on organizational matters which led to the split between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in 1903. While Martov's draft stated that anyone who "personally and regularly cooperates under the guidance of one of [the party's] organizations" should be considered a member of the party, Lenin's draft stated that only those who *personally participate* in one of the party's organizations should be considered a party member. What appeared mere hairsplitting soon was shown to involve the basic difference between organizing an inclusive party and an exclusive sect.

The sect does not strive for large membership, on the contrary it may even find it advantageous to suffer a loss of membership if this involves the elimination of men inclined toward compromise and meditation. "The more we restrict the membership," writes Lenin, "to persons who are engaged in revolution as a profession," the more efficient will the organization be.

Since outside contacts necessarily detract from the members' obligations to the group, sects have looked with suspicion at family responsibilities. Just as celibacy was one of the means by which the Church attempted to insure total allegiance of the clergy, so the sect will look with disfavor at the kinship and other social obligations of its adherents. Sexual promiscuity, so frequent in the Communist Party and other radical organizations, has often had the same function as celibacy in the Catholic clergy—lasting attachment to "outsiders" and permanent outside social obligations could be reduced to a minimum by celibacy in one case, by promiscuity in the other. And if marriage wasn't frowned upon in all radical sects, emphasis was always at least upon marriage with an "insider," which would not detract from devotion to the sect.

Similarly, many sects have looked with disfavor upon their members' occupational activities. Many sects have looked with disfavor, or suspicion, upon those of their members who possessed special occupational skills. Such members, the sect feels, are more difficult to control than others, for the pull of their work is likely to decrease their exclusive devotion to the movement.

Members of the sect who have family or other social obligations in the outside world, whose outside roles might possibly lead to conflicts with their roles as sectarians, are likely to be less controllable, less devoted to the exclusive service of the organization, hence less reliable. The ideal sectarian is one who is *only* a sectarian, a man without any other qualities.

One of the symbols of this surrender of the social obligations of the outside world is the tendency of the "reborn" to change his name after initiation. It might be suggested that the prevalent use of "party names" in radical sects is perhaps more easily understood as an outward symbol of

the newly achieved elite status and the decisive break with the outside world of one's past, than by the need to secure protection against the police.]

In addition to attempting to reduce to a minimum the outside social contacts of its members, and to encompass their total personality, the sect has a tendency to level off individuality. A many-sided development of the personality of the member is likely to bring into play attitudes and thoughts which cannot be easily controlled. But not only does the sect require uniformity among its members, it also desires an undifferentiated character structure. The social structure of the sect must be reproduced in the personality structure of the member.

The development of sensibility, of a sense of discrimination, of esthetic or psychological refinement has always frightened the sectarian, being viewed as the first step towards the sin of subjectivism, that is of heresy. Hence the fear of "petty-bourgeois" interests in art, literature, philosophy or sociology among modern radical sects. "The petty bourgeois intellectuals," writes James P. Cannon, leader of the Socialist Workers Party, with characteristic contempt, "are introspective by nature. . . . They measure the world's agony by their own inconsequential aches and pains" (*The Struggle for a Proletarian Party*, p. 6).

II

The sect is never tolerant. Tolerance is always felt by the sectarians to be a deplorable weakness. While the larger society or group may regard compromise as a virtue, the sect sees in it only a sign of disloyalty. Any departure from its norms is immediately perceived as an attack upon the very basis of its existence. Everything must be sacrificed to cohesion, and the cohesion of the sect can only be maintained if dissent is excluded. To the sect, every internal dissension appears to endanger the mobilization of concerted energies for the struggle with the outside world. Sects cannot afford toward their members the leniency of larger groups. Insofar as the relatively small size of such elite groups does mean the total involvement of the members, every conflict situation is likely to involve their total personality. A conflict within the sect is thus likely to lead to much more deep-going consequences than in larger groups. To the sectarian a man who dissents is not only in error, he is in sin..

Where the church-type organization strengthens its inner cohesion by allowing various conflicting tendencies to exist within its ranks, the political or religious sect must continuously expel dissenters to maintain or increase cohesion among the remaining "worthy" participants.

A group which from its inception is conceived as an elite struggle group must oblige its members to participate continuously in the selection

and reselection of those who are "worthy," that is, those who do not question or dissent, precisely because its very existence is based on the "purity" of its membership. Such groups must continuously engage in self-purification drives, and so they must constantly breed heresy and schism.

Incessantly engaged in struggle with the outside and providing no room for internal differences, these groups will react violently not only against the heretic but also against every form of dissent as an attack upon the very basis of the group's existence. The dissenter, unlike the heretic or renegade, has not left the group either to join the ranks of the enemy or to set up a rival group of his own. Whereas the open group affords him expression within its structure, the sect sees in him only the potential renegade.

The dissenter is, in a sense, even more dangerous to the sect than the renegade who has gone over to the enemy, for the dissenter claims belongingness. By attacking the unanimity of group feeling the dissenter obtrudes an element of personal choice into a structure which is based on unanimity of choice.

The open group can allow the coexistence within its ranks of conflicting and heterogenous elements and will be able to shift its ideological content or its value orientation in accord with the balance of power of the various elements which make up its structure. The closed group, on the other hand, cannot come to terms with internal divergences and hence can react to expression of dissent only by branding it as heresy.

Heresy derives from a Greek word meaning to choose or to take for oneself. The sect defines as heretics all those who propose alternatives where the group wants no alternatives to exist. It is less dangerous for the sect if the dissenter goes over to the enemy than if, as a heretic, he forms his own rival group, for as a heretic he continues to compete for the loyalty of the members of his former group even after he has left it. While the renegade will fight against his former group and give it occasion to draw more closely together, the heretic will proselytize among actual or potential adherents of that group.

The history of radical sects records few cases in which an opposing faction has not been accused of going over to the bourgeoisie, or petty bourgeoisie, as the case may be. It is easier to deal with the heretic if it can be shown that "objectively" he has sold out. Thus Lenin could write: "Do you see now, comrades of the *New Iskra*, where your turn toward Martynovism has landed you? Do you understand that your political philosophy has turned out to be a rehash of the Osvobozhdeniye philosophy? —and that (against your will and unconsciously) you have found yourselves at the tail of the monarchist bourgeoisie?" (*Two Tactics*).

To the sect, vilification, slander, persecution are always justified

against the heretic. As St. Augustine puts it with classical brevity: "Not we have persecuted you, but your own works." "Let them first prove that they are not heretics and not schismatics, and then complain."

Since the sect tends continually to produce heresy it is understandable that sectarians will often spend considerably more time and energy on the persecution of heretics than on the pursuit of their avowed aims. Hatred among Protestant sects which originally split over comparatively minor theological differences was often more pronounced than antagonism between Protestant and Catholic; hatred between members of various radical political sects is more violent than their antagonism against the "class enemy." It is precisely the memory of former closeness which adds fuel to present antagonism.

The struggle against inner enemies strengthens the cohesion of the remaining purified worthies. The sect thus often tends to "invent" inner enemies in order to strengthen its solidarity. It is engaged in a perpetual search for hidden malefactors. This is especially noteworthy in cases where the sect has suffered defeat. Admission that such defeats are due to the strength of the antagonists would be an admission of weakness. Hence sectarians look in their own ranks for dissenters and potential heretics who hampered unity and contributed to weaknesses. True believers have a perennial tendency to account for defeat without in terms of "treason" within. Those members who bear the burden of being scapegoats, through their sacrifice cleanse the group of its failings, and in this way reestablish its solidarity; the loyal members are reassured that the group as a whole has not failed but only some traitors; moreover, they can reaffirm their righteousness by uniting in action against the "traitors" and thus overcome any feelings of personal inadequacy.

A well-known sect leader, James P. Cannon, illustrates this mechanism when he hints darkly: "Almost since the beginning of the Trotskyist movement in this country . . . its functioning has been impeded by an internal disease which poisoned the bloodstream of the party organism . . ." and thus inferentially suggests that lack of success was due to internal sabotage. We may note in parenthesis that such linking of dissent with disease is extremely frequent in radical sectarian literature. Trotsky entitles one of his factional articles "From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene"; Max Shachtman feels that "through the bloodstream of the party's youth must run a powerful resistance to the poison of clique politics and subjectivism" etc., etc. The popularity of this image among sectarians is readily understandable: disease calls for purification, elimination, expulsion. Writes Arnold Petersen, National Secretary of the Socialist Labor Party: . . . "no one, no group, ever 'split off' from the Socialist Labor Party. The expulsion of individuals from the party constitutes removal of unfit material. Excess-

censes removed from a body are 'expulsions'—that and nothing more . . . the SLP has no interest whatever in refuse deposited in the 'garbage can,'" (quoted in Robert J. Alexander, "Splinter Groups in American Radical Politics," *Social Research* XX, 3, 1953).

III

The true believer is always convinced that he has a special hold on the Truth. Any tentativeness in this respect is foreign to him for it would render his elite position untenable and his claims for deference invalid. Thus Calvin could write: "God has been good enough to reveal to me Good and Evil," and James P. Cannon can state emphatically: "The body of doctrine and methods known as Trotskyism is indubitably the genuine Marxism of our time . . . there is no other movement, there is no other school that has answered anything. There is no other school that is worth a moment's consideration. . . ." (*The Struggle for a Proletarian Party*, p. 53.)

Conviction that one indubitably has gotten hold of the Correct Insight into the workings of the Spirit—among secular radical sects usually referred to as History—helps to overcome any feelings of weakness that may crop up among the sectarians when they contemplate their numerical weakness. Numbers do not count, only Correct Insight. Thus a recent split-off from the American Trotskyists proclaims in the first issue of its magazine, *The American Socialist*:

We are part of the stream of history. We are confident of our future because we believe we have the correct understanding and tactic, and because we know we have the body of militants with the grit and tenacity to carry on. Do not anybody despair because of our small numbers, or because the movement of the left in general is so isolated today. We are like the American abolitionists of a hundred years ago. We are like Garrison and Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass and John Brown. . . .

George Santayana once defined a fanatic as "a man who redoubles his efforts when he has forgotten his ends"—this definition may be applied with equal justice to the sectarian. The true believer is unable to profit from experience, unable to correct his vision in the light of new evidence. Evidence, in fact, does not concern him. That is why it is generally quite useless to argue with a sectarian since the purpose of argumentation is precisely to adduce new evidence in the light of which belief is to be tested. The sectarian *knows* and given that knowledge any new evidence appears as simply irrelevant.

The religious believer claims that empirical facts have nothing to do with superempirical realities, that these are separate realms, and he is, of course, quite correct. But when the secular sectarian claims that his beliefs are validated by "science" and at the same time rejects the continual process of self-correction which is the very essence of scientific method, one is apt to be somewhat annoyed. Yet one must understand that "science" in the system of these sectarians has a totally different connotation than it has in the world outside—it connotes a symbol of faith, not a method.

IV

Mention has already been made of the strong leveling tendencies within the sect. The sect attempts to achieve uniformity and homogeneity through de-individualization. All sect members are brothers, co-equal participants in the pneuma of salvation. And yet sects also tend to be strongly authoritarian and subject to the powerful control of charismatic leaders. The paradox, however, is only apparent. Common subjection to authority favors leveling and, as Simmel has said, "insofar as a number of people are equally subject to one individual, they are themselves equal." This kind of negative democratization or equalization of the members of the sect does not contradict but rather complements their subjection to authoritarian control. Despotism thrives on uniformity.

Yet authority relations within the sect show great strain and tension. Centralized control is usually facilitated by organizational structures in which the ordinary member participates only segmentally and sporadically so that a small leadership clique can legitimize its control by referring to its total involvement in, and greater sacrifices for, the tasks of the organization. But since in the sect all members do fully participate in the activities, authoritarian control always encounters the resistance of equally involved sectarians who claim a share in power.

Given these contradictions, sects are forced either to develop bureaucratic structures which negate theoretical equality by instituting factual inequality, or continuously to breed dissent and expulsion of those members who resist the authority of the center—or they combine both patterns in an uneasy equilibrium. Writes James P. Cannon, who heads a sect which is also strongly bureaucratized: "What is the next thing we hear? That they [an internal opposition] are full of 'grievances' against the party 'regime.' I always get suspicious when I hear of grievances. . ." (*Fourth International*, Spring 1954, p. 51).

The sect tends to be torn between two opposite organizational principles, either the extreme bureaucratization of the Church or Army (and consequent loss of sect characteristics) or a structure where all are generals, but where there is always the danger of a pronunciamento.

2. The Radical Sect in America

A formal sociological analysis cannot do justice to ideological contents. To understand the sectarian fully one must place oneself in his position, one must, so to speak, temporarily "become a sectarian." This will be easier for those of us who, at one time or another, have actually been sectarians.

Emily Dickinson speaks somewhere of the pathos of the poet who "always writes letters to the world, but the world never answers." A similar pathos inheres in the life of the radical sectarian in America. Most of them have again and again made efforts to reach out to the world, to merge themselves with the great mass of their fellows, to branch out into the wider community of political men—only to find that their words had no echo, their gestures remained empty and their appeals unanswered.

The original radical impulse of the sectarian was likely to be born out of a revolt against the injustice, the cruelty, the insensitivity of American capitalist society; it was nourished by moral indignation and Utopian idealism. The political sectarian, as distinct from the religious sectarian, didn't want to save his own soul; he wanted, out of the generous impulse of his conviction, to change the human condition of his fellowmen. But such was the state of American society that his appeal found no echo, his eager offers of help no response, his idealism was derided as impracticality and hypocrisy by the very men whom he wanted to help. Such were the twists of history in nineteenth and twentieth century America, that rather than being able to link himself to significant mass movements the radical was perennially rejected and thrust into the isolation of the sect. The matter-of-fact practicality of the labor movement, its insensitiveness to doctrine and idealism, led to his isolation. The socialist movement either adapted itself to prevailing strands of opinion, thus losing much of its radical inflection, or it was thrown into isolation and in a reflex of defensiveness accentuated its sectarian characteristics.

Such is the tragedy of the American radical sect, from the early experiments in communitarianism or single-tax panaceas to DeLeonism and Trotskyism. Yet we have not fully understood the radical sect if we allow analysis to rest at this point. True, rejection by the world led to withdrawal, but such an attitude once established began to develop an autonomy of its own. The initial radicalism led to rejection by the outside, but this rejection in turn led to an accentuation of sect characteristics which made a return to the world impossible. We deal here with a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: the sectarians were deeply convinced of their rejection and this conviction in itself, in addition to all the objective factors which were certainly present, led them further to accentuate outside hostility. The

world was now perceived as hostile and threatening as a whole, salvation was more and more to be found only within the confines of the organization of the worthy. The impulse to go out into the world atrophied. The microcosm of the sect replaced the macrocosm. Thus, insensibly, the sectarian began to forget the generous motives for which the sect had once been established. What counted now was simply the maintenance of the organization. Sheer survival of the community of the faithful primed interest in spreading the message for which they had originally gathered together. What had once been the exigencies of a specific situation was now erected into a kind of frozen dogma. The sect became convinced that it had come "at the wrong time"—but don't sects, as it were, always come at the wrong time?—it gloried in this situation and made no efforts to break out of it. What counted most heavily now was simply sect belongingness, not specific ideas or attitudes. In some such organizations, as long as a man was willing to keep within the brotherly community, no matter what his opinion, he was accepted. Thus the maintenance of the organization as such superseded the ostensible purposes for which it had come into being.

All this one can only view with pain and sympathy and terror. It is easy enough to laugh at the sectarian, but what he enacts is pathos, not farce.

Yet when all this has been said, it remains to state emphatically that the radical sect is an obstacle, not an aid, in the development of a socialist movement in America. We need a new generation of radicals who, like those who built the Debsian Socialist Party, go out into the world of their fellowmen and inquire after their needs, desires, wishes, not men who in their cloistered virtue know the correct prescriptions. I know of no better way to end these remarks than to quote a passage from Marx which stands at the close of the history of the American radical movement that the late Lilian Symes and Travers Clement wrote some 20 years ago, and which remains even more apposite today than it was then: "The development of socialist sects and the development of a genuine labor movement have at all times been in inverse ratio. If sects exist with a measure of historical justification for their existence, it but indicates that the working class has not yet ripened for an independent historic movement. But when the working class reaches maturity, all sects become a reactionary phenomenon."

THE ECONOMICS OF JOSEPH SCHUMPETER

Ben B. Seligman

When an economic theory successfully fuses into one vast system the ideas that an economy continuously reproduces itself without altering levels of production or consumption patterns, that perfect balancing of economic forces is attainable, that the prime movers in economic development are adventurous entrepreneurs whose perpetual search for profit induces such change, and that capitalism will fail simply because it is too successful, there is little doubt that it can be described as an intriguing and even startling doctrine. This was the system constructed by one of the great economists of our time, Joseph A. Schumpeter, who was professor at Harvard from 1927 until his death in 1950.

Schumpeter's theories, however, were not an eclectic collection of conglomerate notions. He has a cohesive theory of the origin, functioning and decline of capitalism out of which is built an imposing set of hypotheses on business cycles, money, interest and prices. Much of Schumpeter's ideas were fixed when he was still a young man. In 1908, at the age of 25, he published a work on theoretical economics that touched on virtually all of the problems of the field and even suggested the solutions at which he would in later life arrive. By the time he was 30, he had written a short history of economics which was to be expanded decades later into the posthumous and fantastically huge *magnus opus*, the *History of Economic Analysis*.* Yet he remained basically a kind of old-fashioned economist, for he rejected the more recent developments in monopolistic competition and Keynesian doctrine. Despite the fact that he acknowledged the importance of advertising and product differentiation, his own doctrinal system was based essentially on "pure" competition. His rejection of the Keynesian message was even sharper, stemming from a distaste for the implication that an economy could be tinkered with to make it work. His own ideas were based on a kind of prime-mover notion: once capitalism started it should be permitted to keep going under its own sealed-in, self-lubricating power. This implied that for "pure" theory, it would be necessary to reject all political, philosophical and ethical considerations.

* *History of Economic Analysis*. Oxford Univ. Press: New York, 1954. 1260 pp. \$17.50.

The type of theory with which Schumpeter was concerned deals with the behavior of single business units in an environment over which they exercise but little control. It was, in the main, the traditional body of thought and he sought to reformulate it in terms of general equilibrium, an approach that emphasized simultaneity and interdependence. But there was always implicit in this structure the notion of marginal utility, which never quite avoided the accusation of making economic man a dextrous balancer of pleasures and pains.

In an early work, *Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der Theoretischen Nationalökonomie*, Schumpeter insisted that economic analysis could be freed of hedonism and that theory should not be used to rationalize the existing pattern of income distribution. This was a particularly important point to stress, for, more and more, economists at the turn of the century were either consciously or unconsciously employing marginal utility and productivity theory to justify this as the best of all possible economies.

As a theorist, Schumpeter exhibited a generosity that was unusual. Although an avowed conservative, he did not hesitate to recognize Marx as a brilliant economist. What mattered to him was the quality of a man's work and what Schumpeter liked to describe as "vision." By this he meant a "preanalytic cognitive act" that supplied the raw material for scientific investigation. This was a perception into economic problems that would enable one to ask really meaningful questions. Given, therefore, the ideological biases, there was no reason to condemn a man's intellectual output simply because one disagreed with him. Ever willing to listen to his adversary, Schumpeter was never satisfied until he viewed reality from the standpoint of the other. This desire to discover the meaning of an opponent's question was extraordinary in a field where the most innocent inquiry could elicit an hour-long exposition of some personal belief.

While Schumpeter acknowledged mathematics as an important tool in economics, it could never, he felt, replace the exercise of intuitive insight. Such intuition led to the art of building useful abstractions, an art in which Ricardo, Marx and Walras were supreme. This, thought Schumpeter, was the real core of economic method. Doubtlessly, he imbibed a good deal of this during his student days at Vienna, where he studied with von Wieser and Böhm-Bawerk, and assuredly must have had to demonstrate sharp wit in debates with Otto Bauer and Rudolf Hilferding. Despite his predilection for the precise, he was something of a romantic among economists. Capitalism, he averred, should be an exciting, glamorous adventure. In his advocacy of the use of mathematics he did not preclude an appeal to historical evidence. In 1950, the last year of his life, he conceded that mathematical models in business cycle studies had not been as fruitful as he had hoped and that as between the theoretical, statistical and historical methods, the

third was the most important. Yet in his own vast research, he seldom failed to employ all three. He was able to use them because of his great knowledge of scientific method. He who doubts this has only to read the introductory chapters of the *History*, where Schumpeter demonstrates a grasp of the philosophical and sociological interrelations in economics which is indeed rare.

No method, insisted Schumpeter, possessed so general a validity that it could claim to be superior to all others. Each method has a specific application: the historical method might be appropriate for an examination of economic organization, while price theory might demand abstraction and model building. Yet both, he pointed out, "often converge and become indistinguishable." Of all the social sciences, he argued, only economics comes close to the natural sciences and this only because it deals with phenomena capable of being "quantified." In fact, measurement of much economic data does not have to be superimposed as in physics for they "already present themselves to our observation as quantities made numerical by life itself." Once this proposition is grasped, there is no need to resort to a study of motives or mainsprings of human behavior. It was the failure to realize this that led the Classicists astray, since associationist psychology, hedonism and comparisons of utility were all irrelevant to the basic technique of economic quantification. But measurement and statistics are not sufficient for comprehending the relationships between economic facts. For this, theoretical economics is the required tool. "We must put our trust," said Schumpeter in the opening pages of his *Business Cycles*, "in bold and unsafe mental experiments or else give up all hope."

He conceded that these experiments may not partake of the reality we know, but while they are arbitrary constructs, they are created with the facts in mind. This gives to economic theory its system and rigor, while at the same time it is shaped by the phenomena it purports to study. Within this methodological framework, equilibrium theory became for Schumpeter a static system in which the long-run effects of small and continuous changes in basic data were observed. While there might not be any practical relevance in this, Schumpeter nevertheless felt that variations in static conditions could yield significant answers for some economic problems (tariffs and taxation). Where changes were large and discontinuous, dynamic methods were called for. Schumpeter first set forth a dynamic model in his *Theory of Economic Development* and later elaborated it in his book on cycles. Starting with static analysis as set forth in his doctrine of the circular flow, he noted how breaks in the flow, such as the introduction of new goods, new methods of production, opening

of new industrial organizations, made the economy a dynamic one. These were the forces that made for "development."

II

Schumpeter's theory of economic change exhibits a kind of internal drive that has nothing to do with either a great man or devil theory of history. Economic change is brought about by "innovation," a catch-all word for the breaks in the circular flow. Innovation is, of course, a broad social process in which many individuals take part, making change a pervasive aspect of the economy. Granting that the economic system will be affected by wars, revolutions, crop variations and taxes, Schumpeter characterized these as "external" factors. He did not deny their importance, but like Marx he wanted to discover the "internal" laws of capitalist motion. He wanted to know what elements there were within the economy that impelled shifts in activity. These, he thought, were the important things—changes in taste, in ways of making things and in methods of supplying goods. It was evident that the last was the most significant, for nowhere else did innovation exert greater force.

It was clear that Innovation was not the same thing as Invention. The latter was a technological fact, while the former was an economic and sociological process. Innovation, Schumpeter insisted, was a matter of business behavior in that it turned existing productive forces to new uses. Technically, innovation sets up a "production function" which is always associated with the rise of a new business leadership. New ways of making things, which is what the production function really means, do not take place in old businesses. So-called old firms which have survived the rigors of economic change have been able to do so, says Schumpeter, because they were fundamentally transformed under the impact of innovation: they no longer are able to display the attributes of conservatism.

Innovation does not proceed smoothly: it comes in clusters and spasmodic movements. As one industrial leader overcomes technological and financial impediments and opens a new path to profit, others follow with a rush. But towards the end of such a prosperous period the entire economy becomes upset and further gains become uncertain. Errors and miscalculations force some firms into bankruptcy. There are adjustments, of both the sharp and rolling variety, with concomitant destruction of values. Realizations no longer meet expectations. A depression ensues in which everyone waits for new facts to be discovered before economic calculations can once more be balanced. This is what Schumpeter called the process of "creative destruction."

Nevertheless, this enabled capitalism to produce increasingly greater quantities of goods. According to Schumpeter, the major criterion for

an economy's success is its ability to expand production: capitalism, he argues, has unquestionably measured up to this index.* While innovation may cause a painful disarrangement of previous economic relationships, in the long run it results in social gain. Set in this context, large-scale industry, often criticized as monopolistic, has a special function to perform. Rigid prices, limited output and patent control have in actuality kept capitalism on an even keel, thus serving as a desirable counterbalance to innovation.

Yet while capitalism has operated admirably, it cannot continue to do so, said Schumpeter. The causes of capitalism's breakdown, however, are not to be sought in the realm of economics, but rather in the habits of thought which comprise its cultural superstructure. Capitalist thought, he said, was initially rational and logical; the very nature of economic calculation impels the business man to clear thinking. It is anti-heroic, basically pacifist and apt to insist on the application of private morals to international relations. Moreover, it provided the social arena for a new bourgeoisie which produced, on the basis of a strong, powerful and Puritanical individualism ". . . not only the modern mechanized plant and the volume of output that pours from it, not only modern technology and economic organization, but all the features and achievements of modern civilization."

Yet, declares Schumpeter, this superb engine will fall apart. Capitalism in its early stages was essentially an adventure. The individual business man may have undertaken risks for the anticipated return, but he was also motivated by the implicit challenge to his industrial and commercial ability. But today progress has been mechanized, and the function of the entrepreneur, to apply new innovations, has atrophied and is being reduced to mere routine. The romance of earlier commercial adventures is wearing away; bureau and committee work now displace individual action. All this, the inevitable outcome of the capitalist process, tends to convert the bourgeoisie into a superfluous class. Thus, the very success of capitalist enterprise paradoxically impairs the status of the class primarily associated with it.

This displacement eliminates the small business man; private property and freedom of contract become archaic legal instruments; millions of absentee stockholders take the place of active participants in the capitalist process; the economic order eventually fails to evoke the loyalty and emotional response required to sustain it. The people begin to turn away from capitalism, says Schumpeter, in spite of its effectiveness as a producing machine. But the great mass of people are unable to express their loss of faith. Their disappointments and dissatisfactions must be articulated by those alienated intellectuals who have acquired a vested interest

* cf. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Chapter V.

in unrest. Intellectuals sooner or later become detached from the dominant order. Overproduced and given no financial stake in capitalism, they are driven to stimulating, verbalizing and organizing discontent in a system that fails to provide them with a satisfying role. The social atmosphere becomes hostile, so that people will refuse on principle to take account of the requirements of capitalist production and in this way seriously impede its effective functioning. Since capitalism can operate well, the explanation of its final collapse is in the destructive action of non-economic minded individuals.

III

It almost appears that Schumpeter would agree with Marx: capitalism, in the long run, tends to stumble over its own inner contradictions. It was perhaps this similarity in vision that made Marx so attractive to him. Not that he was uncritical: there seems little left of the technical aspects of the Marxian structure after he gets through with it, especially in the *History*. Schumpeter placed little stock in Marx's political aims, his Hegelian metaphysics or his materialistic sociology. While he acknowledged the remarkable precision with which Marx formulated the economic interpretation of history, Schumpeter felt that it inhibited the construction of more generalized theories. Nevertheless, Marx was four-square in the Classical tradition: in an early work, *Economic Doctrine and Method*, Schumpeter makes clear that the scientific core of Marxism is traceable to Ricardo and his forebears. Above all else, says Schumpeter, Marx was a very learned and extremely capable economist. He also describes him as a prophet, sociologist and teacher.* The point is that despite the special Marxian bias there is an interest in economic problems in their own terms: there is a primary concern, says Schumpeter, with "sharpening the tools of analysis proffered by the science of [the] day, with straightening out logical difficulties and with building . . . a theory that in nature and intent was truly scientific whatever its shortcomings may have been." Yet because Marx based himself on Ricardian value theory, he failed to break out of the intellectual limits of the time, says Schumpeter. Both Ricardo and Marx argued that the value of a commodity is proportional to the quantity of labor embodied in it (with Marx it was socially necessary labor) and both measured this by resorting to labor time as a standard. Both encountered the same difficulties with the theory, difficulties that led Schumpeter to pronounce it not merely wrong, but dead and buried. However, the fact that Marx was able to distinguish between the quantity of labor and labor power, the ability to create embodied value (measured

* cf. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Part I.

by the quantity of labor that goes into the goods a worker consumes, including the goods and services used up in rearing and training) represented a marked and even ingenious analytical advance over Ricardo. What complicated the problem for Marx was the recognition of the divergence of prices from values. As Schumpeter remarks: "His problem was precisely to show how . . . these absolute values, without being altered came to be shifted about in such ways that in the end commodities, while still retaining their values, were not sold at relative prices proportional to these values." In other words, price deviations did not alter values but only redistributed them.

Marx's greatness as an economist, admits Schumpeter, stems from his realization that capitalism could not be attacked with merely ethical slogans. Marx sought to prove that exploitation was inherent in the logic of capitalism and that no single industrialist could be assessed with personal responsibility for what the system did. This was done with the theory of surplus value, one of the most facile and for that reason powerful inventions of economic discourse. Yet, while Schumpeter does a respectable job in refuting Marxian value theory in its own terms, he is not averse to employing a kind of *ad hominem* argument. At one point he says that the exploitation theory is a rationalization of ancient slogans expressing the resentment of the lower classes against the upper strata living on the fruits of their labor. This eventually became synonymous with exploitation.

However, it was Marx's emphasis on capitalist change that attracted Schumpeter. Marx's recognition that capitalism is not and cannot be stationary, that it is altered continually by internal forces, came close to his own system, Schumpeter felt. It will be recalled, however, that Schumpeter derived the motive power for his dynamic changes from the breakthrough in the circular flow that an innovator achieves. In the circular flow stage, which is a static one, all the factors of production and all the consuming power required for normal circulation are present. But the innovator, securing new credit from the banking system, is able to divert factors of production from existing channels, thus initiating a dynamic phase. In other words, the economy requires the external force of an innovating break in order to achieve significant changes. Thus, Schumpeter does not quite succeed in making economic development completely dependent on elements internal to the economy itself. In this regard, Marx's theory seems a superior one, for by emphasizing the problems of accumulation of capital, the flow of economic resources through simple and extended reproduction, productivity and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, he sought to demonstrate that what makes capitalism move are forces generated from within. Whatever one may have to say about its details, the very conception of the Marxian system is breathtaking.

Both Marx and Schumpeter recognized the increasing obsolescence of the entrepreneur. Marx, in his chapter on credit, points out that the functioning capitalist is transformed by the spread of corporate organization into an administrator of other people's money, while the owner is transformed into a mere lender of capital. Furthermore, said Marx, the centralization of capital, facilitated by the growth of corporations, leads to a rationalization of productive processes. In this sense, corporate growth might be interpreted as a stabilizing factor, a notion not unrelated to Schumpeter's defense of large-scale enterprise. The similarity here is too striking to go unobserved. But these are similarities in detail only, for one thing that Schumpeter surely did not savor was the change in the whole apparatus of organizational and political control that stemmed from Marx's theory.

Perhaps the major difference between Marx and Schumpeter might be described as follows: Marx always analyzed his economic factors in a successive chain of causation, calculating the relationships in an arithmetical manner and deducing thereby the information he wanted about the unknowns that interested him; Schumpeter, on the other hand, sought to discover how the various elements in an economic situation affected each other simultaneously and for this the more powerful tools of algebra and calculus were required. Not that Marx was unaware of the interdependence of economic factors: attention need only be called to his analysis of the way in which the organic composition of capital depends on the rate of surplus value. Yet, in the main, he held to the causal technique and this placed him at a decided analytical disadvantage, for it was difficult to express clearly in this way the mutually interdependent character of economic relationships.

In the *History*, Schumpeter defends the Marxian system, despite alleged errors and inconsistencies, on the ground that it is analytical and logical, comprised as it is of statements of relations between social facts. While it is weighted down by class ideology, influenced by heated value judgments, overladen with questionable sociology, Marxian economics possesses an undeniable methodological meaning which demands that intelligence be brought to bear on it. Marx wrestled with every fact and argument that came his way, often to be unnecessarily diverted from his main point, but he was, says Schumpeter, ". . . a born analyst, a man who felt impelled to do analytic work, whether he wanted to or not." Whatever inconsistencies there are in Marxian economics, are in details, not in vision.

It is well to observe in these days, when Marx is so often dismissed as unworthy of scholarly attention, that Schumpeter advised: "There is no point whatever in perusing selected bits of Marx's writings or even in

perusing the first volume of *Das Kapital* alone. Any economist who wishes to study Marx at all must resign himself to reading carefully the whole of the three volumes . . . and the *Theorien über den Mehrwert*." Schumpeter also cautioned that careful preparation was required for Marx: understanding him demanded a knowledge of the economics of his time and especially of Ricardo.*

IV

Schumpeter's great intellectual hero was Leon Walras. In the *History* he says: "So far as pure theory is concerned, Walras is in my opinion the greatest of all economists. His system of economic equilibrium, uniting as it does the quality of revolutionary creativeness with the quality of classic synthesis, is the only work by an economist that will stand comparison with the achievements of theoretical physics. . . . It is the outstanding landmark on the road that economics travels toward the status of a rigorous or exact science and, though outmoded by now, still stands at the back of much of the best theoretical work of our time." Schumpeter thought Walras so important because he found exact forms for phenomena whose interdependence is attested to by actualities; he derived these forms from each other; he did it in a new field without the accumulated experience of prior work; and he achieved favorable results despite great difficulties.

Walras, himself the son of a noted economist, was trained as an engineer and for a while worked as a free lance journalist advocating typically French middle class ideas on social reform. In fact, his style of thinking and background was typically French—Condillac, Turgot, Cournot, and his father, Auguste Walras, provided the intellectual framework for his main economic ideas. By chance he attended a conference on taxation in Lausanne in 1860. The connections he made there brought him a decade later a professorship at the University. Walras, however, was not a successful theorist in the same sense that, say, Keynes was. He did not receive the immediate acclaim that comes to those able to touch a responsive public

* Schumpeter touches briefly on the Imperialism phase of Marxist doctrine in his *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. His own essay on the subject, *The Sociology of Imperialism*, he considered among the most important he had written. As might be expected, his thesis on imperialism diverged sharply from that propounded by Marxists. The latter utilized class and accumulation theories to account for the complex maze of international economic relations and the resulting politics. The inherent logic of capitalist development, according to Marxism, explains loans, tariffs and aggressive wars. Although history supplies enough evidence to support the Marxist doctrine, Schumpeter argues that the historical facts in the matter have never been made clear. Moreover, Marxists have failed to integrate adequately their theory of imperialism with their general doctrine, he says: the heyday of imperialism came during capitalism's youth; class conflict was lessened by imperialism; and business men followed the flag, not the other way around. In actuality, said Schumpeter, capitalists tend to be anti-imperialist and quite rational about business problems, while imperialism is wrapped in nationalist sentiment. The entire construction here is a dubious one and Schumpeter's refutation unconvincing. For an interesting debate on the question see *Social Research*, June and December, 1952.

chord. Actually, what Walras did was to look at old reality in a new way, but it was a long time before the profession would give him any honors. What Walras did was to throw light on the nature of economic relationships with one basic principle—economic equilibrium. This was an achievement comparable to Marx's, who, perhaps wrong in his selection of tools, was still able to describe economic behavior with the grandeur that comes from the use of a single unifying conception.*

Walras' general equilibrium theory was built up through a process of decreasing abstraction. Starting with a two-person, two-commodity barter situation, he made his model gradually more complex by introducing more commodities as well as the factors of capital and money. At all times the analysis proceeds on the basis of perfect competition. In the two-person case, Walras is able to obtain demand curves for each party from the supply curve of the other. Then he analyzes the factors behind each demand curve by inquiring into the conditions necessary for maximizing satisfactions. This results in the rule that for the maximum satisfaction of each party it is required that the ratio of the marginal utility of each commodity must be equal to the ratio of their prices. In multi-commodity exchange, where the price of each good is stated in terms of all the others, there will be for x goods $x(x-1)$ prices and $x(x-1)/2$ markets. In equilibrium, the prices of two goods in terms of each other must equal the ratios of their prices in terms of any third good. If not, then buying and selling will continue until this state is reached. Thus, the prices are eventually stated in terms of some common standard, an accounting unit, which Walras called the *numeraire*.

All this appears very technical, but it simply comes down to a refined and precise statement that supply and demand determine price. As Schumpeter says, Walras tried to show that while in actuality traders in a market may not be the lightning calculators the theory seemingly suggests they are, they nevertheless do empirically arrive at roughly the same thing. People entering a competitive market with a good and an approximate idea of what they want to sell it for are met by others who are bound to make offers. Somewhere along the line a balance will be struck. Walras is saying the same thing with greater precision.

* Schumpeter's discussion of Walras, like much else in the *History*, has a rugged quality which at times becomes disturbing. A good deal of this can be attributed to the incomplete state of the book. While elaborate in design and execution—it weaves together many threads in economic theory, philosophy, sociology, history, money, business cycles and public finance—there are numerous gaps in it. The discussion of Keynes, for example, is sketchy, being no more than notes, while American Institutionalism (Veblen) is entirely lacking. When Schumpeter died in 1950 he had not completed any part in final form and his widow Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter, who edited the manuscript, had to put it together from material found in at least three different places. The editorial task was made more difficult by Schumpeter's habit of keeping early notes and later drafts together with more polished versions.

Beyond the exchange of goods, there is the question of production. In essence, this is the theory of how land, labor and capital are allocated to different needs. Essentially it is a matter of pricing the "factors of production." Walras here made an important distinction between factors and the services they render: what is significant is the stream of services productive factors can offer. On this basis he created an elaborate classification of resources which provided a comprehensive picture of the free enterprise system and its circular flow.

Walras' approach, however, abandoned the problem of price causation. Any connection between price and value now seemed irrelevant. Economists no longer had to search for the source of value: they now had a formal theory of interdependence in which economic relations were stated in the neutral language of functional equations. For this purpose mathematics proved an invaluable asset. The system, furthermore, was a determinate one because the number of equations was equal to the number of unknowns. Special situations, such as speculative or prestige markets, were excluded. The entire structure, however, seemed to possess but dubious practicality, dealing as it did with idealized cases. One thing is certain: the increasing neutrality and formal rigidity removed such economic theory from the realm of political applicability. In fact, some economists have been able to make this theory so neutral that it can be used, they aver, for a socialist as well as a capitalist society. Walrasian economics, in this sense, is like a huge research program which has not yet been able to supply all the answers. As a starting point it provides for the clear formulation of all possible premises and the inclusion of all important elements. Insofar as this is true, it has its usefulness.

Schumpeter's long and detailed discussion omits, interestingly enough, Walras' theory of applied and social economics. This was due to the fact that Schumpeter visualized the *History* as one of analysis rather than of economic thought in general. In other words, Schumpeter was interested in efforts to describe and explain economic facts and in attempts to provide logical tools for doing so. Policy questions, to which legislators might address themselves, were excluded from major consideration. He was concerned only with the so-called scientific aspects of economic thinking. However, it is doubtful that this is a defensible approach, for it can be argued that the particular outlook of a theorist in the social sciences is bound to impart a special coloration even to the most formal parts of his system. To refuse to acknowledge this is to dodge the task of evaluation. Schumpeter admitted that ideas often glorify the interests of the class which is in a position to assert itself. This may very well result in a theory that does not match the truth. But at times he felt that it might be possible to recognize ideological influences and that a detached intelligence could "enjoy

the privilege of being exempt."* Some doctrines, then, can develop a quality of universality that makes them adaptable to varying social atmospheres. This was the case with the Walrasian system, whose author was something of a socialist.

Walras felt that while his general equilibrium theory set the conditions for maximizing utility, it was the task of applied economics to demonstrate that such a maximum could be attained on the one hand through private initiative and on the other through state regulation. In the area of social economics, which studied the principles of income and property distribution, there should be "equality of conditions, inequality of positions." That is, the community should not fix the individual's position in economic society nor should it profit from it; nor should the individual fix the social conditions in which he functions, nor should he profit from them. State regulation, therefore, was proper in the areas of money, education, justice (areas where the individual cannot properly estimate the utilities of services), monopoly, railroads, and working conditions. Walras observed that free competition in the labor market resulted in inordinately long hours: therefore, government regulation in this area was essential to health. He visualized a liberal-socialist system with central responsibility and the use of a free price mechanism. He supported cooperatives. He was, essentially, a kind of 19th century rationalist reformer very close to the Fabian political approach.

V

As much as Schumpeter admired Walras, so did he abhor Keynes. The late English economist had had, of course, a fantastic success: his great work, *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, set the tone of public discussion on economic matters for almost two decades and, perhaps even more important, it reflected the temper of his time in a way that Schumpeter could never approach, if he had wanted to. It was precisely this that Schumpeter rejected in Keynes. The latter's applied economics could not be separated from the theoretical framework and this Schumpeter could not abide. Keynes, he argued, had merely built a conceptual vehicle for an ideology which posited that the cause of capitalism's collapse was within itself. The alienation of the intellectual and the obsolescence of a class did not count as significant factors: capitalism stumbled over its own feet. In Keynesian doctrine it was not necessary to look for non-economic causes.

* In his presidential address at the American Economic Association in 1948, Schumpeter set forth an opposite view, feeling that there was no escaping ideological influence. Ideologies, he then said, stem from the same source as "vision," and while progress might be slowed by ideology, it would be impossible without it.

Keynes, like most Englishmen, looked upon theory as a program of action. Schumpeter, on the other hand was wary of such approaches. Keynes was more like the Utilitarians who believed that the State had to establish rules for economic behavior, especially when things went awry. Schumpeter, who did not understand Keynes' "enlightened conservatism," thought that a legislature, in order to serve the masses, would only introduce basically anti-capitalist measures, whereas the solution of capitalism's ailments lay rather in a continuation of the past rate of increase in total output. The fact that Keynes' system avoided time sequences and dealt with short term problems led Schumpeter to describe it as a depression-ridden doctrine and lacking in the kind of generality that a good theory should have. However, as has been demonstrated by others, Schumpeter's own theory suffered from certain weaknesses that might have been overcome with a touch of Keynesianism. Schumpeter's interest theory, for example, which postulated the occurrence of this form of income only in a dynamic society, was related to the possibility of profit in new ventures. It was thus a monetary phenomenon linked to innovation and in this sense bore certain similarities to Keynesian doctrine. However, Schumpeter emphasized only the demand side and said little about the supply of loanable funds. What Keynes did was to connect the supply of funds not only to conditions in the money market but to the level of savings as well. Schumpeter always denied that savings could be functionally related to income: in fact, he argued that persons in the upper income brackets save less, relatively and often absolutely, than lower income groups and that the bulk of savings is done with some investment goal in mind. Such an analysis does not begin to measure up to the incisiveness of the Keynesian theory. Nor was Schumpeter ever willing to accept the idea that oversaving and overinvestment might become chronic. So far as he was concerned, Walrasian equilibrium was attainable at the end of every cycle. But Keynes clearly showed that persistent deflation or inflation might be an unwelcome accompaniment of such equilibrium. This is obviously important for any theory of economic development.

Schumpeter's contention that Keynes' doctrine could lead to radicalism was unwarranted. What Keynes had attempted was to give the British liberal tradition a new *political* economy. But he was essentially conservative; he rejected the Labor Party because it was a class party and he preferred to remain with the bourgeoisie. Despite his proposals for government participation in the economy, he opposed collectivism in any form. He thought Marxism erroneous and was puzzled that it could exert an enduring influence on men's minds. In this respect he differed from Schumpeter, who, as we have already noted, believed Marx a great thinker, as indeed he was.

VI

By contrast, Schumpeter was allergic to any doctrine that suggested the feasibility of policy participation by the economist. Throughout the *History* he shows a persistent preference for pure theory, the "positive" features of doctrinal history, rather than for the so-called "normative" propositions. There is implicit in this approach a belief that scientific knowledge is possible in the social sciences independent of value judgments. This is, of course, little more than naiveté. Facts do not order themselves without concepts, and the latter, insofar as they are the expression of our interest in the world about us, are essentially value judgments. Thus, at the very inception of social inquiry, at the point where facts are put together for the purpose of drawing generalizations, "normative" propositions are involved. What is important is to set forth clearly such value judgments as may be implied in particular doctrines. It would, for example, be very helpful if the hedonistic presuppositions of much contemporary theory, especially in that branch described as "welfare" economics, were admitted beforehand. Value judgments cannot be discarded, but they must be meaningful for the particular society which any theory purports to describe. They should be related to the interests of groups in that society and should be expressed in terms of current social and economic change.

Schumpeter's predilection for the general and abstract was itself an expression of inverted interest. During the last few years of his life, he turned away from political events: he had believed Germany not unjustified in seeking to rectify the injustices of Versailles. The sharp reaction this incurred, together with what he thought to be an appalling increase in government intervention in economic affairs, impelled him to turn to purely "scientific" interests. While he had an extraordinary grasp of the methods, views and limitations of virtually all theories, his expressed preference was for those that sought an everlasting universality.

Schumpeter was in reality an intellectual descendent of the Austrian school of economics and it was unavoidable that in his historical and sociological views he should assume what was essentially the attitude of the Middle European intelligentsia. This was perhaps best exemplified in his analysis of the political role of the bourgeoisie, which he insisted was incapable of managing the long-run interests of society. As a result, political affairs become the province of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie and former aristocrats. This, perhaps more than anything else, demonstrates the weakness of his sociological apparatus; it explains also his somewhat arrogant insistence that sociology is to be regarded as the proper occupation of a tired economist. Although of middle-class origin, Schumpeter early adopted the tastes and habits of a Viennese aristocrat. At Harvard he would sometimes describe himself as the last representative of true

European culture. He was repelled by much of Alfred Marshall's writing because of the tone of Victorian morality he sensed in it. Yet he admired England, for its aristocracy knew how to rule.

Why, then, is Schumpeter important not only as an economist but as a social scientist? It is not merely that he advanced a striking and forceful theory of economic development: he achieved at many points a remarkable integration of theory and history; he emphasized, in the main, the dynamic aspects of economic problems; he studied, with a broadness of vision comparable only to Marx, the origin, functioning and decline of capitalism; he sought to employ not only theory and statistics, but historical, sociological and even psychological data; he was concerned, despite the details of economic analysis, with the overall functioning of the capitalist economy, a problem that most academic economists preferred not to discuss.

Despite the great attraction that Schumpeter exerted as a teacher and theorist, there are really no Schumpeterian followers as there are Marxists or Keynesians. This was due not only to the extremely involute presentation in which his doctrines were often couched but also to the obvious fact that in a time of crisis, the critique of policy is usually more attractive. Devoid of the passion that possessed Marx, unable to construct a seemingly simple system as did Keynes, Schumpeter hid his virtues, such as they were, in niceties of logical distinctions and in a phraseology so complex that it might have been lifted from his native German. He could not give his readers what they wanted; he was not a reformer. He sought to be so "scientific" that he ran the risk, in an era when politics and economics were once again being fused, of finding himself without an audience.

THEORIES OF McCARTHYISM--A SURVEY

Dennis H. Wrong

There are signs that Senator McCarthy is slipping. One holds one's breath, for he has stormed back into the headlines to win new triumphs before. But whether he stays or goes it is important to define the social and political roots of "McCarthyism" to see how closely the "ism" is linked to the man. By now, one would expect to find many authoritative interpretations of the political tendency he personifies. Yet such are the passions McCarthy arouses that most discussions of him amount to little more than manifestoes of denunciation or documented exposés. The number of serious political analyses of the man, his mass support and the national mood he expresses, remains surprisingly small.

The very terms in which McCarthy is castigated imply certain "theories" about him. Those who view him primarily in the perspective of the American political tradition assimilate his career to that of other specimens of *demagogus Americanus*. Their verdict is that he is just another unscrupulous politician feeding on the tensions of the period, but destined to be repudiated and to descend into the limbo of "lunatic fringe" politics. Others, more impressed by analogies with recent European history, picture McCarthy as the leader of a formidable reactionary, even fascist, movement, enrolling new millionaires, segments of the Army and the Catholic Church, and an embittered small-town bourgeoisie in what will, it is predicted, remain a powerful faction in American politics for some time to come. A third view sees McCarthy as a mere incident in the slow drift toward the garrison state which started before his rise and will not be checked appreciably by his fall.

The most recent book-length study, *McCarthy and the Communists* by James Rorty and Moshe Dector, sticks fairly closely to the man and his public record. The book is essentially a "campaign document" meant to persuade that public which approves McCarthy's "objectives" while deprecating his "methods," of the insincerity and opportunism of his anti-Communism. The authors' documentation is thorough and they make a few useful distinctions between the McCarthyites and organized totalitarian movements, but their book is chiefly of interest as an expression of the embarrassment and irritation with which those intellectuals who have, as it

were, enlisted for the duration of the Cold War confront McCarthy. Their main complaints are that "he has never proved the seriousness and substantiality of his anti-Communism" and that "both [his] tactics and strategy can only be destructive of the ends sought by authentic anti-Communists."

There is something profoundly disquieting about these terms of opposition to McCarthy, particularly when one remembers that the research for the book was supported by the American Committee for Cultural Freedom. Rorty and Dector are evidently among those intellectuals so ready to serve as unofficial voices of America that they can barely bring themselves to condemn McCarthyism in the large. Their attacks must constantly be interlarded with denunciations of the "anti-anti-Communists" and Europeans who exaggerate McCarthy's power or, like Alan Westin in the July *Commentary*, with warnings that the Communists are exploiting the McCarthy issue.

It hardly needs to be said that the editors of *The Nation* and some European neutralists turn out a good deal of undiscriminating cant about "reigns of terror" in the United States, and certainly the remaining home-grown Stalinists are giving their own twist to anti-McCarthyism. But that McCarthyism, whatever its origins or ultimate significance, has created a national climate in which departures from the most elementary decencies of a democratic society are imperceptibly becoming the norm is something that these Cold War crusaders cannot bring themselves to admit without all sorts of public relations demurrs. In the end they reveal more about the limits of their own concern over McCarthyism than about the phenomenon itself.

Rorty and Dector might argue that *they* are deeply disturbed by McCarthy's inroads on civil liberties, but that their intended audience is less likely to be moved by the protests of civil libertarians than by demonstrations of McCarthy's ineffectiveness as a Communist-hunter. Apart from the questionable expediency and the even more doubtful morality of such a propagandistic approach, what disturbs one about too many of these intellectuals is the way in which their chosen public roles as spokesmen for the American intellectual community have completely usurped what should be their primary roles as critics of society and defenders of freedom.

II

Few serious analysts have pictured McCarthy as the leader of a fascist movement. The absence of an economic crisis, McCarthy's concentration on a single issue and his consequent failure to develop a broad political program and the unorganized character of his support, have frequently been noted as features clearly differentiating his following from the disciplined and ideologically self-conscious fascist movements which developed in Europe and America during the depression years. There are, however, a number of "class theories" of McCarthyism which have characterized it as at least an incipient fascist movement.

The familiar "Marxist" notion that the long-standing Taft-Dewey split in the Republican Party reflects a division within "the ruling class" between

Eastern financial capital and Midwestern industrial capital has been refurbished to explain the Eisenhower-McCarthy split, with McCarthy cast in the role of Taft's heir. The difference between Taft's fussy integrity and McCarthy's improvised hysterics is said to be the measure of the distance we have travelled toward "fascism." This view, which answers to the necessity felt by a certain kind of Marxist to find conflicts of economic interest behind all political struggles, has never had very much to recommend it. Midwestern industrial capital as represented by the leaders of General Motors and Chrysler conspicuously supported Eisenhower in 1952, and Taft himself shortly before his death criticized the Big Business composition of Eisenhower's Cabinet and publicly reminded the President that there were many "middle class" Republican voters.

Undeniably McCarthy has inherited some of Taft's support, but if he has failed to put forward a social program that might attract radicalized masses in a depression he has equally failed to make himself, as Taft did, the spokesman of opposition to the welfare state. His voting record in Congress has become increasingly conservative, but there are many other Republican politicians who are more closely identified with the crabbed bourgeois conservatism that Taft epitomized. McCarthy's support among politicians comes largely from the ranks of these old Taftmen, but his mass following crosses party lines and he has been careful not to jeopardize its loyalty by making speeches on "the menace of creeping socialism." McCarthy's anti-intellectualism and anti-militarism, his stress on his plebeian origins and his sneers at gentility are even reminiscent of some strains of Populist oratory, although it is impossible to accept Leslie Fiedler's characterization of him in *Encounter* as simply a latter-day Midwestern Populist.

A more sophisticated version of the "split in the ruling class" theory has been advanced by the editors of the Stalinoid journal *Monthly Review*. They see McCarthy as the candidate of the men of new wealth who have sprung up in the years of war and post-war prosperity. Plebeian, uncultured, often even uneducated and aggressive, resembling somewhat the robber barons of the last century, the Texas oil millionaires and their smaller-scale counterparts resent the political and social dominance of the wealthy old families of the Eastern seaboard. Their lavish support of McCarthy represents an effort to attain national political power by ousting both the liberal Democrats and the Republican "sophisticated conservatives."

Clearly McCarthy has mobilized new wealth of this sort behind him. David Schine and William Buckley, second-generation heirs to fortunes made in the hotel business and the oil industry, are other conspicuous examples. The former a Jew and the latter a Catholic, both are outside the circle of established Protestant old families. Buckley's book attacking the Yale faculty and his almost obsessive hatred of the "respectable" Ivy League intelligentsia are symptomatic.

The *Monthly Review* editors attribute McCarthy's failure to develop a demagogic social program which might win him support in the depression they anticipate, to a fear of alienating his reactionary backers. Their

article appeared last January and they made much of McCarthy's silence during the recession and his failure to exploit the farm discontent rising in his home state. He has, however, since emerged, if somewhat belatedly, as an active proponent of higher fixed price supports than the present ones. Furthermore, the *Monthly Review* editors fail to note that McCarthy became a national figure before he attracted the support of new millionaires. One of his most novel characteristics is his ability to make use of the mass media: he is the first American politician to win a wide and fanatical following solely by calculated exploitation of the machinery of publicity. If the weight he is believed to carry with the electorate has encouraged rich men to finance him, there is nevertheless a sense in which they need him as much as he needs them.

The Texas oilmen have a definite but quite limited stake in national politics. They wanted a Republican President and Congress to give them rights to tidelands oil, and even the faintest suggestion of possible revision of the tax depletion allowances which have permitted them to keep their millions will loosen their bankrolls. But beyond this, they have no labor problem in an industry which employs little manpower and there is obviously no formidable party of the Left nor the prospect of one to challenge the sources of their wealth. If McCarthy votes for reactionary measures in Congress to please them, there are scores of other legislators who are more useful "waterboys for the vested interests" quietly rigging legislation in the lobbies and committees of Congress. The oilmen's support of McCarthy, as the *Monthly Review* editors seem to recognize, is less a matter of economic self-interest than a grandiose gesture expressing their uninhibited craving for additional power and prestige, as well as *arriviste* resentment of the mellowed wealth of the Eastern "aristocracy." It is certainly doubtful that they would continue to back him if he became a gold brick reformer in the Huey Long pattern; however his power, like Hitler's in relation to the Ruhr industrialists, rests essentially on mass support so that he is far from being solely the instrument of the businessmen currently sponsoring him.

The fact that McCarthy's support comes from groups at both the top and bottom of the class hierarchy does give his following a certain similarity to that of the Nazis. But in the absence of severe internal crisis he cannot be classified as a full-fledged fascist, for an economic depression or a catastrophe promoting comparable disintegration is the classic circumstance favoring a fascist movement. Most forebodings about McCarthy's prospects as an American Hitler have, consequently, stemmed from speculations on what his movement might become in the event of a depression. Could he re-adapt the Communist issue to appeal to a nation suffering from mass unemployment or could he successfully identify himself with a new program while retaining his present supporters? Both possibilities appear doubtful. Here we enter a highly speculative realm, but it now seems probably accurate to conclude as one observer has that "McCarthy is the luxury of a full-employment economy."

III

What large and stable elements in the American body politic has McCarthy successfully mobilized? To answer this question full measure must be taken of McCarthy's ingenuity in single-mindedly concentrating on an issue which arises out of the troubled conditions of world politics but which he has adroitly transformed into a now bogus domestic issue: Communist infiltration of American society. Since the Cold War is unlikely to disappear overnight, McCarthy has been able to exceed the life-span of earlier nativist demagogues who achieved brief national prominence by playing on transitory economic dissatisfactions. It is the shadow of the Cold War rather than the class war which has recently loomed largest in our politics.

This means that to discover the core of McCarthy's support, one must look for groups sharing a common outlook on foreign policy rather than on domestic economic questions. Samuel Lubell sketched the outlines of the McCarthyite coalition in *The Future of American Politics* and, following his lead, Nathan Glazer has advanced in an able article in *Commentary* what might be called, in contrast to the "class theories" discussed above, an "ethnic theory" of McCarthyism. Noting the thinly-concealed pro-Nazi position that McCarthy took in the 1948 Senate hearings on the Malmedy massacres, Glazer sees him as the heir of the old isolationist leaders whose most steadfast followers were of German and Irish descent. The revelations of Communist infiltration in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations gave these groups a chance to charge the leaders of the war with treason and thus retrospectively to justify their opposition to American participation.

In the 1930's and early 1940's these ethnic isolationists found sufficient numbers of *ad hoc* allies to become a powerful bloc capable of delaying active American resistance to the Axis powers. Some liberals and socialists with pacifist leanings, the Communists in the years of the Stalin-Hitler pact, Italian-Americans who sympathized with Mussolini, and businessmen who admired the European dictators' "solution" of the "labor problem" all joined in support of America First. In their current support of McCarthy the German and Irish blocs have found a new set of *ad hoc* allies: other ethnic groups, especially the Poles, whose homelands have been occupied by the Soviet Union, fanatically anti-Communist religious groups, the new millionaires anxious to make a splash in national politics, and a substantial number of Americans, particularly among the less educated, who are baffled by the frustrations of the Cold War and the failures of American foreign policy. And in both periods Republican politicians have actively tried to weld these heterogeneous groupings into a firm alliance against the Democrats.

It is the merit of Glazer's approach to show how the old ethnic isolationists have persisted in spite of their silence in the war and early post-war years and have now reappeared as the largest elements in McCarthy's mass following. At a time when foreign policy questions have once again become

primary, they have regained much of their pre-war power through their ability to swing votes across party lines. Yet Glazer observes that even at the height of their power the old isolationists were unable to elect a President or even to dictate the selection of a major party candidate. He concludes that the chances of McCarthy capturing the Presidency are slight. His arguments are compelling, but the question of whether McCarthy could ever be elected President is altogether too narrow a compass in which to evaluate his role and prospects. Moreover, Glazer does not touch on the larger question of McCarthyism as a mood infecting even the Senator's opponents.

Before considering the "ism" as something partially independent of the man, it is necessary to note another possible "road to power" which McCarthy as the leader of a fascist movement could conceivably follow. Since he leads a foreign policy rather than a class coalition, defeat in war might play the role for him that economic depression played for Hitler. Glazer qualifies his optimism with recognition of this possibility. The loss of India to the Communists, the complete collapse of NATO, another war like the Korean—might not defeats of this magnitude thoroughly discredit present American policy and further polarize public opinion to such an extent that the McCarthyites could develop into a genuine fascist movement with a chance of gaining power?

IV

The essence of McCarthyism may be an assault on traditional liberties, but their erosion clearly started before McCarthy hit the headlines. It started in fact when the Cold War began in earnest in 1946-47. Recognizing this, many interpreters have minimized the significance of McCarthy himself and seen him merely as the symbol of a drift towards militarized bureaucratic government in which civil liberties are given short shrift.

"War," Randolph Bourne once remarked, "is the health of the state." Civil liberties in America have suffered most during wars and immediately before or after them. The First World War witnessed the summary imprisonment of anti-war socialists and pacifists, and the persecution of German-Americans. The Smith Act was passed in 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor, and during the war the mass deportation of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast was one of the most flagrant violations of civil liberty in American history. It is neither surprising nor novel that the conflict with Russia should have produced similar occurrences. What is novel about the present situation is that, except for Korea, the conflict has been political and economic rather than military. European nations have long become accustomed to living in the shadow of war, but cold wars are a new experience to Americans. And the seeming endlessness of the Cold War has created the mood of distemper and blocked aggression which has given McCarthy his opportunity.

Since the Cold War will continue even if McCarthy suffers a political eclipse, he has served as a scapegoat for some "liberals" who by concentrat-

ing their fire on him have been able to avoid confronting the crimes committed or condoned by their friends. Yet, while less damaging to the cause of civil liberties, the opposite extreme of emphasizing McCarthyism without McCarthy also involves some distortion of reality. For McCarthy's activities have greatly accelerated the brutalization of our politics. The Smith Act convictions for words rather than deeds, the unprecedented death penalty for the Rosenbergs, the flimsy excuses for indicting Lattimore, the absurd indignities to which civil servants are subjected, the Attorney General's use of the FBI files for partisan purposes, the Oppenheimer case, the possibly unconstitutional outlawing of the Communist Party, and last, but far from least, the many squalid state and local measures against "subversives"—these events make a pattern. Some of them occurred before McCarthy's ascendancy, most of them afterwards, in none of them was he directly involved; but who can deny that he has contributed to them by aggravating pre-existing repressive impulses, by encouraging his political enemies to try and beat him at his own game, by the fears that his mere presence on the national scene arouses?

Like the Nazis and Stalinists, McCarthy's stock-in-trade is a conspiracy theory of politics. Insofar as the Communists are an active conspiratorial group rather than a broad social category like the German Jews or people "of bourgeois origin" in Russia, they are at present numerically insignificant and the job of crushing them is too easily and too soon completed for them adequately to serve as totalitarian victim. Here, however, McCarthy's most authentically totalitarian traits reveal themselves: he constantly broadens his proscribed minority to include not only Communist Party members but anyone opposing him who ever had any commerce with the Party, real or imaginable. Weissberg, Beck and Godin, and other refugees from the Russian purge of the 1930's have reported that the first question asked by the GPU examiners and one which they relentlessly pursued throughout all questionings was "Who recruited you?" McCarthy too displays less interest in the witnesses appearing before his committee than in finding out who recommended them for government employment, who hired them, and who gave them security clearance, thereby expanding his proscribed minority to include ever-swelling numbers of potential victims. He has even placed "Communist thinkers" and all New Dealers stained by the "twenty years of treason" on the list.

As Hannah Arendt has pointed out in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, organization is the *sine qua non* of totalitarian movements. It is the power of organization, both openly flaunted and working in the darkness, that lends reality to the "ideological fictions" of the movement. McCarthy's agents in the executive branch of the government, his "plants" among newspapermen, and his partisans in patriotic societies give the impression of constituting a diffuse conspiracy, if not a tightly controlled and centralized one. Its similarity to past Communist networks has been remarked on by many observers; totalitarian and semi-totalitarian movements almost invariably imitate the organizational features of their enemies. McCarthy's appa-

ratus functions secretly through an army of informers and openly, not by para-military formations marching in the streets, but by batteries of publicity. When leading national figures must debate McCarthy's wild charges as if they were a pressing national issue, they indeed become a pressing national issue. And when the government employs his flexible criteria of "loyalty" to evaluate its personnel, reality is conferred on McCarthy's claims, just as the Nazi stormtroopers were able to equate "race" with personal destiny by beating up Jews in the street. What occurs here is the bureaucratization through enactment into law of the "ideological fictions" of McCarthyism, just as the racist fantasies of the Nazis were converted into impersonal juridical standards by Himmler. Even if McCarthy is soon discredited, his conception of the "Red menace" has been, so to speak, objectified and is able to outlive his personal political power.

It is necessary to emphasize once more that these similarities between the McCarthyites and the Nazis do not suffice to make the former a coherent fascist movement. They are similarities of "form" rather than of historical content. But they amount to an unmistakable injection of the totalitarian mentality into American political life. If McCarthy has simply galvanized the tendency to restrict civil liberties that emerges in all periods of actual or imminent war, he has nevertheless been successful enough to leave his own imprint upon it. If he should be repudiated by the professional politicians and his power at the polls revealed to be grossly exaggerated, the trend away from civil liberties will be to some degree arrested and the air will certainly be cleared. Yet his departure will not remove the pressures on civil liberties.

Too many intellectuals are addicted to apocalyptic modes of thinking: unless they can represent their enemy as a colossal force of evil threatening all liberal values, they become complacent and make little effort to combat more limited dangers. This applies equally to those liberals—often retaining illusions about Stalinism—who magnify McCarthy's power by picturing him as an American Hitler, and to the "hard" anti-Communists, concerned only with the admittedly greater world-wide menace of Soviet expansionism, who think that they have taken an adequate "stand" on McCarthy by showing that he is not a fascist, that he actually helps the Communists, and that his power is precarious. There was a time when a single case of injustice would evoke from the intellectual community a cry of protest that was free of ulterior ideological compulsions. Today one group of liberals responds to McCarthyism in escapist fashion by so exaggerating the urgency of combating it that all the more perplexing problems of modern politics are made to seem unimportant by comparison. Another group, aptly labeled "the petrified anti-Stalinists" by Philip Rahv, appears to feel that until blood is actually spilled in the streets McCarthy is no cause for concern. Yet whatever McCarthy's political fate may be, resistance to the garrison state ideology and the defense of civil liberties will continue to be necessary. To build an effective dam one does not have to believe in the imminence of a deluge.

AMERICAN NOTEBOOK

Some Brief Comments
On the Domestic Scene

The American Student: a Profile

George Rawick

During the past few years a number of articles have appeared characterizing the "younger generation" as one which does not "issue manifestoes, make speeches, or carry posters," a generation silent and undissenting. Thornton Wilder has argued in *Harper's* that this is the "ruminating" generation, "facing the too-long delayed task of consolidating its liberty and impressing upon it a design." Cleon Holmes, in the *New York Times*, less optimistically saw the generation as "beat," pushed up against itself by the anxieties of the nineteen-forties.

While there is some truth in these descriptions, they tend to be partial and a bit melodramatic. Wilder writes as a grand-uncle patronizing his nephews, while Holmes assumes a hard-bitten posture which takes narcotics, liquor, be-bop, and sexual promiscuity as the clues to "American youth."

It may be worth trying to probe a little deeper, to place the present in an historical context, and to offer an analysis of the moods of those between 18 and 25 which will at least be written from the perspective of a "participant-observer." And since it is hopeless to attempt to characterize an entire generation, we shall limit ourselves to that group of college students who, seemingly, are in school because of an interest in intellectual and cultural matters. (It had better be recognized that a primary motivation for attending college is the belief that it will lead to financial and sexual success. Those who "live for rather than off ideas" make up only a tiny minority of the student population.)

The period between 1919 and the present marks a unified epoch, for modern America fully emerged only in the nineteen-twenties. The war ushered in a period in which the buoyant optimistic faith of the pre-war generation in scientific method and social progress were gravely shaken. The crusade had not succeeded.

The holy war had ended in the debacle of Versailles. The New Industrial Society, characterized by a new social responsibility, did not emerge

—the business of America remained business. The Columbia *Literary Monthly*'s prayer of 1917 that "While fighting for democracy in Europe, let us make sure that we are not losing our democracy here," was answered by the Palmer raids and the Ku Klux Klan. The Philistines refused to give way before the *avant garde*. Taking a quick look at the new America, young intellectuals loudly became expatriates.

Despite its self-imposed spiritual and at times physical exile, the "lost generation" did not retreat solely to introspective probing. Sensing the malaise of their times in cultural rather than political terms, they still found themselves in opposition to the dominant values of an industrial-capitalist society. While they did not engage in political activity or create political organizations, the names of such of their little magazines as *secession*, *transition*, *broom* (to make a clean sweep of it), breathed a spirit of denial and revolt.

By no means, however, did all of the college intellectuals feel as alienated. For most, the nineteen-twenties was the era of raccoon coats, jazz, parlor psychoanalysis, parties, speakeasies and travel. While this group shared vicariously in the life of the Left Bank or Greenwich Village, they only played at rebellion, art and sex. Fundamentally, they were intent on preparing themselves for the world of the young professional, in which, if progress was not inevitable, success was.

The depression of the nineteen-thirties put an end to all this. The student sons and daughters of the middle-class were left financially strapped. Some got through college doing "busy-work" for WPA projects, while others alternately looked for work and went to school, for in a job-scarce world, what was the point in hurrying?

Whether through the lessons of their own economic crisis, a sympathy with the distress of others, or an identification with those young people who had gone out to organize the new CIO unions, a significant number of American students were radicalized in the nineteen-thirties. Thousands participated in anti-war strikes, signed the Oxford peace-pledge, studied Marxist literature, argued the relation of art to propaganda, were touched in some way by the political left. For many in the late thirties, however, radicalism regrettably became synonymous with the vague and generalized liberalism of the Stalinists in the Popular Front period.

The advent of war left many feeling with W. H. Auden that the nineteen-thirties had been a "low, dishonest decade," yet a good deal of social and political concern carried through to the war period. Decimating the campus, the war released a flood of patriotic-democratic devotion on the part of many young intellectuals, even though the day-by-day realities of the foxhole, the corvette, and the army camp called for a heroism more demanding and less immediately satisfying than their earlier fantasies. Many saw a moral justification for fighting a war against the horrors of the concentration camps and mass crematoria, even though few could specify what it was they were fighting *for*. The young radicals of the 1930's, especially the majority consisting of fellow-travellers, had

enjoyed a convenient image of things to be *against*—war, fascism, Hearst—and somewhat surprisingly, this image survived into the early forties, if only because the war led to few intellectual changes or clarifications. The ideas of the earlier period—remember that it is still the small minority of intellectually-conscious students we are speaking of—had become dimmed and flaccid, but simply because there was nothing with which to replace them, they lingered on into the early forties.

In the immediate post-war period, the veterans provided the link with the values and experiences of an earlier decade. Their seriousness and intensity made for a certain intellectual vitality in the crowded college towns. The experiences of the war and the demands of post-war life created a need for political expression. All political tendencies were comparatively active; some campus newspapers displayed a militant non-sectarian radicalism; intellectual activity was eager, intense and anxious.

Nonetheless, these post-war years had more in common with those that were to follow than with the mood of the thirties. Commitments in the post-World War II era to either liberalism or socialism were more tentative, expectations were more "realistic" and limited, and those who played the role of radical social critic did so with a certain humility. The tone was that of E. M. Forster's *Two Cheers for Democracy* rather than Stephen Spender's *Forward From Liberalism*. The non-ideological character of the Popular Front had now turned into an anti-ideological mood. While many students would still commit themselves to working against certain evils, they refused strict ideologies.

In the 1948 Wallace campaign the political energies of the Popular Front of the late thirties reached their final spasm. Despite Stalinist inspiration of the Wallace movement and the fact that on most campuses the active leaders of the Young Progressives were Stalinists or fellow-travellers, a quite considerable number of students was involved in the Wallace campaign, students who could by no stretch of the imagination be called Stalinists. They were characterized by no ideology at all; they merely felt a vague sense of social malaise, a need to "do something," a misty faith in "the people." The words of the thirties had been forgotten; snatches of the melody lingered on. But not for long.

With the failure of the Progressive Party and the departure from the campus of most of the veterans, a new mood set in. It is complex and hazy, easier to sense than to describe, since almost any description is likely to be more precise than the actuality.

That almost instinctive commitment to a democratic ideal which had been true for most American students is now no longer quite so certain. "The people," to many American students, no longer seem the repository of hope or virtue. The working class, content at least in America with TV, beer and mass culture, does not inspire student intellectuals to believe in social change. For them the fantasies of science fiction seem more real than the sitdown strikes of the thirties.

A sense of their own ignorance and impotence pervades many of the

most socially conscious campus intellectuals, who are disillusioned—for the most part, vicariously—with both liberalism and socialism.

Placing their faith in social science, they seem to declare, "We must analyze. We must understand society. All we can do is to work, try to live satisfying lives, be good to one other, occasionally protest a bit when the attacks on academic freedom come too close, while contributing a little to a body of knowledge which, in the long-run, may enable us—or our descendants—to act." Many of these students raise much the same set of historical questions as do those within the socialist tradition—many even acknowledge a major intellectual debt to Marx—but are cynical about movements for social change. They never had, and can see no reason to acquire, either the Liberal Mist or the Socialist Vision.

On the other end of the scale are the campus esthetes. They are sceptical of democratic ideologies, seeing them as responsible for the barbarization of culture. They yearn for the kind of society they vaguely imagine to have existed in the vague past, a society whose goal was the "refinement of thought and taste" rather than the accumulation of material necessities and comforts.

A significant number of those who are not satisfied with either "social-scientism" or literary study turn toward ideologies which are pessimistic about human-nature. As Edouard Bernstein, commenting on the reaction to the Cromwellian Revolution, observed, those who live through "untold sacrifices, without any satisfactory results," who observe "political struggles (succeeding) each other without bringing the solution of social difficulties any nearer," who have seen "men who had been hailed as deliverers, when once raised to power (assume) the mien of oppressors," often reach the conclusion that the "chief evil (lies) in man himself, in the weakness of human nature." Many graduate students who were old enough to have gone through the war, as well as some of the younger students, not only are not politically oriented, they are ideologically committed to an anti-political attitude. One perceptive commentator has observed of this group that they are "neither sufficiently naive to become disillusioned nor sufficiently romantic to become angry. The 'silent generation' . . . simply doesn't believe that it is within the responsibility or the power of the individual to achieve the salvation of society."

For others, a positive conservative ideology which justifies some form of corporatism—albeit a corporatism minus racism and persecution—is emerging. For these, the models of Peter Drucker, James Burnham, and *Fortune* magazine seem enticing, for they envision themselves as the technicians of a new bureaucratic society. Some students among this group are even somewhat friendly to Stalinism, on a level quite different from that of Popular Front. They feel, even if they do not say, "Yes, Stalinist Russia is not a classless society, nor is it going in that direction. It is a bureaucratic collectivist state, but this is not a matter for wailing, for all modern industrial societies inevitably (and perhaps beneficially) move in the same direction."

While the moods of this generation of college intellectuals are related to those of wider intellectual circles, there is an important difference in quality and meaning. Those older people who have lived through the experiences of the past twenty years and who remain honest, have seen many of their commitments turn into wickedness, sloth, or failure. They can be "beaten" by these experiences and grow tired, or they can go through a process of re-evaluation. But those who know only the end product without having known the struggle have nothing to modify or reaffirm. The differences between the disillusioned and those who never were in the position to be disillusioned, except vicariously, are profound. What for one group seem to be important questions to which the wrong answers had been given, for the other seems literally non-sense. Thus, for example, socialism for most members of the later generation is neither "right" nor "wrong," it is merely irrelevant.

For many intelligent students not only are the answers hard to find, but the questions seem impossible to formulate. Pushed on into life, but cut off from understanding or belief, their mood has perhaps been best expressed by one of them who ended a friendly yet critical review of the first issue of *Dissent* by honestly declaring, "And if we were asked, 'What kind of magazine did you expect?', we should probably be unable to answer with anything but vague impressions. Indeed, it is rather difficult to intelligibly spell out precisely what is bothering us."

The pattern of adherence to non-political, or if political, conservative, ideologies, as well as the failure of many to make any commitment, is produced not only by confusion, but also by fear. At present, a "job-consciousness," once only characteristic of upperclassmen, pervades even freshmen who often give as their excuse for refusing to participate in any type of liberal or radical activity the fear of getting on "the List" and thereby being barred from employment, medical or law school, and military commissions. The attack on civil-liberties has a very powerful and mainly "underground" impact. Although men who think too much have always been in danger, it is only in periods in which there is a failure of belief that the failure of nerve takes on significant proportions.

The last year or so has seen some change on the campus. The present group of young undergraduates did not share, even indirectly, in any of the experiences of the nineteen-thirties, the war, or the immediate post-war period. World War II had been for them a time of collecting scrap-paper and tin-foil, the depression a time of cribs and kindergartens. Most of them have known only hectic prosperity, suburbania, schools which consciously placed their emphasis on conformity (known to post-Deweyian educators as "adjustment"), television sets, the Korean war, the acceptance of the military as the norm rather than the unusual. Most accept America without dissenting, feeling that *on its own terms*, which they have internalized, it has for the most part succeeded.

While the majority of the classes of 1955, 1956, and 1957 accept a *status quo* far to that right of that accepted by earlier generations, a small

group which has not been corrupted by a sense of guilt for being previously sympathetic to Stalinism, or by an acceptance of the ethos of the new Roman Empire, has appeared. If lacking in knowledge and sophistication, these students have nevertheless begun to question and find their own way.

A certain amount of fresh political activity, initiated by the new undergraduates, and not by older politicos on campus, has taken place. Groups spontaneously opposed to McCarthyism have appeared, often going under the name of Robin Hood clubs—a response to attempts to ban Robin Hood from textbooks. The atmosphere is such that a militant liberal organization could organize a moderately successful campus movement in opposition to McCarthyism and to American foreign policy. Even the minuscule student socialist movement has profited from this atmosphere.

And among the older students, those in the graduate schools, there remains a kind of stubborn, independent, though not at all dramatic sense of resistance. They continue to be suspicious of political movements and ideologies, yet they try hard to think and work things out for themselves—and their capacities for intellectual dissent, while clearly not available at the present moment to any movement or ideology, are larger than is commonly supposed.

Despite these rumblings, the great mass of new students, as they learn techniques devoid of values, remain apolitical. Some stir uneasily but do not move. Until a long-run shift in the political and intellectual temper of the United States takes place, we should not expect too much social or political ferment in the colleges. But this is hardly a reason for wailing about the "beat or silent generation." The intelligent student of today struggles at least as hard with his uncertainties as the student of two decades ago struggled for his certainties. History has not come to a dead stop; times of crisis and confusion have been weathered before; the energies and emotions of social rebelliousness have not yet been rendered superfluous.

NOTES OF A SUPERFLUOUS MAN

Philosophy: a diamond-studded shoe-string.

Was Roosevelt's "freedom of religion" an improvement on the Eighteenth Century's "freedom of thought?" The latter necessarily includes the former, but it is doubtful whether the former includes the freedom to be irreligious, unbelieving, gnostic. . . .

If Pyrrhus has you in his pay-roll, extoll the wisdom of his strategy and make no disparaging remarks about the cost of his victories.

Freedom remains an ideal that mankind has not yet known as a reality. No human society has yet been free from the mortal sins of slavery, exploitation or oppression, which doom each society in turn to decay, degradation, defeat.

EDOUARD RODITI

Russia: Methods of Analysis

In his article (*DISSENT*, Summer 1954) Mr. Deutscher asks whether a higher level of civilization corresponds to a higher level of economic development and whether a mass increase in literacy induces progress toward democracy. To such general questions, general answers may be given. But they are bound to be either arbitrary or skeptical in tone, and in both cases sterile. As against such generalizations, which were the pet prejudices of bourgeois liberalism in the nineteenth century, Marx—I turn to him since Mr. Deutscher speaks in his name—stressed the need to describe historical movements in their specific contexts. What Marx looked for was not generalities about capital formation, but an historical analysis of primitive accumulation as the path by which in Western Europe the capitalist order of economy emerged from the feudal. And he took special care never to “metamorphose” such an “historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical theory of the *marche générale* imposed by fate upon every people whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself in order that it may ultimately arrive at the form of economy which will ensure, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labor, the most complete development of man.” To N. K. Mikailovski, the Russian populist writer, who had thus “metamorphosed” Marx’s historical analysis, he offered the example of Rome where the combined emergence of free proletarians and accumulated wealth did *not* result in capitalism. Marx concluded: “Thus events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.” (Marx, *Selected Correspondence*, pp. 352-355).

To my mind Mr. Deutscher is guilty of having used in a different context just such a wrong method of social analysis.

The point Mr. Deutscher emphasizes is that industrialization leads to democratization. The industrial revolution in England led to a gradual democratization. So it will be in Russia. But such an analogy neglects the trends of world economic development as they were in the early 19th century and as they are in the mid 20th century, one vastly different from the other, as well as the impact on them of different national contexts. Can we then believe that industrialization tends to develop democ-

racy by itself, so to speak, and at any time? The case of Germany, or of Japan, proves, however, that a specific and very complex combination of factors, involving far more than the mere fact of industrialization, determines the outcome. What then is the corresponding combination for Russia?

Whether a society is to be described as "progressive" depends on far more than the level reached by its economic forces; it depends also on the possibility for, and direction of, their further development. Consider the rise of totalitarianism in Russia and Germany. In each case, to be sure, it arose out of specific—that is, different—conditions. Yet in both instances totalitarianism had one fact in common: that the economic development of both countries had previously been blocked, in Russia by the isolation of a backward economy and in Germany by the isolation of an advanced economy.

The Russian economic process is not, then, a planned economic expansion in general, but a definite one. It has thereby shown itself liable to its own forms of "moral and economic instability." Why should it be supposed that economic expansion is inherent in this society? And by what means of analysis does Mr. Deutscher determine that at precisely *this* stage of Russian economic development Stalinism is rendered anachronistic? Surely he cannot be contending that Stalinism as a fetter on Russian economy has now been rendered anachronistic in the sense that one may say, for example, that private enterprise has become so at the level of production presently achieved in advanced countries. And why does he assume that the present economic level of Russia, still a relatively backward country, is sufficient to render a totalitarian organization of the state machine unnecessary? I would contend, on the contrary, that totalitarianism presents an alternative development in backward countries during their process of economic growth, just as, in a different form, it presents such a possibility in advanced countries whose productive forces have outgrown their market limits.

Mr. Deutscher claims that a deep and now irrepressible contradiction has arisen within Stalinism—a contradiction between its intentions and methods of power, on the one hand, and its economic achievements, on the other. Is this to suggest that under Stalinism this "contradiction" is more acute than under capitalism? Yes, answers Mr. Deutscher, because under Stalinism economic growth favors democratization and socialism at some point and because that point has been reached by now. Why this is necessarily so, however, he never says. Actually, the same thing could be said about capitalism. Mr. Deutscher counters by saying that in Russia the specific organization of the economic process—the existence of nationalized economy—allows for socialism. But can this be asserted without further ado for a backward society in which that process is regulated at all steps by political and administrative command without any democratic controls?

Stalinism, says Mr. Deutscher, enforced industrialization and literacy upon Russia in a backward, brutal and irrational fashion, and it will wreck

itself because of these very achievements. But he neglects to add that Stalinism enforced them only in such ways and to such a point as to strengthen its own regime. This is hardly the first case in which the technical, economic and cultural "resources" of more advanced countries were borrowed for the purpose of building up a fundamentally backward and irrational order—much of Russian history consists of such borrowings. More important, however, is the fact that a social order is an organic whole, the elements of which you cannot arbitrarily take apart and then define as bad or good, progressive or backward. It is a sum total which must be judged by its predominant traits. That is why the advance of industrialization or the growth of literacy in Russia cannot be discussed as isolated phenomena.

Post revolutionary Russia has developed very dynamically, to be sure, but that does not in the least imply socialist consequences. International pressure and the competition of powers have impelled Stalinism to develop backward Russia. But Stalinism has dynamized Russian backwardness rather than overcome it. Marxism in Russia has been an ideology subordinating human energies to material development, and as such it has lacked the human element Marx premised for socialism. For Marxism is not a theory of economic development proper, though Marx's analysis has profoundly contributed to such a theory. It is essentially an inquiry into the conditions favorable to man's mastery over economic forces and, therefore, over social processes. Marx *took MODERN INDUSTRIALIZATION for granted*, and investigated the conditions under which a socialist order might result from it. By contrast, the task of the Bolsheviks in Russia was to create modern industrialism on the concentrated but sparse basis bequeathed by Tzarism. This they did while being motivated by a socialist ideology. The result, I take it, is a totalitarian form of State Capitalism. But whether Russian society is or is not State Capitalism does not here matter nearly so much as whether one sees clearly that it is not a socialist or potentially socialist society.

Even as he insists upon the terrific tempo of Russia's industrial revolution, Mr. Deutscher fails to consider the *cost* of this tempo, its effects on the structure of the country—technically, economically, culturally, socially, politically! Has the quantitative increase in basic industries been matched by a proportionate qualitative improvement? Are not disproportionalities a typical feature of the Russian economy? And what about the level of productivity and its rate of increase? Only if he confronted such questions could Mr. Deutscher enlighten his readers about the *kind* of planning through which the Russian economy is managed.

To cite a particular example: Mr. Deutscher reckons that forced labor in Russia constitutes about a tenth of all industrial labor, while in the same breath he dismisses that forced labor as a purely marginal aspect of Russian economy. But this is an entirely impermissible procedure. What matters is not the absolute amount of forced labor but its consequences upon the character of industrial labor as a whole, not to speak of the working of the Russian economy. Surely the *kind* of working class that has emerged

from the process of Stalinist industrialization must be decisively shaped by the existence of forced labor.

It is not enough to declare in the abstract that planning as an economic technique may be, and has been proven to be, superior to the decentralized processes of an economy based on private ownership. One must then analyze specifically, in time and place, what the consequences of this planned technique have been in Russia, and what the limits of its cumulative application are in terms of equipment and labor efficiency. Will Mr. Deutscher tell us precisely what was achieved there beyond rapid increases in the quantities of specific products?

II

On the basis of its planned society, contends Mr. Deutscher, Russian society can be reformed peacefully. His main argument, besides economic growth, is that there is technically no way back from the statified forms of economic organization created by Stalinism. Very well; I readily admit the point even for the agricultural sector of Russian economy. I would go further and agree that the Russian pattern represents, though in a special form, a general trend in today's world toward a publicly owned and planned economy.

But what of it? That is hardly crucial to the problem Mr. Deutscher raises. What matters is whether the "force of economic circumstances" is a constraint upon, or a spur to, the people's labor. Even the technologically higher achievements of the West are marred by the social structure in which they grew. And Russia is clearly in a far lower social condition. Do then her economic achievements constitute an unambiguously progressive trend simply because they are irreversible? Does not the social and political structure in which they are embodied imperil and unbalance them both domestically and internationally? That they are irreversible hardly means that they are indestructible. The problem is to determine under what conditions their stabilization and further development is possible. Here, as in the West, though with obvious differences, the difficulty is: how to adjust to economic achievements and potentialities while overcoming social and political institutions that have come to be an obstacle upon them.

How then are the Russians to break up the Stalinist straitjacket? For neither in the case of Stalinism nor capitalism can socio-political institutions be divorced from economic achievements. Both societies have developed the economic forces, but only within a given direction and context. Both systems behave according to specific motives, imposed by some people upon others. Both contain determinate social groups, which are to different extents antagonistic to each other and thus carry on corresponding social struggles. Can these struggles be disposed of and, as it were, be overcome automatically in the mere course of things? Are the obstacles to be overcome in such a process of transformation greater or smaller in Russia than in the West? Which system is more flexible and which more rigid? These

are the questions that Mr. Deutscher must answer before he can so blithely pose the possibility of a peaceful emergence from Stalinism.

As to the analogies Mr. Deutscher draws between Stalinist Russia and certain periods of Tsarist Russia, they actually work against his argument. After a certain degree of economic development Tzarism could neither win the support of an increasingly large part of the population nor adapt itself to the new socio-political requirements of that economic development. And Stalinism, which compresses into its life span both the achievements of the Westernizing Tsars and the weaknesses of their successors, cannot, any more than the latter, disestablish itself merely because, like the former, it has begun to overcome Russian backwardness. Both the Westernizing Tsars and Stalinism equipped that backwardness rather than did away with it.

Through its economic development, Stalinism has armed the Russian state with an unprecedented power. But this is far from being matched by social gains for the people. What has been developed has been sharply limited to what makes the people the best tools available to the State. Anything beyond that, even when economically feasible, has been frowned upon as a potential danger to the State. As a result, there is not one focus out of which any opposition could arise. There are frictions and antagonisms within the State, but they are streamlined into an elaborate web of totalitarian controls. And if they so much as present the suspicion of a threat to the State, they are dealt with through a frightful suppression, even if this means a temporary weakening of the State. Just because the mechanism of power in Russia is much grosser and less stable than in the Western nations, it can afford to impose itself upon society by means of a harsh State-directed class struggle. Hence—together with the process of industrialization to which Mr. Deutscher points—there occurs an enormous waste of energies and a process of barbarization which are, however, the price to be paid to keep the regime going.

That is why it has proven so delusive to think that economic improvements will lead to relaxation. Quite the contrary. The improvements have thus far been so limited and their effects so potentially explosive—though without yet allowing the people an articulate and independent mode of expression—that each time they have led the State to reassert its power with renewed brutality and to destroy everything which did not directly strengthen its power. Why should Stalin's death keep that course from being followed again? If, as Mr. Deutscher states, the regime "still wields all the material instruments of power" and if "no one can say how or when it will relinquish them," what matters is not to repeat that "a profound contradiction is maturing" and that it will be solved by reforms, but to show, in terms of specific social forces, how it will come to the point of explosion.

III

According to Mr. Deutscher, potentially socialist economic foundations have engendered in Russia an antagonistic political edifice. Now,

how could that be if socialism is conceived of in Marx's terms, as an economically organic though socially revolutionary process evolving, on the one hand, from productive forces of a given character and at a given stage of their development and, on the other, from social forces of a given strength, maturity and cohesiveness? The truth is that such a fancied contrast is optimistically misread into the context of Russian reality. And this flows from the premised misconception that the Russian revolution had been socialist in character, and has remained so at the economic level to this very day, in spite of all "distortions." It flows also from the further misconception that a publicly owned and planned economy is of necessity and cannot but be potentially socialist. Such a fallacy has been still further popularized by all those who have a vested or fancied interest in representing as socialism any departure from private ownership. Finally, its acceptance has been facilitated by certain concepts of modern economics about formal economic organization and functioning.

Fallacy it remains, for all that. First, Marx's scheme relative to the conditions and eventual process of a socialist revolution did not apply to the Russian revolution. A single point of identity with it, inconclusive to my mind, is that the urban workers did indeed provide the Bolsheviks with the strategically decisive force for their revolution as well as the rallying center for the rebellious soldiers and peasants. (That factor was hardly present in the Yugoslavian revolution and not present in the Chinese or Indo-Chinese ones—the only genuine social revolutions* which occurred and triumphed since October 1917, and which were patterned on what was thought to have been the Bolshevik precedent.) And secondly, even the Bolshevik leaders thought that their revolution could not be said to be socialist except as a promise, predicated upon its support by a triumphant Western socialism. Short of that, they said, it would be doomed to failure. And that is what happened, and even before Stalin's rise to power. Indeed, it was this very failure of socialism to make even a start in Russia which promoted the advent of Stalinism and opened up a course of development completely different from and opposite to what the Bolshevik leaders had envisioned.

A LAST BUT MOST IMPORTANT POINT needs to be made with reference to the international setting of Russia's development. Though Mr. Deutscher considerably qualifies his forecast by an analysis of the eventual impact on Russia of the international conjuncture, he does not seem to realize that it is essential to *start* from the world situation in order to explain the very foundations of Russia's evolution. On that basis, a scheme of evolution applying to Russia as a closed system does not hold water. Russia's "dynamics" simply do not make sense unless seen as the resultant of a corresponding international development. And domestic forces can,

* This is not meant in any normative sense, but simply to connote a process of social transformation provoking, at the time it happens, unquestionable popular support.

in that respect, only modify the main course thereby determined for Russia. This, I know, is currently denied today on account of Russia's strength. But what is that strength irrespective of Europe's decay, the restlessness, the incipient emancipation and self-assertion on the world scene of the unindustrialized countries, and of the United States having become on short notice a potentially paramount power?

More specifically, all these disturbing forces and disruptive trends released by the consequences of World War II and its aftermath, however unusual and politically confused they be, have an importance and an impact which must not be obscured by the dazzling polarization of the international struggle between two giants. It is these forces which prevent stabilization in the world, even if it were desired. Neither Russia nor the United States can afford to allow these forces a free development, nor can they influence or control them except to a limited extent. Nonetheless, it is they which will mainly set the conditions for Russia's next stage—and not along a line of stabilization.

Among Mr. Deutscher's assumptions there is one which sees post-Stalinist Russia as a kind of enlightened despotism. The comparison could be true only insofar as such regimes are known to come too late. But it is not true at all, because even for as long as the limited time in which such regimes can hold sway, they require stability, which is what Russia mostly lacks. Despotic, yes. Enlightened it just cannot afford to be, even if it so wished. The international conjuncture simply does not allow it, even if both Russia and the United States nourished the best of intentions for a lasting compromise.

PIERRE TRESSE

"The Problem of American Power"

In Irving Howe's article on "The Problem of American Power" (*DISSENT*, Summer 1954) there are two major points with which I wish to take issue. They are: 1) Howe's analysis of the "secret of McCarthy's power," and 2) what he sees as the need for "temporary agreements," for establishing "temporary balances of power."

It is my impression that Howe sees the problem of McCarthyism as psychological, not political. The fundamental explanation for the power of McCarthyism, he says, is "the deep-seated if frequently suppressed state of panic . . . which has seized large sections of the American population." True, Howe also states that this panic is "the result of the split between American power and American inability to use its power." But as a statement of cause this is meaningless: What is power if not the ability to act? If the U. S. cannot "use its power," it lacks the ability to act, hence, in the given circumstances, is powerless. Even if the statement were accepted as it stands, it would beg the question, which is to inquire after the roots of America's impotence in the face of the world-wide threat of Communism. These roots—which I have no intention to discuss here at length—are

found in the social structure of American society as it exists today, not in panic or ignorance or contempt for other peoples' aspirations.

And this is true for McCarthyism, too. According to Howe, McCarthy is the product of America's inability to cope with international Communism. True. But here the question only begins. McCarthy's political base, as Howe's own comparison of Eisenhower with Hindenburg and of McCarthy with Hitler implies, is a large segment of the population whose political know-nothingism and cultural ignorance combine with a deepening conservatism, itself due to the stake they have in a prosperity produced chiefly in war or conditions of war, and therefore unworthy of confidence as to its health and permanence. But this is merely the quasi-objective condition of McCarthy's power. At one point Howe implies that "those who bear the burden of power," too, look to McCarthy. This is manifestly untrue. McCarthy's strength is neither dependent upon the Republican Party nor, as the writers of the *Monthly Review* have it, upon the new Texas millionaires. It is due to his cold appraisal of the needs of the politically and socially reactionary forces in this country. For them the issue of Communism, not of international but of the allegedly *internal* threat of Communism, is providing the means to gradually straitjacket labor, to streamline the press and other organs of communication, to "clean out" the schools and universities, even the churches, and, generally, to wage a quietly efficient war against all actual or potential opponents. However, they would rather do it Brownell's than McCarthy's way. McCarthy knows this, but he knows, too, that to eliminate him, to eradicate McCarthyism, would mean to put the threat of Communism, internal or external, into an entirely different perspective—a perspective of which even conservative Americans, like Acheson and Telford Taylor, have proved capable. To do this, however, would deprive the Brownells of the motivation for their incursions upon civil liberties, it would necessarily blunt the edge of the reactionary attack and would undoubtedly precipitate a political realignment. Hence the forever faltering efforts to weaken McCarthy, the moral decrepitude of most of his Republican and many of his Democratic opponents. The price for this, to be sure, is great. As Howe indicates, it makes the rational conduct of foreign affairs impossible. It is probably no exaggeration to say that while a progressive social policy in foreign affairs is anyway excluded by the nature of American national interests as interpreted by the present powers in Washington, McCarthyism prevents even the rational pursuit of these interests by means of negotiations, agreements, etc.

HERE I COME TO THE SECOND POINT in Howe's article which I wish to discuss. Recognizing, though without the necessary explicitness, America's inability to institute the kind of foreign policies which would check the advance of Communism and encourage social democracy, i.e., huge investment grants, etc., he pleads for negotiations and at least temporary accommodations, so that time might be gained to grope for solutions.

However, *in the absence* of the policies suggested by Howe, *in the absence* of the active political struggle against Communism which he and a large body of liberals have in mind, time is *against* America. As Geneva has proved, as another Berlin conference—if the U. S. consents to one, which I doubt—would prove, negotiations favor the Soviet bloc, not because the Russians and Chinese are better diplomats than the Americans but because their diplomacy proceeds from a *policy*. True, even Secretary Wilson conceded that the defeat in Indochina was due “95 per cent” to political factors; and, belatedly, the State Department has begun to emphasize economic measures. But this makes only more transparent that the considerations of U. S. foreign policy are essentially military and will remain so, and this means continued support to everything that is most reactionary in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Negotiations, by gaining time for the Soviet bloc, will also gain time for the undermining of these reactionary regimes, for a more total and efficient domination by Communists of indigenous radical movements, thus making overseas bases, and military personnel furnished by U. S. allies, slowly but surely and “peacefully” ineffective against the day when they might be needed.

It is thus illusory to count on negotiations and agreements concerned not with national boundaries, naval quotas and similar matters of a bygone age, but the fate of entire populations to whose vital interests such negotiations, in order to have meaning and a degree of permanence, must somehow be relevant. This “somehow,” as regards American policies, is utterly lacking.

If thus the nature of American society as it exists today precludes a progressive foreign policy and if (due to this fact) negotiations, too, will prove futile—what of the future? The future does not, of course, depend upon America alone. There will unquestionably be upheavals within the Soviet bloc, within Russia itself perhaps; the changes which these would bring cannot be predicted, but the strong desire for stability which undoubtedly exists in Russia (though possibly not in China) and America may bring a new “Roosevelt-Stalin era” in which both would police their assigned parts of the world. This would, of course, further entrench reaction everywhere, producing stagnation and making universal the kind of brutal suppression characteristic of the Russian police state.

Thus, there is no future, not in “peace,” certainly not in war—unless and until the American people themselves rise to the stupendous tasks confronting them.

H. BRAND

BOOKS

A Political Biography

THE PROPHET ARMED (TROTSKY: 1879-1921), by Isaac Deutscher. Oxford University Press, New York. 528 pp. \$6.

Stalin is "waiting in the wings" as Mr. Deutscher concludes this first half of what is to be a two-volume biography of Leon Trotsky. It is the year 1921. The revolution has, by fair means or foul, weathered a series of wracking trials; and it is plunging into others which will witness its destruction in the triumph of absolute dictatorship. The leaders of the revolution are still its heroes—Lenin, Trotsky, their colleagues. Having held onto victory against fantastic odds, they and the revolution with them, will perish—Lenin dying in 1924, fearful of bureaucratism's menace; the others, most of them, victims of assassination at the hands of the "committee man." Significantly, too, it is the year in which the Bolshevik Party, with whatever misgivings, outlaws oppositional groupings. Calling his last chapter "Defeat in Victory," Mr. Deutscher closes the book at this point, with the introduction of the New Economic Policy and the suppression of the Workers' Opposition. A second volume, to be called "The Prophet Unarmed," will conclude the biography.

On the face of it, the biographer has planned his structure exceedingly well. Yet a multitude of questions nag their way into mind, and they compel suspension of a full discussion of this study until the appearance of its second half. There is no question that Mr. Deutscher has performed a prodigious job of research and presentation. It is difficult to imagine that any future biographer will unearth significant material on Trotsky's life that Mr. Deutscher has overlooked, or supersede this volume in breadth.

Trotsky was, as Mr. Deutscher details,

one of the literary giants of our times. He wrote extensively on subjects ranging from poetry to military science, and wrote with consummate skill. His autobiography, *My Life*, and the monumental *History of the Russian Revolution*, to mention but two particularly relevant works, are masterpieces in their respective genres. Inevitably, comparison with Trotsky's own abundant work suggests itself. Yet it is a measure of Mr. Deutscher's achievement that his work is fresh, a tribute to scholarship and objectivity. Neither idolatrous, nor carpingly critical, Mr. Deutscher explores every facet of Trotsky's development and genius against the background of Russia's revolutionary movement. Though the prevailing tone of the book is admiration and respect, there is no effort to conceal or minimize what are in his view failings. Mr. Deutscher is steeped in the knowledge of his material. Inasmuch as Trotsky has been vilified more, perhaps, than any man in history, *The Prophet Armed* commends itself if only in the respect that it sets the record straight. It commends itself further in that, as against the spate of books which in recent years have labored and distorted the revolution, its ideals and its heroes, it is written in sympathy with the revolution.

Mr. Deutscher is no novice, lately come to his subject. He is presumably a Marxist and certainly an avowed socialist. Yet it is precisely here that the "nagging" interposes itself, for it is questionable whether *The Prophet Armed* does socialism or, for that matter, Trotsky, honor. In a sense it is the very thoroughness of the book that is its undoing.

Essentially, *The Prophet Armed* is a political biography, though the personal facts of Trotsky's life are fully presented (in greater detail in many respects than in *My Life*.) Pages upon pages present Trotsky's agreements and disagreements with Lenin and Martov and Plekhanov in the first decade of this century, and their further agreements and disagreements in the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. Mr. Deutscher appraises the disputes and "takes sides"—often with Trotsky, sometimes against him. That the reader may not concur in these judgments is not of special importance. What does seem important, however, are (a) an empirical emphasis that seems to hand the decision to success (it worked—hence it must be right); and, far more important (b) the omissions—the disputes, issues and events which are so badly skimped, minimized or "compromised" as to undermine what is valuable in the book.

We have the right to demand of the socialist historian that he critically evaluate the Russian Revolution with the vision of retrospect. Surely, the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly warranted a critique, favorable or otherwise, as extensive as the machinations of the *Pravda* editorial board in 1902. Surely, the decision of the Tenth Party Congress to outlaw factions merited substantially fuller discussion than Trotsky's 18-year-old philippics. Mr. Deutscher notes that the decision to outlaw factions set the stage for the dictator "waiting in the wings." But there is a curiously sanguine "resignation" about it—are we to conclude in the next installment that it was awful, terrible, but it "worked"? Similarly the differences between Lenin and Trotsky on the World War, and on the nature of the revolutionary dictatorship, are glossed over in the solidarity effected in the revolution itself (which is brilliantly and excitingly presented). Trotsky, in his years of exile, returned to all of these issues (as well as others, like Kronstadt) and defended, by and large, the acts of the revolution. Right or wrong, he felt they commanded the interest (and examination) of socialists.

I do not mean to suggest that Mr. Deutscher should have written a book

that he did not intend to write. Nor that he should have joined the pack which can't see the Russian Revolution for the Constituent Assembly. In the pattern of the book, only those events and disputes in which Trotsky was a direct participant are generally given full attention. Which may be a fault, but is certainly the prerogative of the author. Nevertheless, *The Prophet Armed* is a political biography, and the choice of what to include, what to omit, what to compress, what to elaborate, must necessarily have political meaning. In fairness to Mr. Deutscher, we must judge the book under discussion on its own terms and not with the consciousness of his views on other matters with which we may disagree (see Mr. Deutscher's article in the last issue of DISSENT). It may well be that I am reading into this book what is not there, nor meant to be there. Yet, however quietly or indirectly, these views, or their basis, intrude themselves.

In his introduction to the book, Mr. Deutscher explains the source of his title in Machiavelli's *The Prince* ("all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been destroyed"). He then doubts whether the distinction between the armed and unarmed prophet, "the difference between conquest and destruction," is always as clear as it was to Machiavelli. "And when next the Prophet Unarmed is contemplated," he writes, "the question will arise whether a strong element of victory was not concealed in his very defeat." The present volume undermines its own virtues precisely to the extent that an affirmative answer is discernible.

E. GELTMAN

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Trade Unions and Democracy

THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN TRADE UNIONS: A THEORETICAL STATEMENT, by Seymour Martin Lipset. (A Chapter in *Freedom and Control in Modern Society*. Edited by Morroe Berger, Theodore Abel and Charles H. Page. 326 pp. Van Nostrand. \$4.50.)

"A country that has a totalitarian government operates like our union operates." In these words, delivered at the 1947 convention of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Harry Bridges made no bones about admitting that his union is a dictatorial, one-party organization. Most labor leaders are not that honest. In fact most labor leaders are probably not aware that the majority of unions are more like one-party states than like genuinely democratic organizations.

What is there about unions that drives them toward dictatorial control? An answer to this question calls for a careful study of such factors as the internal structure of unions, status level of union members, leadership traits, and a union's need to adjust to the industry with which it bargains. Examining these factors, Seymour Martin Lipset, a professor of sociology at Columbia University, comes up with a list of propositions which he believes should be tested by further careful research.

Defining bureaucracy as ". . . a system of rational (predictable) organization," Lipset points out that unions are compelled by their collective bargaining role to develop bureaucratic structures. As a union grows and multiplies its activities, the bureaucratic apparatus expands and becomes more intricate. In big unions, collective bargaining becomes a complicated affair, requiring the attention, not only of the elected officials, but also of research workers, statisticians, time study engineers, experts on pensions, social security and industrial hygiene. Moreover, many industrial and quasi-industrial unions have administrative departments to handle education, recreation, political action, workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, and public relations. In time, a complex of administrative agencies and personnel becomes formalized and evolves by a kind of

inner logic of its own. Master-minding the apparatus is an elite of specialists and technicians under the command of the top officialdom.

Along with increasing specialization of function goes centralization of control. The corporation with which a large union deals is highly centralized, and the union cannot escape the need for coming to terms with that kind of centralization. More centralization means increased bureaucratic control, since in return for granting seniority, pensions, improvement factors and other such security benefits, a corporation demands "union responsibility," meaning freedom from wildcat strikes, strict adherence to contract terms, and uniformity in local practices. To achieve the needed centralization for efficient bargaining with large corporations, union officials must press for mechanisms designed to assure standard procedures. In the process of making the union "responsible," the officialdom gathers more power in its collective hands, exercises increasing authority over subordinate bodies, and cracks down on local opposition elements. As a case in point, Lipset cites how the UAW recently gave its international executive board the right to suspend officials of local unions for violating international policies. Though this move was defended as necessary for successful contract negotiations, Lipset suggests it had the added effect of strengthening the hands of international officials over local opposition.

How do we test whether internal democracy exists in a union? Lipset quotes from *The UAW and Walter Reuther*, by Irving Howe and B. J. Widick:

There is one decisive proof of democracy in a union (or any other institution): oppositionists have the right to organize freely into "parties," to set up factional machines, to circulate publicity and to propagandize among the

members. . . . The presence of an opposition . . . is the best way of insuring that a union's democratic structure will be preserved. . . . To defend the right of factions to exist is not at all to applaud this or that faction. But this is the overhead (well worth paying) of democracy: groups one considers detrimental to the union's interest will be formed. The alternative is dictatorship.

By this test the UAW is still far from being a one-party organization. But to Lipset it is the *trend* that counts, and he believes that any constitutional clause which strengthens the international executive board of a large union over its local bodies signifies a drift away from democracy. One could suggest many current developments in the trade union movement which might be studied to test Lipset's hypothesis. What, for example, happens to democracy when unions like the CIO Oil Workers propose including in their draft constitutions a provision which would penalize a member who "wrongfully" criticizes any decision made by an officer of the organization? Or what happens when a union like the AFL's Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters condemns the right of members to petition for redress inside the union and bans caucus meetings as unconstitutional? And why couldn't the set of hypotheses posed by Lipset be tested by an intensive study of specific union constitutions, by-laws and organizational procedures, beginning, say, with the steelworkers union?

Lipset is careful to point out that the degree of bureaucratization varies from union to union according to the nature of the industry, the union's history and background, and even such chance factors as the traits of high-ranking leaders. Examining with a fresh eye the theory that "the greater the bureaucratization of an organization the less potential within it for membership influence over policy formation," Lipset shows how, once in control of the administrative machinery, the ruling group takes over communication, clamps down on the union press, and exacts conformity from field staff members on penalty of stopping their pay checks.

The leadership of a bureaucratic union also tends to monopolize the political skills needed to run the organization. The chief training ground for acquiring such skills is the union itself. By steady practice, leaders learn to speak before large groups, to negotiate with management, to write articles, reports, resolutions, to handle parliamentary strategy. It is true that some unions conduct so-called leadership training courses, but such courses are also carefully managed by the hierarchy, and serve to indoctrinate members with a barrage of official economics, politics, and policies—in short, with a "line." Secondary leaders who aspire to climb the union success ladder know what is expected of them and take care to display only the attitudes that meet with approval from above. Once the union apparatus is fairly well stratified, however, the opportunity for secondary and local leaders to climb diminishes progressively. "The average worker . . . has little opportunity or need to learn such skills. He rarely, if ever, is called upon to make a speech before a large group, to put his thoughts down in writing or to organize a group's activities. The officers' political skills within the union may therefore be suggested as one of the major factors which prevents the effective organization of opposition sentiment in labor organizations and which enables an incumbent administration to use its superior communicative skills to subdue or divert discontent," Lipset writes.

Noteworthy is Lipset's hypothesis that dictatorial unions usually reveal a wide gap between the status of rank-and-file workers and that of the leadership. Union officials enjoy a higher and more steady income; they move in better prestige circles, come in contact with other union officials, management representatives, even political figures. Freed from the dull routine of the assembly line, union officials lead a more varied and interesting life. In time they become an elite and have more in common with each other than they have with the rank and file union members. They develop a "class" interest in their administrative jobs, in the power they wield, and in their social prestige.

Actually, the union official leads, not

a working class life, but one more comparable to that of proprietors, managers and professionals. And he acquires middle-class mores, outlook and attitudes. Knowledge, skills, income, job control, "head" instead of "hand" work—these separate the union official from the workers who elected him. Eventually his high status legitimates his authority; he comes to justify his post on the grounds that he is most capable to perform it. Moreover, the rank and file union members support this high status, vote for the high salaries and for measures which help to formalize the power position of the officialdom.

If the position of the union leader in office is an enviable one, his place once ousted from office is hardly to be envied. Defeated for office, he cannot find another high status role within the union. If he goes back in the shop he must buck production—and what a come-down that is for an erstwhile labor leader! Out of the middle class and into the proletariat, he suffers from a deep sense of humiliation and failure. What is worse, "there is evidence that it is also perceived in this way by fellow workers," Lipset observes.

There are some unions—Lipset mentions the Newspaper Guild, Actors Equity, and the Typographical Union—in which the status gap between leaders and rank-and-file members is negligible; indeed the members of some of these unions often enjoy higher income and prestige than their officials do. Consequently, when an official fails of re-election he can return to his trade with little change in his style of living. This may account for the fact that in such unions unfettered participation and institutionalized opposition prevail.

The extent to which the leadership can control participation in union affairs varies from union to union. The degree of dictatorship tends to be greater in unions like the Steelworkers, which were organized from the top down, whereas in unions like the UAW, which resulted from the merger of large, strong, autonomous bodies, opposition gets built in from the start, and in the early stage offers fierce resistance to the attempt by any leadership clique to clamp down on democracy and to set up a dictatorship. One

has only to read the proceedings of successive UAW international conventions to see how, in such unions, the habits of democratic participation become stubborn cultural traits. Years of internecine warfare between contending factions mark their history, and even after one faction finally defeats its opponents and gains full control of the central apparatus, the democratic habits of voicing opposition die hard in locals. Years must go by and a long series of constitutional changes and organizational decrees must be enacted before subordinate bodies are shorn of all independence and transformed into obedient creatures of the administration.

Lipset makes clear that when a union is dictatorial the reason is not that the leaders are dictators by nature. Rejecting the "great man theory," he holds that a multiplicity of elements interact to make a given union what it is. History, tradition, type of community, nature of the industry, size of the union, state of the market, occupational status of the members—the interaction of these factors exert more force in shaping a leader than the leader can exert in making the union what he thinks it ought to be.

Lipset distinguishes between two types of union leaders: 1) the career leader or official who knows that no other career is open to him which affords a comparable income, congenial work and social status, and who therefore regards his office as a vehicle to advance his personal welfare; and 2) the leader committed to a social ideal that means more to him than material rewards. Usually the latter passes through an evolution, beginning as an idealist and ending up as a "practical" man. This transformation reveals the limitations of the labor leader as leader. If the idealistic views he began with are far in advance of those of the membership, he has to compromise his ideals in order to stay in power, and adjust his policies to the framework in which he operates. This does not mean that the committed leader does this deliberately; this adjustment is rationalized in the context of the day-to-day policies of the union. As Lipset points out, "many socialists who are now trade union leaders still attempt to explain and

justify many of their actions as being consistent with a socialist or left-democratic goal . . ." The conviction that he acts always in the workers' best interests gives the "committed" leader a feeling of self-righteousness which easily becomes ruthlessness in defense of his power. Because in large unions such leaders require a mass base, they institute a system of "education" to convert as many workers as possible to the official viewpoint. "Democracy" thus becomes understood to mean only this kind of controlled education and participation. But even controlled democracy can sometimes get out of hand and shake the apparatus from top to bottom. For there comes a time when the leadership's performance falls far short of its promises; it can't deliver, and the ranks become restive. Such a crisis situation, brought on by a disastrous strike, mass unemployment or sweeping technological changes, brings to the fore secondary leaders who still take their ideology seriously, with a new program to challenge the controlling group. Lipset suggests that the more diffuse and far-reaching a union's goals are, and the more it encourages participation—even if supervised—the greater the potential for internal opposition.

All in all, if Lipset's thesis is sound, the long-range chances for democracy in trade unions are not so good—and this goes even for those unions whose official rhetoric is replete with the word "democracy." Many of the propositions he asserts have been raised before, but by reformulating them and indicating how they might be tested by further research, he has made a genuine contribution to the study of what makes unions tick. Unfortunately, "The Political Process in Trade Unions" will probably share the fate of many other valuable studies of this kind, hidden away in a sociological tome few trade unionists will ever bother to read. Yet this is just the kind of paper that deserves to be read, studied and discussed far and wide in union circles.

As a way of testing the democratic spirit of the more progressive unions, ones with established educational programs, this reviewer offers the following suggestion:

Organize rank-and-file-discussion groups

and let them go to work on Lipset's thesis. Don't bring in any union officials or university professors to "lead" the discussion or "guide" the thinking, but allow the workers to explore the subject for themselves. Let them raise challenging questions, search out critical answers, make comparisons and test their own conclusions. This would be a democratic adventure in learning what democracy really is, and in working out yardsticks for measuring the degree of democracy in their own union. After acquiring a deeper insight into the causes that lead to dictatorship, such discussion groups could then investigate the problem of how to safeguard union democracy with the view to learning what methods, techniques, organizational devices, administrative checks and structural changes are necessary to make unions really democratic, or at least to slow down the trend toward crustification and bureaucratic blight.

For if enough members learn what democracy means and become inspired with the will to fight for it, no iron law of oligarchy can over-ride union affairs.

FRANK MARQUART

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CORRESPONDENCE

Ends and Means

Editors:

David Sachs' article "On Ends Justifying Means" (DISSENT No. 2) seems to me to have treated too lightly certain ethical questions which have long been a source of division in radical movements. Western Socialism has been characterized by a libertarianism and a humanism which have been seldom equalled in other ideologies of the culture; socialists have often considered human freedom to be the highest value to be striven for and have decried all attempts to devalue the individual human personality by treating it as instrumental and as an expendable quantity. It is perfectly obvious that the existence of the state is incompatible with the realization of these values. For the state is at least that institution "which possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence"; it always means the organized constraint of individuals, the suppression of freedom, the systematization of murder, and the abandonment of human love and sympathy as principles of organization. If we accept the state we must, in a sense, accept this. Those who possess an "ethic of ultimate ends," who believe that the good cannot be obtained by the institutionalization of evil, cannot do this and must always to an extent oppose the state. And such persons have always been of importance in radical movements.

An ethic of ultimate ends is properly opposed in politics by an "ethic of responsibility." (The distinction is made by Max Weber in an essay which can be recommended to all libertarian socialists, "Politics as a Vocation," which is reprinted in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by Gerth and Mills.) If we believe that the crucial evaluation of our actions is to be found in an examination of their effects tomorrow, if we accept responsibility for the effects of our day-to-day actions, we cannot be so much concerned with responsibility for the natures of the actions themselves. Then our views concerning the state will be different. Then we must realize that any abandonment of power,

state power included, means a rejection of responsibility. And then politics becomes of great relevance, and with it compromise, expediency, and a sharing in the responsibility for the evils committed by the state.

In opposition to Mr. Sachs, I would hold that we must make the choice between the two ethics—and that most of us have chosen an ethic of responsibility. And this acceptance of the state is no light matter, it is not like a taxi-cab that one can take at one's will; it involves taking a share in administering a justice which is all too blind and taking part in a struggle for power which is often not to our tastes. (For example, I personally think it more or less follows from such an ethic and from the present state of affairs in the United States that socialists must give electoral support to something as inadequate as the Democratic party—even including Mr. Stevenson.) Furthermore, I think that a radical movement of thought must include and sympathize with those who choose the other course—the anarchists, the pacifists, and some of the religious thinkers—who are more "purely ethical" people. They can perhaps remind us that even for us there may come a time for saying no.

W. O. H.

It's a Free Country

Editors:

I have just seen your first issue (such things circulate slowly here in the provinces), and your apparently genuine eagerness for reader response prompts me to write. Let me put it to you straight: you provoke amusement, the kind of amusement that grown-ups experience in watching children at silly play. You scrawl your name across the top of the cover in the same print that youngsters scrawl dirty words on fences; and as if the childish air weren't enough, you scrawl your name again across the bottom, but this time to prove that you are also backward. I am not simply objecting to the way you write your name, but I do think it is significant in more ways than you realize.

The gist of your position seems to be: we ain't clean (like the 100% Ameri-

cans) and we ain't dirty (like the Stalinists), we're just slightly disheveled.

The sad part of it is that most of us honest liberals would really very much like to see the kind of America you envision—a socialist democracy. But we also realize that we certainly aren't going to have it! Or, if we are, going to get it, it won't be by talk, talk, talk, and brave breast-beating. And because we refuse to make martyrs of ourselves in hopeless action or spend our hours in the frustration of impotent talk, we are accused of being "former radicals who have signed their peace with the society as it is." Our days are taken up with doing our jobs, loving our families, visiting our friends, listening to music and reading good books, trying to make the best of what we have. That means voting for Stevenson, not because we are so

naive as to believe that Stevenson is going to bring us socialism, but because we have no other realistic choice; and it wouldn't help to get him elected by publicly proclaiming him the lesser of the only available two evils.

If that makes us crackpot realists, what practical or realistic program do you offer? You made it quite clear that for all practical purposes you are useless and impotent: "DISSENT is not and does not propose to become a political party or group"; that is, you don't propose to do anything at all, except take pot shots at all the intellectual liberals who refuse to join you in your paranoid moaning and groaning. Well, go ahead and raise your traditional banner of personal freedom—it's still a free country for wild talk, though not for calculated action.

JOHN V. HAGOPIAN

The Brass

"The only bearable thing in Olmütz is a first-class café with ice, newspapers, and good confectionery. Like everything else the service there is affected by the military system. When two or three generals—I can't help it, but they always remind me of parakeets, for mammals don't usually dress in such colors (save for the back parts of baboons)—sit down together, the whole troop of waiters surround them and nobody else exists for them. Once in despair I had to have recourse to swank. I grabbed one of them by the coat-tails and shouted, 'Look here, I might be a general sometime, so fetch me a glass of water.' That worked.

"An officer is a miserable creature. Each envies his colleagues, bullies his subordinates, and is afraid of his superiors; the higher up he is, the more he fears them. I detest the idea of having inscribed on my collar how much I am worth, as if I were a sample of some goods. And nevertheless the system has its gaps. The Commanding Officer was here recently from Brünn and went into the swimming baths, when I was astonished to observe that his trunks carried no marks of distinction!"

From a letter of Freud, quoted in *The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud*, by Ernest Jones.

AMONG OURSELVES

Among the new contributors to DISSENT in this issue: G. D. H. Cole, the famous British socialist, author of *What Marx Really Meant*, etc. Dennis Wrong, a sociologist who writes regularly for the *Canadian Forum*. Victor Alba, Spanish socialist and author of a history of the Spanish Republics as well as of a study of Latin American politics. Ben B. Seligman, an economist who has contributed to *The Jewish Frontier*, *Commentary* and other magazines. George Rawick, a graduate student in history.

The next issue will start our second year of our publication. We think it will be the best one thus far. For a listing of articles already on hand see our announcement on the back cover.

The number of regular readers keeps growing steadily; we now have a paid circulation of over 2,000 and hope to reach the 3,000 mark with this issue—provided our friends do a bit of hustling and get subscriptions, find newsstands and bookdealers willing to take the magazine. We now have a national distributor who will put DISSENT on any stand or bookshop desiring it. Just drop him a card with your request. See back cover for name and address.

AN INTERVIEW WITH SILONE

continued from page 306

What is the most important date in universal history?

The 25th of December in the year zero.

And in recent history?

June 17, 1953, when the East German workers mutinied.

Have you any opinions about the third World War?

It will provide the basis for the fourth one.

Whom do you admire most among military heroes?

Joshua in the act of stopping the sun, and the soldier Schweik.

Do you believe that progress is inevitable?

No.

Or that man is by nature a free agent?

I believe that man can be free.

Or that he is responsible for his acts?

To the extent that he is free.

Do you believe that man can conquer his destiny?

Yes, if he accepts it.

Have you any opinions about suicide?

It is one of the many things that I have never succeeded in understanding.

Do you believe there will ever be a perfect political order?

No.

Or in the possibility of perfect laws, institutions, and government?

No.

Or in a Christian State?

No, that would be a contradiction in terms.

Or in a Christian society?

The society in which love supplants law will be Christian.

What do you understand the socialist revolution to mean?

The doing away with those obstacles, social and economic, which restrict the liberty of mankind.

Suppose all that were realized, would men then be happy?

Not necessarily. The ancient ills of life would still be with us; new ones would arise.

Can there be liberty in a socialist state?

I think that in an epoch of monopolies no liberty is possible without taking a certain number of socialist measures.

As in Russia, for example?

Socialism does not exist in Russia but the very contrary, State Capitalism; no liberty, but the very opposite.

Do you think the intellectuals should play the role of guides?

No.

How do you appraise the maxim, "To be straight, always follow the working class"?

As a compass that has lost its usefulness. There is no longer a single road for the working class.

Is there not a definite direction for its majority?

According to the country in question, the majority of the working class is Laborite, Social-Democrat, Communist, Titoist, Syndicalist, Peronist, etc. To follow it always and to wherever it may lead is absurd.

Don't you think that there is something spontaneously progressive about the proletarian movement, providing there is no external coercion in its way?

Spontaneous, no.

In the long run what will finally decide its effective character?

The limitation imposed by given circumstances, the conscience of its members and of its leaders.

Are you a pessimist?

No.

Have you faith in man?

I have faith in that man who accepts suffering and transforms it into truth and moral courage. That is why at this moment I think of someone who might be making his way out of the tremendous polar night of the forced labor camps of Siberia—he could bring sight to the blind.

Someone? Who?

His name does not matter.

(“Preguntas y Resuestas,” *Cuadernos*, VI, May-June 1954.
Translated by BERTRAM D. SARASON).

In Future Issues of DISSENT:

- George Woodcock—*Proudhon, a Re-evaluation*
Benno Sarel—*Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin*
Albert Mathiez—*Jacobinism and Bolshevism*
Leo Koefler—*Marxism and Christian Eschatology*
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